drug analysis in Massachusetts

2018Ladies and gentlemen, it was heroin on that date, and it is still heroin." 5 The Supreme Judicial Court has since observed that it "'may be impossible' for any defendant to prove that the drug analysis in his or her case was tainted by [Dookhan's] misconduct" because "even if Dookhan herself were to testify in each of the thousands of cases in which she served as primary or secondary chemist, it is unlikely that her testimony, even if truthful, could resolve the question whether she engaged in misconduct in a particular case." Bridgeman, 476 Mass. at 305 , quoting from Scott, 467 Mass. at 351-

2018See id . at 342, 5 N.E.3d 530 . 8 In September, 2015, after she had pleaded guilty to tampering charges, Farak testified before the grand jury under a grant of immunity for any additional charges, concerning the timing and scope of her misconduct. 9 The respondents do not contest Judge Carey's factual findings. 10 " Ruffin defendants" are individuals who pleaded guilty before receiving results of the drug analysis in their cases.

2023See Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 92-93 (2018) (judge reasonably determined probation officer's testimony about positive drug test, as well as drug test results themselves, constituted sufficiently reliable evidence).

2023See Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 92-93 (2018) (judge reasonably determined probation officer's 4 testimony about positive drug test, as well as drug test results themselves, constituted sufficiently reliable evidence). b.

2017See Alvarez, supra. See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 556 (2013) (school zone conviction does not require proof of ‘“any additional wrongdoing by the defendant; it is enough that the drug violation occurred within a school zone, regardless whether the defendant knew he was within a school zone”); Roucoulet, supra at 650-651 , quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593 (1991) (‘“one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated”). *167 In Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 228-230 , we concluded that G.

2013See Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 650-651 (1992), quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593 (1991) (“After the elements of [the predicate] offense have been established, one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated”).

2006Compare Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410 Mass. 631, 637 (1991) (no violation where police officer informed cadets of fellow cadet’s dismissal for failing a drug test), and Gauthier v. Police Com’r of Boston, 408 Mass. 335, 338 (1990) (no violation where chief of police, acting in official capacity, disclosed information about plaintiffs fitness to be a police officer), with Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 241 F.Sup.2d 78, 100 (D.Mass. 2003) (violation where a person was given access to plaintiffs confidential files containing information on domestic disputes), and Bennett, 230 F.Sup.2d at 223 (violation whe

2005There was no invasion of a right to privacy when a chief of police, acting in his official capacity, disclosed information about a plaintiff’s fitness to be a police officer, see Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410 Mass. 631, 637 (1991), or when a police officer informed cadets of a fellow cadet’s dismissal for failing a drug test, see Gauthier v. Police Comm’r of Boston, supra at 338-339.

2012The contention is a matter of first impression in the Commonwealth. 9 Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, supra, the only Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to consider the specific question whether defense counsel may waive a defendant’s right to confront the analyst before admission of a drug analysis certificate approved the practice.

2012Although the United States Supreme Court has not considered the specific question whether defense counsel may waive a defendant’s right to confront an analyst before introduction in evidence of a drug analysis certificate, the majority in Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332 , found that “[d]efense attorneys and their clients will often stipulate to the nature of the substance [identified in a drug analysis certificate] . . . [without] insisting] on live testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic analysis.” The Court’s failure to mention the need for

2017See Alvarez, supra. See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 556 (2013) (school zone conviction does not require proof of ‘“any additional wrongdoing by the defendant; it is enough that the drug violation occurred within a school zone, regardless whether the defendant knew he was within a school zone”); Roucoulet, supra at 650-651 , quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593 (1991) (‘“one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated”). *167 In Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 228-230 , we concluded that G.

2013See Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 650-651 (1992), quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593 (1991) (“After the elements of [the predicate] offense have been established, one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated”).

2017See Alvarez, supra. See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 556 (2013) (school zone conviction does not require proof of ‘“any additional wrongdoing by the defendant; it is enough that the drug violation occurred within a school zone, regardless whether the defendant knew he was within a school zone”); Roucoulet, supra at 650-651 , quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593 (1991) (‘“one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated”). *167 In Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 228-230 , we concluded that G.

2017See Alvarez, supra. See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 556 (2013) (school zone conviction does not require proof of ‘“any additional wrongdoing by the defendant; it is enough that the drug violation occurred within a school zone, regardless whether the defendant knew he was within a school zone”); Roucoulet, supra at 650-651 , quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593 (1991) (‘“one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated”). *167 In Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 228-230 , we concluded that G.

2017See Alvarez, supra. See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 556 (2013) (school zone conviction does not require proof of ‘“any additional wrongdoing by the defendant; it is enough that the drug violation occurred within a school zone, regardless whether the defendant knew he was within a school zone”); Roucoulet, supra at 650-651 , quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593 (1991) (‘“one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated”). *167 In Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 228-230 , we concluded that G.

2014See United States v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176, 178-179 (9th Cir. 1987).

2012United States v. Robinson, 617 F.3d 984, 989-990 (8th Cir. 2010).

2012In a recent case in which defense counsel stipulated to the composition and weight of controlled substances contained in a drug analysis certificate, the Fourth Circuit expressed its inclination “to require that defendants make a clear waiver of their Sixth Amendment right [to confrontation].” United States v. Williams, 632 F.3d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding that trial judge wrongly accepted defense counsel’s stipulation over noted objection of defendant).

2012An individual trial judge, of course, retains discretion to conduct a colloquy as a matter of personal routine. 15 As noted above, a defendant’s right to confront the analyst in such a case falls within the list of rights related to “strategic or tactical matters, resting] ultimately in counsel, with the degree of required client consultation and participation dependent on the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Conley, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 391 . 16 Particularly with regard to the comparative benefit or detriment of the analyst’s testimony before introduction in evidence of a drug analysis certifi

2012See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321-322 (2009); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 352 (2010).

2012Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz , remarked one year before that decision, “I doubt many think that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses cannot be waived by counsel.” Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 256 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).

2011See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. 766, 770 (2009). 4 Other circuit courts of the United States Court of Appeals have indorsed the holding in United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 978-979 (11th Cir. 1984), cert, denied sub nom.

2011See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. 766, 770 (2009). 4 Other circuit courts of the United States Court of Appeals have indorsed the holding in United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 978-979 (11th Cir. 1984), cert, denied sub nom.

2010“Proof that a substance is a particular drug need not be made by chemical analysis and may be made by circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Dawson, 399 Mass. 465, 467 (1987).

2006“The disclosure of facts between co-workers is sufficient to violate privacy.” Bennett, 230 F.Sup.2d at 223; see also Bratt, 392 Mass. at 519 (“the disclosure of private facts about an employee among other employees in the same corporation can constitute sufficient publication under the Massachusetts right of privacy statute”).

2006Compare Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410 Mass. 631, 637 (1991) (no violation where police officer informed cadets of fellow cadet’s dismissal for failing a drug test), and Gauthier v. Police Com’r of Boston, 408 Mass. 335, 338 (1990) (no violation where chief of police, acting in official capacity, disclosed information about plaintiffs fitness to be a police officer), with Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 241 F.Sup.2d 78, 100 (D.Mass. 2003) (violation where a person was given access to plaintiffs confidential files containing information on domestic disputes), and Bennett, 230 F.Sup.2d at 223 (violation whe