drug test in Florida

2018Labor Source v. E.H., 765 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (acknowledging that an emergency room drug test in the absence of other employer-originated suspicion could underlie an employer’s § 440.09(7)(b)-based defense). 6 of an injured employee only “if the employer has reason to suspect that the injury was occasioned primarily . . . by the use of any drug, as defined in this chapter, which affected the employee to the extent that the employee’s normal faculties were impaired” as to the accident in question. § 440.09(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added).

2004In affirming, we agreed with the “JCC’s ruling that, while a drug test performed for medical purposes may be admissible to support an intoxication defense under section 440.09(3), the presumption set out in section 440.09(7)(b) does not arise as the result of a positive confirmation drug test using a medically-drawn sample unless the Florida Administrative Code rules required by section 440.09(7)(d) are followed.” Id.

2017The State alleged that he violated the condition of his supervision that he “not use intoxicants to excess.” Id However, the supreme court held that the “use of cocaine, as evidenced by a single drug test, *735 did not violate 'the community control condition requiring him to refrain from using intoxicants to, excess.” Id. at 185 (emphasis added).

2012While the Court in Alston rejected the position that “a single drug test, without more, is sufficient evidence to find a violation of this particular community control provision,” it did so “because the conduct established does not appear to be that which the excessive use condition was intended to proscribe.” Id. at 185 .

2010Corp., 588 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding that the appellant directly violated company policy when he failed a drug test in violation of the company’s policy that “no employee can be present at work with drugs or alcohol in his system”); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 463 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (finding that an employer met its burden of establishing misconduct where an employee admitted kissing a coworker in “clear violation of an express policy” enacted to prevent potential sexual harassment actions against the employer); Rosa v. Jeffe

2004In Ford v. Southeast Atlantic Corp., 588 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), this court affirmed a finding of misconduct on evidence showing that an employee was terminated because of his single act of failing a drug test in violation of his employer's policy that no employee be present at work with drugs in his or her system.

2023Under these circumstances, this case falls squarely within the holdings of Reyes v. McCray, 879 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (issuing writ of habeas corpus based upon a trial court’s sua sponte order of a defendant’s drug test without probable cause), and Smith v. McRay, 907 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“The record shows that the petitioner did not violate a court order or court decorum.

2023Under these circumstances, this case falls squarely within the holdings of Reyes v. McCray, 879 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (issuing writ of habeas corpus based upon a trial court’s sua sponte order of a defendant’s drug test without probable cause), and Smith v. McRay, 907 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“The record shows that the petitioner did not violate a court order or court decorum.

2022Consequently, "the plain and ordinary meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary." Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992)).

2022Consequently, "the plain and ordinary meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary." Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992)).

2021This finding is sufficient to support a conclusion that she was voluntarily unemployed.”); Brown, 954 So. 2d at 1208 (affirming determination that the husband voluntarily terminated his employment as a pilot where he failed a drug test); Vazquez, 922 So. 2d at 370 (“We agree with the trial court that the husband’s termination was voluntary because it was caused by his own deliberate repeated misconduct.”); Bronson v. Bronson, 793 So. 2d 1109 , 1110–11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (affirming the trial court’s finding that the husband had voluntarily “caused his termination of employment” through absente

2021This finding is sufficient to support a conclusion that she was voluntarily unemployed.”); Brown, 954 So. 2d at 1208 (affirming determination that the husband voluntarily terminated his employment as a pilot where he failed a drug test); Vazquez, 922 So. 2d at 370 (“We agree with the trial court that the husband’s termination was voluntary because it was caused by his own deliberate repeated misconduct.”); Bronson v. Bronson, 793 So. 2d 1109 , 1110–11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (affirming the trial court’s finding that the husband had voluntarily “caused his termination of employment” through absente

2016Compare Dawson v. State, 177 So.3d 658, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (concluding probation officer’s testi-rnony “that she conducted a urinalysis at her office that indicated appellant used cocaine, and then she sent a urine sample to a laboratory which issued a report indicating the urine tested positive for cocaine” was hearsay because the officer “lack[ed] expertise in conducting the test”), Rothe v. State, 76 So.3d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“[T]he officer’s testimony'about the results, of the drug test she performed ... is hearsay , for she admitted. on cross-examination that she has no s

2016Compare Dawson v. State, 177 So.3d 658, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (concluding probation officer’s testi-rnony “that she conducted a urinalysis at her office that indicated appellant used cocaine, and then she sent a urine sample to a laboratory which issued a report indicating the urine tested positive for cocaine” was hearsay because the officer “lack[ed] expertise in conducting the test”), Rothe v. State, 76 So.3d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“[T]he officer’s testimony'about the results, of the drug test she performed ... is hearsay , for she admitted. on cross-examination that she has no s

2016Compare Dawson v. State, 177 So.3d 658, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (concluding probation officer’s testi-rnony “that she conducted a urinalysis at her office that indicated appellant used cocaine, and then she sent a urine sample to a laboratory which issued a report indicating the urine tested positive for cocaine” was hearsay because the officer “lack[ed] expertise in conducting the test”), Rothe v. State, 76 So.3d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“[T]he officer’s testimony'about the results, of the drug test she performed ... is hearsay , for she admitted. on cross-examination that she has no s

2016Compare Dawson v. State, 177 So.3d 658, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (concluding probation officer’s testi-rnony “that she conducted a urinalysis at her office that indicated appellant used cocaine, and then she sent a urine sample to a laboratory which issued a report indicating the urine tested positive for cocaine” was hearsay because the officer “lack[ed] expertise in conducting the test”), Rothe v. State, 76 So.3d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“[T]he officer’s testimony'about the results, of the drug test she performed ... is hearsay , for she admitted. on cross-examination that she has no s

2016Compare Dawson v. State, 177 So.3d 658, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (concluding probation officer’s testi-rnony “that she conducted a urinalysis at her office that indicated appellant used cocaine, and then she sent a urine sample to a laboratory which issued a report indicating the urine tested positive for cocaine” was hearsay because the officer “lack[ed] expertise in conducting the test”), Rothe v. State, 76 So.3d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“[T]he officer’s testimony'about the results, of the drug test she performed ... is hearsay , for she admitted. on cross-examination that she has no s

2012See Dann Ocean Towing, Inc. v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 37 So.3d 968, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

2010Corp., 588 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding that the appellant directly violated company policy when he failed a drug test in violation of the company’s policy that “no employee can be present at work with drugs or alcohol in his system”); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 463 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (finding that an employer met its burden of establishing misconduct where an employee admitted kissing a coworker in “clear violation of an express policy” enacted to prevent potential sexual harassment actions against the employer); Rosa v. Jeffe

2010Freeman v. State, 980 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

2007See Henry, 937 So.2d at 571 (rejecting an ineffective assistance claim related to the failure to pursue and present evidence of drug addiction where "trial counsel met with stiff resistance from his client at every turn regarding any efforts to piece together a drug defense for either the guilt phase or for mitigation"); Brown v. State, 894 So.2d 137, 146 (Fla. 2004) ("An attorney will not be deemed ineffective for honoring his client's wishes.").

2007See Henry, 937 So.2d at 571 (rejecting an ineffective assistance claim related to the failure to pursue and present evidence of drug addiction where "trial counsel met with stiff resistance from his client at every turn regarding any efforts to piece together a drug defense for either the guilt phase or for mitigation"); Brown v. State, 894 So.2d 137, 146 (Fla. 2004) ("An attorney will not be deemed ineffective for honoring his client's wishes.").

2000See id. at 84 (relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which prohibited admission of public records regarding "factual findings resulting from investigations made pursuant to authority granted by law").