Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
23 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: L.S. (Minor Child), and A.S. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Servicesgreen2 sentences2019See Matter of L.S., 125 N.E.3d 628, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“ . . . [The drug test results] were inadmissible as hearsay and should not have been admitted . . . .”); see In re K.R., 133 N.E.3d 754 , 762 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1727 | December 31, 2019 Page 14 of 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[W]e conclude that drug test results do indeed fit into the business records exception to the hearsay rule.”). [26] During DCS’s investigation, Mother submitted to an oral fluid screen. 2019R. 803(6). [29] In In re L.S., 125 N.E.3d 628, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), this court held that the drug test reports were not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule because, even though an affidavit of the laboratory director stated that the reports were maintained in the normal course of business activity, the laboratory did not depend on the reports to operate or conduct its business. | 2 | 4 |
In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.T.green2 sentences2019The reports, which described the agency’s impressions following home visits and supervised visits, “included third-party statements concerning events not observed by [SCAN’s] staff Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1727 | December 31, 2019 Page 17 of 18 members” and “conclusory lay opinions”; “appeared to have been compiled for the sole benefit of DCS,” which was also SCAN’s sole source of referrals; and did not appear to “ha[ve] been prepared for the systematic conduct of [SCAN].” K.R., 133 N.E.3d at 761 (citing E.T., 808 N.E.2d at 642-43 ). [29] The K.R. panel contrast 2019In rejecting the parents’ argument that the drug test results did not fit within the business records exception to the hearsay rule, the K.R. panel distinguished the circumstances surrounding the admission of the parents’ drug test results from the circumstances surrounding the admission of a social services agency’s reports in Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of E.T., 808 N.E.2d 639, 642-43 (Ind. 2004). [28] In E.T., our Supreme Court found that reports generated by nonprofit SCAN, Inc., a social services agency, did not qualify as business records within the meaning of the business r | 1 | 3 |
E.W. v. J.W.green1 sentence2020See E.W. v. J.W., 20 N.E.3d 889, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Mother did not appear for the drug test, and the trial court presumed Mother’s nonattendance meant that she would have tested positive.”). | 1 | 1 |
Andrew Wann v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2015Wann, 997 N.E.2d 1103, 1105-1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (probation officer’s hearsay testimony and the Redwood Toxicology Laboratory report were substantially trustworthy after officer testified to the administration, handling and transmission of the drug screen), reh’g denied. [10] Here, Benham had already admitted violating her probation by ingesting banned substances including heroin. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Williams, 714 N.E.2d at 652 (holding that excluded testimony was unlikely to have weighed appreciably in the defendant’s favor in light of the DNA and other evidence that connected him to the crime and that the exclusion of certain testimony was harmless error). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 770749green1 sentence2013See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 578 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that “the Board’s Zero Tolerance Policy would surely be irrational if it subjects to punishment students who did not knowingly or consciously possess a weapon”). 3 Because the Parkers’ waived their due process claim related to the “final and binding” provision of the Handbook, we need not address their inability to obtain an independent drug test or whether they had a constitutionally protected property interest. 19 Hinterlong, No. 2-09-050-CV, 2010 WL 522641 *2. | 1 | 1 |
Jeff Strachan and Annette Gaspard v. Union Oil Companygreen1 sentence1995Accordingly, we conclude that Jobes' state law claims are inextricably intertwined with an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement, and are thus preempted by Section 301. 5 See also Utility Workers of America, Local No. 246 v. Southern California Edison Co. (1988), 9th Cir., 852 F.2d 1083, 1087 (California state constitutional challenges to employer's drug testing program preempted by Section 301); Strachan v. Union Oi Co. (1985), 5th Cir., 768 F.2d 703, 704-705 (state tort law claims arising out of suspension and testing of employees whom the employer suspected of drug use and mental | 1 | 1 |
