6 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hatchergreen2 sentences2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica 2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sweetgreen2 sentences2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica 2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica 2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica | 1 | 1 |
Benton Ex Rel. Benton v. Pellumgreen2 sentences2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica 2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pagangreen2 sentences2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica 2018As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208 , 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91 , 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practica | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Smithgreen2 sentences2014As to whether the family court improperly ordered a six-month suspended incarceration sentence but allowed Wife to purge the sentence by paying Husband $16,356: Smith v. Smith, 359 S.C. 393, 396 , 597 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A determination of contempt lies within the sound discretion of the [family court]."); id. (stating an appellate court should reverse a finding of contempt only when such a finding is without evidentiary support); id. ("[C]ontempt results from willful disobedience of a court order." (internal quotations marks omitted)); id. at 397 , 597 S.E.2d at 189 ("A willful 2014As to whether the family court improperly ordered a six-month suspended incarceration sentence but allowed Wife to purge the sentence by paying Husband $16,356: Smith v. Smith, 359 S.C. 393, 396 , 597 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A determination of contempt lies within the sound discretion of the [family court]."); id. (stating an appellate court should reverse a finding of contempt only when such a finding is without evidentiary support); id. ("[C]ontempt results from willful disobedience of a court order." (internal quotations marks omitted)); id. at 397 , 597 S.E.2d at 189 ("A willful | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Lottgreen2 sentences2014As to whether the family court improperly ordered a six-month suspended incarceration sentence but allowed Wife to purge the sentence by paying Husband $16,356: Smith v. Smith, 359 S.C. 393, 396 , 597 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A determination of contempt lies within the sound discretion of the [family court]."); id. (stating an appellate court should reverse a finding of contempt only when such a finding is without evidentiary support); id. ("[C]ontempt results from willful disobedience of a court order." (internal quotations marks omitted)); id. at 397 , 597 S.E.2d at 189 ("A willful 2014As to whether the family court improperly ordered a six-month suspended incarceration sentence but allowed Wife to purge the sentence by paying Husband $16,356: Smith v. Smith, 359 S.C. 393, 396 , 597 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A determination of contempt lies within the sound discretion of the [family court]."); id. (stating an appellate court should reverse a finding of contempt only when such a finding is without evidentiary support); id. ("[C]ontempt results from willful disobedience of a court order." (internal quotations marks omitted)); id. at 397 , 597 S.E.2d at 189 ("A willful | 1 | 1 |
Gallagher Ex Rel. Estate of Evert v. Evertgreen2 sentences2014See Gallagher v. Evert, 353 S.C. 59, 63 , 577 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The notes to Rule 59, SCRCP, indicate that subsection (g) was added to help insure the judge is promptly notified that the motion has been filed. 2014See Gallagher v. Evert, 353 S.C. 59, 63 , 577 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The notes to Rule 59, SCRCP, indicate that subsection (g) was added to help insure the judge is promptly notified that the motion has been filed. | 1 | 1 |
Runyon v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2014As to whether the family court improperly sanctioned Wife pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and exceeded its authority in the sanctions ordered, including its decision to dismiss Wife's claim that Husband should have to reimburse her for a drug test: Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 15, 18-19 , 471 S.E.2d 160, 161-62 (1996) (stating under Rule 11, SCRCP, a party may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper, or for making frivolous arguments); id. at 19 , 471 S.E.2d at 162 (stating the party "may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith (i.e 2014As to whether the family court improperly sanctioned Wife pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and exceeded its authority in the sanctions ordered, including its decision to dismiss Wife's claim that Husband should have to reimburse her for a drug test: Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 15, 18-19 , 471 S.E.2d 160, 161-62 (1996) (stating under Rule 11, SCRCP, a party may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper, or for making frivolous arguments); id. at 19 , 471 S.E.2d at 162 (stating the party "may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith (i.e | 1 | 1 |
Conway v. CITY OF GREENVILLE, SCgreen2 sentences2004See Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc., 353 S.C. 157, 170-71 , 577 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2003) (county ordinance requiring a 1,500-foot setback for sexually oriented businesses based on the rationale of combating secondary effects of those businesses was constitutional); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 573 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (statute making it unlawful to defraud a drug test furthers the public purpose of ensuring a drug-free workplace, which is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police powers in regulating public safety and welfare, and outweighs any legitimate interest of t 2004See Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc., 353 S.C. 157, 170-71 , 577 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2003) (county ordinance requiring a 1,500-foot setback for sexually oriented businesses based on the rationale of combating secondary effects of those businesses was constitutional); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 573 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (statute making it unlawful to defraud a drug test furthers the public purpose of ensuring a drug-free workplace, which is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police powers in regulating public safety and welfare, and outweighs any legitimate interest of t | 1 | 1 |
Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc., 353 S.C. 157, 170-71 , 577 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2003) (county ordinance requiring a 1,500-foot setback for sexually oriented businesses based on the rationale of combating secondary effects of those businesses was constitutional); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 573 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (statute making it unlawful to defraud a drug test furthers the public purpose of ensuring a drug-free workplace, which is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police powers in regulating public safety and welfare, and outweighs any legitimate interest of t 2004See Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc., 353 S.C. 157, 170-71 , 577 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2003) (county ordinance requiring a 1,500-foot setback for sexually oriented businesses based on the rationale of combating secondary effects of those businesses was constitutional); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 573 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (statute making it unlawful to defraud a drug test furthers the public purpose of ensuring a drug-free workplace, which is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police powers in regulating public safety and welfare, and outweighs any legitimate interest of t | 1 | 1 |
Curtis v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc., 353 S.C. 157, 170-71 , 577 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2003) (county ordinance requiring a 1,500-foot setback for sexually oriented businesses based on the rationale of combating secondary effects of those businesses was constitutional); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 573 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (statute making it unlawful to defraud a drug test furthers the public purpose of ensuring a drug-free workplace, which is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police powers in regulating public safety and welfare, and outweighs any legitimate interest of t 2004See Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc., 353 S.C. 157, 170-71 , 577 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2003) (county ordinance requiring a 1,500-foot setback for sexually oriented businesses based on the rationale of combating secondary effects of those businesses was constitutional); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 573 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (statute making it unlawful to defraud a drug test furthers the public purpose of ensuring a drug-free workplace, which is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police powers in regulating public safety and welfare, and outweighs any legitimate interest of t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2008After a thorough review of the record and counsels brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss Mathiss appeal and grant counsels motion to be relieved. [1] APPEAL DISMISSED. 2008After a thorough review of the record and counsels brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss Mathiss appeal and grant counsels motion to be relieved. [1] APPEAL DISMISSED. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Anders v. California
green
1 sentence2008After a thorough review of the record and counsels brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss Mathiss appeal and grant counsels motion to be relieved. [1] APPEAL DISMISSED. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 595-96, 571 S.E.2d at 705-06 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
City of Charleston v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences2004See Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc., 353 S.C. 157, 170-71 , 577 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2003) (county ordinance requiring a 1,500-foot setback for sexually oriented businesses based on the rationale of combating secondary effects of those businesses was constitutional); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 573 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (statute making it unlawful to defraud a drug test furthers the public purpose of ensuring a drug-free workplace, which is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police powers in regulating public safety and welfare, and outweighs any legitimate interest of t 2004See Greenville County v. Kenwood Enterprises, Inc., 353 S.C. 157, 170-71 , 577 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2003) (county ordinance requiring a 1,500-foot setback for sexually oriented businesses based on the rationale of combating secondary effects of those businesses was constitutional); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 573 , 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (statute making it unlawful to defraud a drug test furthers the public purpose of ensuring a drug-free workplace, which is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police powers in regulating public safety and welfare, and outweighs any legitimate interest of t | 1 | 2004–2004 |
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island
green
2 sentences2002Commercial speech may be implicated, however, when, as here, it is used as evidence to prove an element of the offense, i.e. that the adulterant was intended to defeat a drug test. “[T]he First Amendment does not protect commercial speech about unlawful activities.” 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 , 497 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 1495 , 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 , 93 S.Ct. 2553 , 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)). 2002Commercial speech may be implicated, however, when, as here, it is used as evidence to prove an element of the offense, i.e. that the adulterant was intended to defeat a drug test. “[T]he First Amendment does not protect commercial speech about unlawful activities.” 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 , 497 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 1495 , 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 , 93 S.Ct. 2553 , 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations
green
2 sentences2002Commercial speech may be implicated, however, when, as here, it is used as evidence to prove an element of the offense, i.e. that the adulterant was intended to defeat a drug test. “[T]he First Amendment does not protect commercial speech about unlawful activities.” 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 , 497 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 1495 , 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 , 93 S.Ct. 2553 , 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)). 2002Commercial speech may be implicated, however, when, as here, it is used as evidence to prove an element of the offense, i.e. that the adulterant was intended to defeat a drug test. “[T]he First Amendment does not protect commercial speech about unlawful activities.” 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 , 497 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 1495 , 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 , 93 S.Ct. 2553 , 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.