manner claim in New York

2026A notice of claim must contain, inter alia, the nature of the claim; the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose; and the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained so far as then practicable ( see id. ). "'The requirements of the statute are met when the notice describes the incident with sufficient particularity so as to enable the defendant to conduct a proper investigation thereof and to assess the merits of the claim'" ( Garland v City of New York , 237 AD3d 669 , 670, quoting Washington v City of New York , 190 AD3d 1009, 1011 ). "'Nothing more

2026"General Municipal Law § 50-e(2) requires that the notice of claim set forth, among other things 'the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose'" ( T.N. v City of New York , 227 AD3d 815 , 816, quoting Brown v City of New York , 95 NY2d 389, 393 ; see Davis v City of New York , 210 AD3d 865, 866 ).

2023"A notice of claim which, inter alia, sufficiently identifies the claimant, states the nature of the claim and describes the time when, the place where, and the manner in which the claim arose, is a condition precedent to asserting a tort claim against a municipality" ( Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City , 127 AD3d 957, 959 , abrogated in part by Smith v City of New York , 210 AD3d 53 ; see General Municipal Law § 50-e[1][a]; Brown v City of New York , 95 NY2d 389, 392-393 ; O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 358 ).

2019Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (2), a notice of claim must set forth the name and address of the claimant and his or her attorney, "the nature of the claim," "the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose" and "the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained." "The test of the notice's sufficiency is whether it includes information sufficient to enable the [municipality] to investigate the claim" ( O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 358 [1981]; see Rosenbaum v City of New York , 8 NY3d 1, 10 [2006]).

2021A notice of claim must set forth, among other things, "the nature of the claim" and "the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose" (General Municipal Law § 50-e[2]). "'The requirements of the statute are met when the notice describes the [incident] with sufficient particularity so as to enable the defendant to conduct a proper investigation thereof and to assess the merits of the claim'" ( Conn v Tutor Perini Corp. , 174 AD3d 680 , 681, quoting Palmer v Society for Seamen's Children , 88 AD3d 970, 971 ). "[I]n making a determination on the sufficiency of a notice of c

2020The General Municipal Law requires that the notice set forth, among other things, "the nature of the claim," and "the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose" [*2](General Municipal Law § 50-e[2]; see Brown v City of New York , 95 NY2d at 393 ; Palmer v Society for Seamen's Children , 88 AD3d 970, 971 ).

2024"Timely and proper service of a notice of claim which, inter alia, sufficiently identifies the claimant, states the nature of the claim and describes 'the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose,' is a condition precedent to the commencement of a common-law tort action against a municipality" ( Santoro v Town of Smithtown , 40 AD3d 736, 737 [2d Dept 2007], quoting General Municipal Law § 50—e [1] [a]; see Matter of Pil-Yong Yoo v County of Suffolk , 215 AD3d 852, 853 [2d Dept 2023]).

2024"Timely and proper service of a notice of claim which, inter alia, sufficiently identifies the claimant, states the nature of the claim and describes 'the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose,' is a condition precedent to the commencement of a common-law tort action against a municipality" ( Santoro v Town of Smithtown , 40 AD3d 736, 737 [2d Dept 2007], quoting General Municipal Law § 50—e [1] [a]; see Matter of Pil-Yong Yoo v County of Suffolk , 215 AD3d 852, 853 [2d Dept 2023]).

2026A notice of claim must contain, inter alia, the nature of the claim; the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose; and the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained so far as then practicable ( see id. ). "'The requirements of the statute are met when the notice describes the incident with sufficient particularity so as to enable the defendant to conduct a proper investigation thereof and to assess the merits of the claim'" ( Garland v City of New York , 237 AD3d 669 , 670, quoting Washington v City of New York , 190 AD3d 1009, 1011 ). "'Nothing more

2000General Municipal Law § 50-e (2) (“Form of notice; contents”) requires, among other things, that a Notice of Claim “be in writing, sworn to by or on behalf of the claimant” and that it set forth: “(1) the name and post-office address of each claimant, and of his attorney, if any; (2) the nature of the claim; (3) the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose; and (4) the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained so far as then practicable.” Reasonably read, the statute does not require “those things to be stated with literal nicety or exactness” (Purdy

2026"General Municipal Law § 50-e(2) requires that the notice of claim set forth, among other things 'the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose'" ( T.N. v City of New York , 227 AD3d 815 , 816, quoting Brown v City of New York , 95 NY2d 389, 393 ; see Davis v City of New York , 210 AD3d 865, 866 ).

