drug test in Texas

2024In re T.R.L., No. 10-14-00290-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2178 , at *14 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A factfinder may reasonably infer from a parent’s refusal to take a drug test that the parent was using drugs.”); In re C.R., 263 S.W.3d 368, 374 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2008, no pet.) (trial court could reasonably infer parent avoided taking drug tests because she was using drugs).

2023See In re C.R., 263 S.W.3d 368, 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (noting that a factfinder may reasonably infer from a parent’s refusal to take a drug test that the parent was using drugs).

2025See In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (“The trial court may infer from a refusal to take a drug test that appellant was using drugs.”).

2024See In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (“The trial court may infer from a refusal to take a drug test that appellant was using drugs.”).

2025See In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied) (“A factfinder may reasonably infer from a parent’s refusal to take a drug test that the parent was using drugs.”); see also In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (“We give deference to the fact finder’s conclusions, indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of that finding, and presume the fact finder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its findings, so long as a reasonable fact finder could do so.”); see also In re E.P., No. 10-22-00086-CV, 2022 WL 2977479 , at *2 (Tex

2025See In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied) (“A factfinder may reasonably infer from a parent’s refusal to take a drug test that the parent was using drugs.”); see also In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (“We give deference to the fact finder’s conclusions, indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of that finding, and presume the fact finder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its findings, so long as a reasonable fact finder could do so.”); see also In re E.P., No. 10-22-00086-CV, 2022 WL 2977479 , at *2 (Tex

2026Mother’s failure to appear for a drug test in the four months prior to the close of trial supports the trial court’s continuing-danger finding that “[t]here are concerns with the mother’s sobriety.” See In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (noting that factfinder could reasonably infer that parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug screening indicated parent was avoiding testing due to ongoing drug use).

2025See In re I.W., No. 14-15-00910-CV, 2016 WL 1533972 , at *6 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent’s “refusal to submit to the drug test may be treated by the [fact finder] as if he had tested positive for drugs”); see also In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (fact finder could infer parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered narcotics-use testing indicated she was avoiding testing because she was using narcotics).

2023See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (noting that evidence of drug use may constitute evidence of endangerment); see also In re G.M., 649 S.W.3d 801 , 810 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“A parent’s illegal drug use and its effect on parenting ability may support the conclusion that a child’s surroundings endanger her physical or emotional well- being.” (citing In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.))); In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied) (noting that it is reasonable for the factfinder to infer from a parent’s failure to take a d

2020See In re G.A., No. 01-11-00565-CV, 2012 WL 1068630 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (a parent’s drug use can endanger a child’s physical or emotional well-being); J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125 (parent’s illegal drug use supports conclusion that environment endangers physical or emotional well-being of children).

2026Mother also refused to submit to narcotics-use testing on November 14, 2024 and February 18, 2025.19 See In re Z.J.B., No. 14-18-00759-CV, 2019 WL 347474 , at 19 Mother’s FSP informed her that if she missed a required narcotics-use test, it would be considered a positive result. 37 *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 29, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent’s positive narcotics-use tests and failure to appear for other narcotics-use tests weighed in favor of trial court’s best-interest finding); In re I.W., No. 14-15-00910-CV, 2016 WL 1533972 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 1

2025DFPS caseworker Vidal testified that during the pendency of the case, mother tested positive for narcotics use, and mother did not attend all required narcotics-use testing.25 See In re I.W., No. 14-15-00910-CV, 2016 WL 1533972 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent’s “refusal to submit to the drug test may be treated by the [fact finder] as if he had tested positive for drugs”); In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (fact finder could reasonably infer parent’s failure to complete scheduled narcotics-use screenings in

2024I A After conducting an investigation from January to March of 2020, the Department removed Father’s three children, one-year-old twins (a 1 654 S.W.3d 535 , 550 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022). 2 Id. at 558 (Zimmerer, J., dissenting). 3 283 S.W.3d 336 , 345 (Tex. 2009). 4 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). 2 boy and a girl) and a three-year-old daughter.5 At the time of removal, Father and the children had been homeless for two months and were living in Father’s car after their grandmother, Father’s mother, decided that they could not live with her. 6 During the investigation, Fathe

