drug test in Utah

2025Friend observed that Sandy was “upset,” “crying,” 20210565-CA 5 2025 UT App 165 State v. Richey “kind of confused,” “a little discombobulated,” and “visibly a little groggy,” so he suggested that Sandy take a drug test.

2023Technician stated that he performed the confirmation test ten minutes after the first, but Technician’s supervisor testified that it was eleven minutes later, presumably based on the machine’s recalled results. 20220187-CA 3 2023 UT App 46 Brindley v. Logan City next day for Logan’s Safety Officer (Safety Officer), showing a BAC of .017. ¶5 The Handbook specifies that “[a]n employee who has tested positive on a drug test and is allowed to return to work and who receives a positive result on any subsequent drug test will be terminated.” Logan City Employee Handbook § 15-02(2)(b) (revised Nov. 2

2023I’d like to make sure that Cassandra is complying with everything, and that she’s able to do what she needs to do.” It further stated, “So I would like to do that as quickly as possible, [Counsel], but I don’t know how long of a period it’s going to take because it will also depend on whether or 20210506-CA 7 2023 UT App 103 John v. John not your client is able to do everything that’s required.

2022The court gave Bowers sole physical custody of Daughter, established dates for Burkhart to have supervised parent-time, and created a visitation schedule for Burkhart that would start after he completed a drug test, an anger management course, and a 20210276-CA 2 2022 UT App 132 Bowers v. Burkhart parenting course.

2022Here, though AP&P initially took Samples to jail after he failed the drug test, Samples was taken to prison while awaiting trial because of a parole violation. 20200537-CA 13 2022 UT App 125 State v. Samples to do.

2022Investigator said that when he asked Father about Mother’s drug use, Father “claimed that he didn’t know anything that was going on with her.” Investigator further testified that when he asked to see the trailer where police had found drug paraphernalia, Father “den[ied him] access.” Investigator said that Father also initially “claimed it wasn’t his trailer . . . and that just no one goes in it.” But when Investigator pressed, Father “admitted that he goes inside to smoke cigarettes.” Investigator said that he asked Father to take a drug test but that Father “declined.” Finally, Investigator

2020Hutchinson’s parole agent observed that Hutchinson “was under the influence of drugs due to his accelerated and involuntary body movement.” After questioning, Hutchinson admitted to recently using both heroin and methamphetamine, and he was unable to produce a sample 20180413-CA 6 2020 UT App 10 State v. Hutchinson for a drug test.

2017He is catching up on grade 20170094-CA 3 2017 UT App 57 In re B.J.V. level work, he is playing sports in extra-curricular activities, the home is clean, meets safety standards and the case worker had no concerns about the parent child relationship or the care [B.J.V.] was receiving from his father.

2017This qualified privilege effectively precludes Bahnmaier from recovering damages for defamatory statements unless she can show an abuse of the privilege by demonstrating that Rytting “(1) made a, defamatory statement knowing it to be false or (2) acted in reckless disregard as to its falsity.” See Ferguson v, Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, ¶¶ 27-28 , 221 P.3d 205 . ¶ 25 Bahnmaier asserts that her deposition testimony that she did not tell Ryt-ting she would not pass a drug test raises a question of fact as to whether Rytting either knew that her statement to Petersen was false or acted in

2017This qualified privilege effectively precludes Bahnmaier from recovering damages for defamatory statements unless she can show an abuse of the privilege by demonstrating that Rytting “(1) made a, defamatory statement knowing it to be false or (2) acted in reckless disregard as to its falsity.” See Ferguson v, Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, ¶¶ 27-28 , 221 P.3d 205 . ¶ 25 Bahnmaier asserts that her deposition testimony that she did not tell Ryt-ting she would not pass a drug test raises a question of fact as to whether Rytting either knew that her statement to Petersen was false or acted in

2017Although employee manuals or statements of policy may be sufficient to create an implied contract, “Utah law allows employers to disclaim any contractual relationship that might otherwise arise from employee manuals.” Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2014 UT 56, ¶25 , 345 P.3d 523 . “[A] clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter of law, prevents employee manuals or other like material from being considered as implied-in-fact contract terms.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Although employee manuals or statements of policy may be sufficient to create an implied contract, “Utah law allows employers to disclaim any contractual relationship that might otherwise arise from employee manuals.” Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2014 UT 56, ¶25 , 345 P.3d 523 . “[A] clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter of law, prevents employee manuals or other like material from being considered as implied-in-fact contract terms.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Although employee manuals or statements of policy may be sufficient to create an implied contract, “Utah law allows employers to disclaim any contractual relationship that might otherwise arise from employee manuals.” Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2014 UT 56, ¶25 , 345 P.3d 523 . “[A] clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter of law, prevents employee manuals or other like material from being considered as implied-in-fact contract terms.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2014Duran now argues that he was unconstitutionally seized because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a drug violation when he detained Duran in front of the police car. ¶ 4 Certainly “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures ‘extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.’ ” State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 10 , 112 P.3d 507 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)).

2014Duran now argues that he was unconstitutionally seized because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a drug violation when he detained Duran in front of the police car. ¶ 4 Certainly “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures ‘extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.’ ” State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 10 , 112 P.3d 507 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)).

2014When Westminster identified Fowler's drug test and Teynor's interpretation of the test results as its legitimate reason for firing Fowler, the burden shifted back to Fowler to prove that Westminster's "proferred reason [was] in fact a pretext designed to mask discrimination." See id. 116 Fowler successfully carried his burdens in the federal litigation, as the jury expressly found that Westminster's alleged reliance on the drug test was a "pretext for discrimination against Mr. Fowler based on his disability." The jury's pretext finding determined that Westminster did not terminate Fowler's em

2014Duran now argues that he was unconstitutionally seized because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a drug violation when he detained Duran in front of the police car. ¶ 4 Certainly “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures ‘extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.’ ” State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 10 , 112 P.3d 507 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)).

2014Duran now argues that he was unconstitutionally seized because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a drug violation when he detained Duran in front of the police car. ¶ 4 Certainly “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures ‘extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.’ ” State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 10 , 112 P.3d 507 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)).

2014Cf. Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 UT App 326, ¶¶ 15-16 , 142 P.3d 594 (concluding that an issue "was not completely and fully litigated" when it "was not the central issue in the [prior litigation], and was only superficially addressed").

2014Cf. Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 UT App 326, ¶¶ 15-16 , 142 P.3d 594 (concluding that an issue "was not completely and fully litigated" when it "was not the central issue in the [prior litigation], and was only superficially addressed").