Utility Workers of America, Local No. 246, Afl-Cio Jeanette Cintron Alan Rook, Cross-Appellees v. Southern California Edison Company, Crossgreen1 sentence1995Accordingly, we conclude that Jobes' state law claims are inextricably intertwined with an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement, and are thus preempted by Section 301. 5 See also Utility Workers of America, Local No. 246 v. Southern California Edison Co. (1988), 9th Cir., 852 F.2d 1083, 1087 (California state constitutional challenges to employer's drug testing program preempted by Section 301); Strachan v. Union Oi Co. (1985), 5th Cir., 768 F.2d 703, 704-705 (state tort law claims arising out of suspension and testing of employees whom the employer suspected of drug use and mental | 1 | 1 |
Johnny Lee Jackson v. Daryl Gates City of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence1993See Jackson v. Gates (9th Cir.1992), 975 F.2d 648, 652-53 ; Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker (3rd Cir.1989), 868 F.2d 74 , 77; Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't (3rd Cir.1988), 840 F.2d 1139 , 1147, cer. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 , 109 S.Ct. 1636 , 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989) McDonell v. Hunter (8th Cir.1987), 809 F.2d 1302 , 1309; Bonks v. Dep't of Public Safety and Corrections (1992), La.App., 598 So.2d 515, 518 . 4 In *864 this case, because the Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Department had no procedure, Sheriff Hamner needed a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use before he cou | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reyes v. State
green
2 sentences2018In this test, the trial court must determine whether the evidence reaches a certain level of reliability—i.e., whether it has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness—in order to be considered at a probation revocation hearing. 868 N.E.2d at 441 . [11] Reed cites the substantial trustworthiness test and argues that the trial court should not have admitted Weeks’ testimony regarding the drug test results, the counseling, and the victim impact panel. 2010This scientific opinion was determinative in that case because Reyes had already failed a drug test and the court had already revoked his probation, but the court gave him an opportunity to serve only half of his previously-suspended sentence "[ilf no new drug appeared when the second urine sample was tested, and if the level of marijuana did not come back higher than in the first test. ..." Id. | 2 | 2010–2018 |
Pope v. State
green
2 sentences2016We observed that “Pope was Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1508-CR-1228 | March 17, 2016 Page 5 of 9 impeded in her defense” in that she “sought an independent drug test promptly after being informed of the allegations against her.” Id. [B]ecause she received no notice of these allegations and was summarily returned to jail, [the defendant] was unable to get an independent drug screen until several weeks later. 2012But we observed that “Pope was impeded in her defense” in that she “sought an independent drug test promptly after being informed of the allegations against her.” Id. at 973 . | 2 | 2012–2016 |
In Re GAULT
green
2 sentences2010The legal authority which S.W. cites to develop this argument is Indiana Code section 31-37-8-4 and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). 2010The legal authority which S.W. cites to develop this argument is Indiana Code section 31-37-8-4 and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
CS v. State
green
1 sentence2019Id. [18] In the instant matter, the hearings held by the trial court on March 13 and March 16, 2018, combined, comport with the "fundamental fairness" required in juvenile delinquency proceedings. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of: B.H. & B.H. (Minor Children), and T.H. (Mother) v. The Indiana Dept. of Child Services
green
1 sentence2019B.H., 989 N.E.2d at 360 . [31] The drug test results at issue here show that Mother tested positive for cocaine and marijuana four times. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Marsh v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. [12] In this case, the trial court revoked Ruffin’s probation after he was terminated from the ReEntry Court Program for failing to attend his appointments as instructed and for failing a drug test. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Curtis L. Bass v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Oman v. State
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Harvey v. State
green
2 sentences2002Id. 2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Anderson Community School Corp. v. Willis ex rel. Willis
green
2 sentences2000Corp. (1998) 7th Cir., 158 F.3d 415 , cert. denied (1999) 526 U.S. 1019 , 119 S.Ct. 1254 , 143 L.Ed.2d 351 . 2000Corp. (1998) 7th Cir., 158 F.3d 415 , cert. denied (1999) 526 U.S. 1019 , 119 S.Ct. 1254 , 143 L.Ed.2d 351 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad
green
2 sentences2000Corp. (1998) 7th Cir., 158 F.3d 415 , cert. denied (1999) 526 U.S. 1019 , 119 S.Ct. 1254 , 143 L.Ed.2d 351 . 2000Corp. (1998) 7th Cir., 158 F.3d 415 , cert. denied (1999) 526 U.S. 1019 , 119 S.Ct. 1254 , 143 L.Ed.2d 351 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Gold v. Harrison
green
2 sentences2000Corp. (1998) 7th Cir., 158 F.3d 415 , cert. denied (1999) 526 U.S. 1019 , 119 S.Ct. 1254 , 143 L.Ed.2d 351 . 2000Corp. (1998) 7th Cir., 158 F.3d 415 , cert. denied (1999) 526 U.S. 1019 , 119 S.Ct. 1254 , 143 L.Ed.2d 351 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.