2025"General Municipal Law § 50-e(2) requires that the notice of claim set forth, among other things, the time when, the place where[,] and the manner in which the claim arose" ( Davis v City of New York , 210 AD3d 865, 866 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2013The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the public corporation an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available (see Teresta v City of New York, 304 NY 440, 443 [1952]; Palmer v Society for Seamen’s Children, 88 AD3d 970, 971 [2011]). “[I]n determining compliance with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e, courts should focus on the purpose served by a Notice of Claim: whether based on the claimant’s description [the public corporation] c

2013The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the public corporation an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available (see Teresta v City of New York, 304 NY 440, 443 [1952]; Palmer v Society for Seamen’s Children, 88 AD3d 970, 971 [2011]). “[I]n determining compliance with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e, courts should focus on the purpose served by a Notice of Claim: whether based on the claimant’s description [the public corporation] c

2026A notice of claim must contain, inter alia, the nature of the claim; the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose; and the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained so far as then practicable ( see id. ). "'The requirements of the statute are met when the notice describes the incident with sufficient particularity so as to enable the defendant to conduct a proper investigation thereof and to assess the merits of the claim'" ( Garland v City of New York , 237 AD3d 669 , 670, quoting Washington v City of New York , 190 AD3d 1009, 1011 ). "'Nothing more

2025General Municipal Law § 50-e(2) requires that the notice of claim set forth, among other things, "the nature of the claim" and "the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose" ( id. ; see Washington v City of New York , 190 AD3d 1009, 1011).

2015We reject defendant’s further contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request a downward departure from the presumptive risk level (see People v Goldbeck, 104 AD3d 567, 567-568 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]; People v Reid, 59 AD3d 158, 159 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 708 [2009]).

2015We reject defendant’s further contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request a downward departure from the presumptive risk level (see People v Goldbeck, 104 AD3d 567, 567-568 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]; People v Reid, 59 AD3d 158, 159 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 708 [2009]).

2015Defendant failed to preserve for our review his challenge to the manner in which the hearing was conducted (see People v Tubbs, 124 AD3d 1094, 1095 [2015]; People v Williamson, 73 AD3d 1398, 1398-1399 [2010]) and, in any event, we conclude that the requisite standards were met (see generally Correction Law § 168-n [3]).

2015Defendant failed to preserve for our review his challenge to the manner in which the hearing was conducted (see People v Tubbs, 124 AD3d 1094, 1095 [2015]; People v Williamson, 73 AD3d 1398, 1398-1399 [2010]) and, in any event, we conclude that the requisite standards were met (see generally Correction Law § 168-n [3]).

2015We reject defendant’s further contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request a downward departure from the presumptive risk level (see People v Goldbeck, 104 AD3d 567, 567-568 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]; People v Reid, 59 AD3d 158, 159 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 708 [2009]).

2015We reject defendant’s further contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request a downward departure from the presumptive risk level (see People v Goldbeck, 104 AD3d 567, 567-568 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]; People v Reid, 59 AD3d 158, 159 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 708 [2009]).

2015Defendant failed to preserve for our review his challenge to the manner in which the hearing was conducted (see People v Tubbs, 124 AD3d 1094, 1095 [2015]; People v Williamson, 73 AD3d 1398, 1398-1399 [2010]) and, in any event, we conclude that the requisite standards were met (see generally Correction Law § 168-n [3]).

2015Defendant failed to preserve for our review his challenge to the manner in which the hearing was conducted (see People v Tubbs, 124 AD3d 1094, 1095 [2015]; People v Williamson, 73 AD3d 1398, 1398-1399 [2010]) and, in any event, we conclude that the requisite standards were met (see generally Correction Law § 168-n [3]).