2023See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (noting that evidence of drug use may constitute evidence of endangerment); see also In re G.M., 649 S.W.3d 801 , 810 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“A parent’s illegal drug use and its effect on parenting ability may support the conclusion that a child’s surroundings endanger her physical or emotional well- being.” (citing In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.))); In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied) (noting that it is reasonable for the factfinder to infer from a parent’s failure to take a d

2023Mother never submitted to a single drug test despite twenty-two requests from the Department. “[A] fact finder reasonably can infer that a parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug tests indicates the parent is avoiding testing because they were using illegal drugs.” See In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 265 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

2022See, e.g., In re D.B.S., No. 05-20-00959-CV, 2021 WL 1608497 , at *6 (Tex. 28 App.—Dallas Apr. 26, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting in endangerment analysis that mother “was also arrested for theft, though the case was later dismissed”). 29 See, e.g., E.G., 643 S.W.3d at 253 (“The trial court could have concluded that [m]other’s ongoing relationship with [f]ather [who was using drugs] jeopardized her substance[-]abuse recovery[] and posed a risk to [the child’s] emotional and physical well-being.”); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (holding

2021Any Error in Admitting Drug Test Results Was Rendered Harmless by Substantially Similar Testimony Admitted Without Objection We have previously decided that the drug test results were improperly admitted as exhibits under the business-records exception in a parental-rights termination case because they indicated a lack of trustworthiness where the affidavit contained “no information as to the qualifications of the person or the equipment used, the method of administering the test, and whether the test was a standard one for the particular substance.” In re K.C.P., 142 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. App

2019Appellant likewise asserts on appeal that the admission of “the drug test results without anyone to testify to these matters [the qualification of the tester, the equipment used, and the testing procedures] is an abuse of discretion.” For this proposition, she relies upon In re K.C.P., 142 S.W.3d 574 , 579–80 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2004, no pet.).

2013Just as the trial court may infer from a drug test refusal that a parent was using drugs in a parental termination case, 8 the visiting judge here could properly infer that C.C. and J.C.’s refusal to provide the evidence supporting the removal of the children from C.C. in 2007 indicated that such evidence would be damaging to their case. 9 The visiting judge was entitled to conclude, based on some evidence—the order of termination providing endangerment and abandonment as two of the grounds, his observations of C.C., the testimony she 8 See In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254 , 262 & n.7 (Tex. App

2012See In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d at 263 ("A parent's decision to engage in illegal drug use during pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of losing a child, supports a finding that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being.") Accordingly, we find there is legally sufficient evidence to terminate the parental relationship between Eric and his children.

2023See In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (providing that a parent’s failure to submit to a drug test can be considered a positive result).

2022See In re K.-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (providing that a parent’s failure to submit to a drug test can be considered a positive result); In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“A factfinder may infer from a parent’s failure to take the initiative to complete 7 At the time, J.M. was two years old, and E.M. was four months old. 8 Mother admitted that prior to this case, her three daughters were removed from her care because she continued to allow them to be around her previous paramour someone who had sexually abus

2021See, e.g., In re G.P., 503 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied) (evidence legally and factually sufficient to show mother’s failure to provide safe environment where mother failed to provide Department with any information about her living or employment circumstances, failed to make child support payments, failed to seek out and accept counseling services, refused to take required drug tests, and failed to even maintain contact with her child); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (evidence legally and factually sufficient to show mother had demo

2020See, e.g., In re G.P., 503 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied) (upholding finding of failure to provide safe environment where mother failed to provide Department with any information about her living or employment circumstances, failed to make child support payments, failed to seek out and accept counseling services, refused to take required drug tests, and failed to even maintain –18– contact with her child); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (considering evidence that mother had failed a drug test, had attended only half of her parenting c

2021See, e.g., In re G.P., 503 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied) (evidence legally and factually sufficient to show mother’s failure to provide safe environment where mother failed to provide Department with any information about her living or employment circumstances, failed to make child support payments, failed to seek out and accept counseling services, refused to take required drug tests, and failed to even maintain contact with her child); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (evidence legally and factually sufficient to show mother had demo

2020See, e.g., In re G.P., 503 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied) (upholding finding of failure to provide safe environment where mother failed to provide Department with any information about her living or employment circumstances, failed to make child support payments, failed to seek out and accept counseling services, refused to take required drug tests, and failed to even maintain –18– contact with her child); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (considering evidence that mother had failed a drug test, had attended only half of her parenting c

2018“A parent’s failure to remain drug-free while under the Department’s supervision will support a finding of endangering conduct under subsection (E) even if there is no direct evidence that the parent’s drug use actually injured the child.” In re J.A.W., No. 02-08-215-CV, 2009 WL 579287 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (citing Vasquez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 190 S.W.3d 189, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)).