green
2 sentences2000Oman does not dispute that reasonable cause existed for Michigan City's request that he submit to a drug test after he was involved in "an accident" as the driver of one of two fire trucks that collided en route to a fire call. [21] Justice Kennedy explained in Von Raab : As we note[d] in [ Skinner ], our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warran 2000Oman does not dispute that reasonable cause existed for Michigan City's request that he submit to a drug test after he was involved in "an accident" as the driver of one of two fire trucks that collided en route to a fire call. [21] Justice Kennedy explained in Von Raab : As we note[d] in [ Skinner ], our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warran | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Chandler v. Miller
green
2 sentences2000The Court reasoned that the requirement did not fit within the “closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.” Id. at 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 . 2000The Court reasoned that the requirement did not fit within the “closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.” Id. at 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Oman v. State
green
2 sentences2000Oman v. State, 707 N.E.2d 325 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). 2000Oman v. State, 707 N.E.2d 325 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
James Randall Willis Ii, by His Next Friend and Father, James Randall Willis v. Anderson Community School Corporation
green
2 sentences2000Corp. (1998) 7th Cir., 158 F.3d 415 , cert. denied (1999) 526 U.S. 1019 , 119 S.Ct. 1254 , 143 L.Ed.2d 351 . 2000Corp. (1998) 7th Cir., 158 F.3d 415 , cert. denied (1999) 526 U.S. 1019 , 119 S.Ct. 1254 , 143 L.Ed.2d 351 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Garcia v. State
green
1 sentence1998I.C. § 6-7-3-5; Garcia, 686 N.E.2d at 885 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Angela Schlacter-Jones v. General Telephone of California Patricia Leathers Carol Todd Doug Bartrip
green
1 sentence1995Whether Jobes was improperly required to submit to a drug test is inextricably intertwined with management's control and regulation of the terms and conditions of her employment. 6 Schlacter-Jones, supra. Because Jobes' claims are inseparable from the parties' rights and obligations under the collective bargaining agreement, they are preempted by Section 301. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Banks v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr.
green
1 sentence1993See Jackson v. Gates (9th Cir.1992), 975 F.2d 648, 652-53 ; Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker (3rd Cir.1989), 868 F.2d 74 , 77; Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't (3rd Cir.1988), 840 F.2d 1139 , 1147, cer. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 , 109 S.Ct. 1636 , 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989) McDonell v. Hunter (8th Cir.1987), 809 F.2d 1302 , 1309; Bonks v. Dep't of Public Safety and Corrections (1992), La.App., 598 So.2d 515, 518 . 4 In *864 this case, because the Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Department had no procedure, Sheriff Hamner needed a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use before he cou | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department
green
1 sentence1993See Jackson v. Gates (9th Cir.1992), 975 F.2d 648, 652-53 ; Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker (3rd Cir.1989), 868 F.2d 74 , 77; Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't (3rd Cir.1988), 840 F.2d 1139 , 1147, cer. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 , 109 S.Ct. 1636 , 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989) McDonell v. Hunter (8th Cir.1987), 809 F.2d 1302 , 1309; Bonks v. Dep't of Public Safety and Corrections (1992), La.App., 598 So.2d 515, 518 . 4 In *864 this case, because the Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Department had no procedure, Sheriff Hamner needed a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use before he cou | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Mcdonell v. Hunter
green
1 sentence1993See Jackson v. Gates (9th Cir.1992), 975 F.2d 648, 652-53 ; Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker (3rd Cir.1989), 868 F.2d 74 , 77; Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't (3rd Cir.1988), 840 F.2d 1139 , 1147, cer. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 , 109 S.Ct. 1636 , 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989) McDonell v. Hunter (8th Cir.1987), 809 F.2d 1302 , 1309; Bonks v. Dep't of Public Safety and Corrections (1992), La.App., 598 So.2d 515, 518 . 4 In *864 this case, because the Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Department had no procedure, Sheriff Hamner needed a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use before he cou | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Fraternal Order Of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Kevin M. Tucker green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| In re McDonald green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Federal Savings & Loan Insurance v. Murdock-SC Associates green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.