2024On the latter point, we need only note that we recently rejected the applicability of a harmless error analysis to this manner of error ( see People v Heidrich , 226 AD3d at 1099; see also People v Flores , 153 AD3d at 193-195 ).

2024On the latter point, we need only note that we recently rejected the applicability of a harmless error analysis to this manner of error ( see People v Heidrich , 226 AD3d at 1099; see also People v Flores , 153 AD3d at 193-195 ).

2024Petitioner waived any complaint about the manner in which the hearing was conducted by willingly participating in the hearing without objection ( see Matter of Tonya B. v Matthew B., 90 AD3d 463, 463-464 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024Petitioner waived any complaint about the manner in which the hearing was conducted by willingly participating in the hearing without objection ( see Matter of Tonya B. v Matthew B., 90 AD3d 463, 463-464 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024"Timely and proper service of a notice of claim which, inter alia, sufficiently identifies the claimant, states the nature of the claim and describes 'the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose,' is a condition precedent to the commencement of a common-law tort action against a municipality" ( Santoro v Town of Smithtown , 40 AD3d 736, 737 [2d Dept 2007], quoting General Municipal Law § 50—e [1] [a]; see Matter of Pil-Yong Yoo v County of Suffolk , 215 AD3d 852, 853 [2d Dept 2023]).

2024"Timely and proper service of a notice of claim which, inter alia, sufficiently identifies the claimant, states the nature of the claim and describes 'the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose,' is a condition precedent to the commencement of a common-law tort action against a municipality" ( Santoro v Town of Smithtown , 40 AD3d 736, 737 [2d Dept 2007], quoting General Municipal Law § 50—e [1] [a]; see Matter of Pil-Yong Yoo v County of Suffolk , 215 AD3d 852, 853 [2d Dept 2023]).

2024As to preservation, although defendant concedes his failure to object during pretrial proceedings, he asks that we take corrective action in the interest of justice ( see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]; see also People v Nellis , 217 AD3d 1056, 1062 [3d Dept 2023]). [FN3] Considering the totality of circumstances, including the potential effect on the fairness of trial that flows from the decision to utilize an anonymous jury without any justification ( see People v Flores , 153 AD3d at 195 ), we find such action is appropriate.

2024As to preservation, although defendant concedes his failure to object during pretrial proceedings, he asks that we take corrective action in the interest of justice ( see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]; see also People v Nellis , 217 AD3d 1056, 1062 [3d Dept 2023]). [FN3] Considering the totality of circumstances, including the potential effect on the fairness of trial that flows from the decision to utilize an anonymous jury without any justification ( see People v Flores , 153 AD3d at 195 ), we find such action is appropriate.

1999In the instant case, the notice of claim was patently defective since it was silent as to the manner in which the claim arose (see, Levine v City of New York, supra; see also, Matter of Albers v County of Suffolk, 226 AD2d 526 ; DiMenna v Long Is.

1986The original notice of claim served in the present case was patently defective since it failed to describe with sufficient particularity "the place where and the manner in which the claim arose” (General Municipal Law § 50-e [2]; see also, Levine v City of New York, 111 AD2d 785, 786 ; Caselli v City of New York, 105 AD2d 251, 253 ).

2007The essential elements to be included in the notice are the nature of the claim, the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose.” (Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 546 [1983].) For this reason, courts have regularly held that actions for declaratory judgment challenging a school district’s compliance with law, but not seeking monetary damages need not comply with the condition precedent established by Education Law § 3813 (1).

2001A paper which is not denominated a notice of claim may satisfy that requirement if it provides the necessary information as to the nature of the claim, the time when, the place where, and the manner in which the claim arose (see, Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ., 60 NY2d 539, 547 ; Hygrade Insulators v Board of Educ., 207 AD2d 430, 431 ).

1995The defendant has failed to establish that there was a significant possibility that a conflict of interest existed and that it affected the manner in which his defense was conducted (see, People v Alicea, 61 NY2d 23, 30, 31 ; People v Carlson, 180 AD2d 743 ).

1993The record does not establish that a conflict of interest, or at least the significant possibility of a conflict of interest, existed and that any such conflict affected the manner in which the defense was conducted (see, People v Alicea, 61 NY2d 23 ; People v Carlson, 180 AD2d 743, 744 ).