drug test in Connecticut

2021Id., 308 .

2018With respect to the right to confrontation, defense counsel argued that admitting Amanti's testimony concerning the results of the drug test violated the defendant's right to confrontation as explicated by the Supreme Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico , 564 U.S. 647 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). 6 The prosecutor responded that Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) 7 and its progeny do not apply to probation revocation hearings.

2018With respect to the right to confrontation, defense counsel argued that admitting Amanti's testimony concerning the results of the drug test violated the defendant's right to confrontation as explicated by the Supreme Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico , 564 U.S. 647 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). 6 The prosecutor responded that Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) 7 and its progeny do not apply to probation revocation hearings.

2018With respect to the right to confrontation, defense counsel argued that admitting Amanti's testimony concerning the results of the drug test violated the defendant's right to confrontation as explicated by the Supreme Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico , 564 U.S. 647 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). 6 The prosecutor responded that Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) 7 and its progeny do not apply to probation revocation hearings.

2018With respect to the right to confrontation, defense counsel argued that admitting Amanti's testimony concerning the results of the drug test violated the defendant's right to confrontation as explicated by the Supreme Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico , 564 U.S. 647 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). 6 The prosecutor responded that Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) 7 and its progeny do not apply to probation revocation hearings.

2001Comstock does not provide any contrary evidence as to who was present at the times of disclosure, rather it asserts that the privacy protections included in § 31-51u only apply to disclosure by the employer to non-employees. "[I]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature's intent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility Control , 246 Conn. 18 , 29 , 716 A.2d 78 (1998).

2001Comstock does not provide any contrary evidence as to who was present at the times of disclosure, rather it asserts that the privacy protections included in § 31-51u only apply to disclosure by the employer to non-employees. "[I]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature's intent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility Control , 246 Conn. 18 , 29 , 716 A.2d 78 (1998).

2001Comstock argues that "a tort action for invasion of privacy is triggered by the public disclosure of any matter that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and is not of legitimate concern to the public" and therefore, Overton "will need to establish that Comstock caused an unreasonable publicity in his private life to sustain this cause of action." (Emphasis in original.) The existence of an invasion of privacy action was first recognized in Connecticut in Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc ., 188 Conn. 107 , 128 , 438 A.2d 1317 (1982).

1999On review of the first trial, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court's determination that "the surge protector incident, coupled with an attendance problem the previous year, would not justify a drug test under § 31-51x ." Poulos v. Pfizer, Inc. , supra, 244 Conn. 598 .

1998"A motion to strike is the proper manner in which to raise the issue of the legal sufficiency of a special defense to a cause of action." Passini v. Decker. 39 Conn. Sup. 20 , 21 , 467 A.2d 442 (1983), citing Nowak v. Nowak 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , 394 A.2d 716 (1978); see Practice Book § 152(5).

1998"A motion to strike is the proper manner in which to raise the issue of the legal sufficiency of a special defense to a cause of action." Passini v. Decker. 39 Conn. Sup. 20 , 21 , 467 A.2d 442 (1983), citing Nowak v. Nowak 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , 394 A.2d 716 (1978); see Practice Book § 152(5).

1998In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, 242 Conn. 17, 32 , 699 A.2d 101 (1997).

1998In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, 242 Conn. 17, 32 , 699 A.2d 101 (1997).

1998"A motion to strike is the proper manner in which to raise the issue of the legal sufficiency of a special defense to a cause of action." Passini v. Decker. 39 Conn. Sup. 20 , 21 , 467 A.2d 442 (1983), citing Nowak v. Nowak 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , 394 A.2d 716 (1978); see Practice Book § 152(5).

1998"A motion to strike is the proper manner in which to raise the issue of the legal sufficiency of a special defense to a cause of action." Passini v. Decker. 39 Conn. Sup. 20 , 21 , 467 A.2d 442 (1983), citing Nowak v. Nowak 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , 394 A.2d 716 (1978); see Practice Book § 152(5).

1998Id.