2013See Vasquez v. Texas Depart. of Protective & Regulatory Services, 190 S.W.3d 189, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Robinson v. TDPRS, 89 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (finding pattern and practice of drug abuse, despite attending programs, to be sufficient evidence to support best-interest finding).

2015See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 526 (while not an element, motive can be a circumstance indicative of guilt); Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (lying is a circumstance of guilt), aff'd, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 526 (while not an element, motive can be a circumstance indicative of guilt); Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (lying is a circumstance of guilt), aff’d, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 526 (while not an element, motive can be a circumstance indicative of guilt); Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (lying is a circumstance of guilt), aff'd, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 526 (while not an element, motive can be a circumstance indicative of guilt); Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (lying is a circumstance of guilt), aff’d, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim.

2009Code § 103.002(3); (6) Free v. American Home Assurance Co. , 902 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding that "there is no dispute" that supervisor's statement regarding why former employee was fired "concerned [employee's] performance of his duties . . . and his compliance with [employer] policies").

2009Code § 103.002(3);6 Free v. American Home Assurance Co., 902 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding that “there is no dispute” that supervisor’s statement regarding why former employee was fired “concerned [employee’s] performance of his duties . . . and his compliance with [employer] policies”).

2009Evidence of C.C.’s desire to return home likewise does not undermine the best interest finding. “[W]hat the children want . . . is not always in their best interests.” Phillips v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 25 S.W.3d 348, 356 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000, no pet.).

2009Evidence of C.C.'s desire to return home likewise does not undermine the best interest finding. "[W]hat the children want . . . is not always in their best interests." Phillips v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs. , 25 S.W.3d 348, 356 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).

2008Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex.2004) ("Clearly, erroneous admission is harmless if it is merely cumulative.").

2008Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex.2004) (“Clearly, erroneous admission is harmless if it is merely cumulative.”).

1993Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); see also English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex.1983).

1993Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc. , 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); see also English v. Fisher , 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).

1993Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); see also English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex.1983).

1993Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc. , 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); see also English v. Fisher , 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).

2018Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim.

2018See Johnson, 509 S.W.3d at 322 ; Ramsey, 473 S.W.3d at 809 ; Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360 .

2024IV, No. 04-17-00425-CV, 2017 WL 6597829 , at *15 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Dec. 27, 2017, pet. denied) (quoting Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)). - 18 - 04-24-00426-CV Deficient Performance With respect to the first prong of the Strickland test—counsel’s allegedly deficient performance—C.R.Y.B. complains about (1) counsel’s nonappearance at pretrial permanency hearings, (2) counsel’s uncertainty about C.R.Y.B.’s service or appearance status during announcements immediately prior to trial, (3) counsel’s fail

2022There was ample evidence—separate from Father answering affirmatively that Mother had been using methamphetamines at the time of removal—to support these findings: • Father told Gibbs on the day of removal that Father would fail a drug test that day; • Father admitted to knowing that Paternal Grandmother and her boyfriend were using methamphetamines while the children lived in the home; • Father admitted that Z.C. did not see a doctor for the first five months of Z.C.’s life; • Father acknowledged having a history of substance abuse problems; • Father had been concerned that Paternal Grandmoth

2023As to Karl and based on the drug test results in Exhibit H, the evidence before 42Even though Mother testified she attended the AA/NA meetings between June and September, nothing in the log the AA/NA group kept for the meetings contains Mother’s name or verifies Mother’s attendance. 43See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28 . 29 us shows that it was reasonable for a factfinder to infer that after Karl was born and Mother knew her parental rights to him were at stake, Mother still chose to keep using meth.

2023See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 ; see also In re T.R.L., No. 10-14-00290-CV, 2015 WL 1020865 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A factfinder may reasonably infer from a parent’s refusal to take a drug test that the parent was using drugs.”).

2026See In re K.W., No. 01-23-00530-CV, 2024 WL 116938 , at *10 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 11, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d at 118 (trial court may measure parent’s future conduct by past conduct).