48 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1886–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Steiner v. Eckertgreen2 sentences2021See Steiner v. Eckert, 2013 IL App (2d) 121290, ¶ 15 (recognizing that a party may not acquiesce in procedure followed in the trial court and then complain about that procedure on appeal). 2020See Steiner v. Eckert, 2013 IL App (2d) 121290, ¶ 15 (recognizing that a party may not acquiesce in procedure followed in the trial court and then complain about that procedure on appeal). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Segovianogreen2 sentences2016See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000) (a defendant cannot ask the trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then claim on appeal that it was error for the trial court to do so). ¶ 23 CONCLUSION ¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County. ¶ 25 Affirmed. ¶ 26 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring. ¶ 27 I concur with the decision of this panel that “shall” in section 2-10.1 of the Act actually means “may.” I concur because the unambiguous supreme court precedent cited by the author compels a finding that in this statute “shall” 2016See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000) (a defendant cannot ask the trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then claim on appeal that it was error for the trial court to do so). ¶ 23 CONCLUSION ¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County. ¶ 25 Affirmed. ¶ 26 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring. ¶ 27 I concur with the decision of this panel that “shall” in section 2-10.1 of the Act actually means “may.” I concur because the unambiguous supreme court precedent cited by the author compels a finding that in this statute “shall” | 2 | 2 |
Ores v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2015See also Ores, 218 Ill. 2014See also Ores, 218 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences1978(See Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 418 , 261 N.E.2d 305 ; Steffa v. Stanley (1976), 39 Ill. 1976And compare Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, at 176-77 with Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 431-32 (1970).) Considering that injury is a necessary element of a cause of action in negligence, to so hold would be to construe section 15 of the statute of limitations in a manner which would bar an action for negligent injury to property before it arises. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sandhamgreen1 sentence2023People v. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d 379, 382 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cosbygreen1 sentence2012People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 271 (2008). -5- by Prucnicki) or the context in relation to when exactly defendant refused to submit to testing (was defendant advised prior to his refusal or after).2 While we find these unanswered questions troubling, we call attention to the fact that it was defendant’s burden at the hearing to prove a prima facie case for rescission. | 1 | 1 |
Pekin Insurance Company v. Roszak/ADCgreen1 sentence2012Pekin Insurance Co. v. Roszak/ADC, LLC, 402 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Ganley v. City of Chicagogreen1 sentence2012Ganley v. City of Chicago, 18 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| The PEOPLE v. Santuccigreen | 1 | 1 |
The PEOPLE v. Zaccagninigreen2 sentences1987App. 2d 302, 312-13 , 179 N.E.2d 415, 420 (a personal injury case), People v. Santucci (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 93, 99 , 180 N.E.2d 491, 493-94 (court interrogated each and every witness who testified, in some instances causing reiteration and emphasis on testimony which pointed to defendant’s guilt and, in another, casting discredit upon a key witness for the defense, and also made remarks to defense counsel of a nature as to show impatience, if not hostility, to the manner in which the defense was conducted), and People v. Zaccagnini (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 408, 410 , 194 N.E.2d 286, 287 (conduct of tr 1987App. 2d 302, 312-13 , 179 N.E.2d 415, 420 (a personal injury case), People v. Santucci (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 93, 99 , 180 N.E.2d 491, 493-94 (court interrogated each and every witness who testified, in some instances causing reiteration and emphasis on testimony which pointed to defendant’s guilt and, in another, casting discredit upon a key witness for the defense, and also made remarks to defense counsel of a nature as to show impatience, if not hostility, to the manner in which the defense was conducted), and People v. Zaccagnini (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 408, 410 , 194 N.E.2d 286, 287 (conduct of tr | 1 | 1 |
| Reske v. Kleingreen | 1 | 1 |
| McKinnie v. Lanegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skinner v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Skillom
green
2 sentences2019Skillom, 2017 IL App (2d) 150681, ¶ 25 . ¶ 87 The defendant argues that the State’s participation at the preliminary inquiry in this case was adversarial and “more than de minimis.” This is so, he contends, because the State was permitted to make direct arguments against his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2018Skillom , 2017 IL App (2d) 150681 , ¶ 25, 411 Ill.Dec. 808 , 74 N.E.3d 117 . ¶ 87 The defendant argues that the State's participation at the preliminary inquiry in this case was adversarial and "more than de minimis ." This is so, he contends, because the State was permitted to make direct arguments against his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Enright v. National Council Knights & Ladies of Security
neutral
2 sentences1934(Enright v. Knights and Ladies of Security, 253 Ill. 460 .) Restrictions upon the power of an agent of an insurance company to waive any of the conditions of the contract or upon the manner of such waiver are themselves conditions of the contract, which may be waived the same as any other condition of the policy. ’ ’ In Zeman v. North American Union, 263 Ill. 304 , on p. 312, the court held: “The law is well settled in this State that the provisions of the by-laws of mutual benefit societies of this character may be waived by the society; that the local lodge or council of such society is the 1913(Enright v. Knights and Ladies of Security, 253 Ill. 460 .) Restrictions upon the power of an agent of an insurance company to waive any of the conditions of the contract or upon the manner of such waiver are themselves conditions of the contract, which may be waived, the same as any other condition of the policy. | 2 | 1913–1934 |
Dromgold v. Royal Neighbors of America
neutral
2 sentences1932(Dromgold v. Royal Neighbors, 261 Ill. 60 ; Zeman v. North American Union, 263 id. 304; Guter v. Security Benefit Ass’n, supra.) A general agent clothed with power to solicit insurance, receive the application and forward it to the company, receive and deliver the policy and collect the premium, has power to waive a condition of the policy notwithstanding that power is negatived by provisions in the policy and his contract of employment. 1929(Dromgold v. Royal Neighbors, 261 Ill. 60 ; Zeman v. North American Union, 263 id. 304.) The rule as to what constitutes a warranty in an application for a mutual benefit certificate differs where the application is filled out and the questions answered by the insured and where the questions are asked and the application is filled out by an agent of the society, and in the former case, where the answers are false and no information as to their falsity is given to the agent, the benefit certificate may be declared void by the society. | 2 | 1929–1932 |
David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508
green
1 sentence2026Although Ortiz and David demonstrate that this framework is not an end-all-be-all for assessing circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the critical takeaway from Ortiz and David is that all evidence of discrimination, no matter direct or indirect, must be evaluated together in a single pile. - 16 - No. 1-25-0147 Given that the only alleged evidence of the Association discriminating against the Schoffs was circumstantial and the Commission analyzed that evidence using the McDonnell Douglas framework, which is a proper manner of analysis (see David, 846 F.3d at 224 ), to determine whether th | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Roman v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board
green
1 sentence2026He contends that such a “comparator analysis” is pertinent here because -7- No. 1-24-1876 this court employed a similar manner of analysis in Roman v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2014 IL App (1st) 123308 , ¶¶ 144-152. ¶ 24 However, Officer Marrero’s reliance on Roman is completely unavailing, as that case is readily distinguishable from the one at hand. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Phillips
green
1 sentence2024People v. Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 58 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Lawson
green
1 sentence2024Defendant argues Holmes’s handwritten affidavit would have been strong evidence for defense counsel to use to disavow Holmes’s inculpation of defendant. ¶ 90 While the failure to impeach a key witness can constitute deficient performance (People v. Lawson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180452, ¶ 53 ), the manner in which defense counsel impeaches a witness is considered a matter of trial strategy and is generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2022Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90 . ¶ 39 3. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Jolly
green
1 sentence2022People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 28 . ¶ 25 At the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence, the circuit court asked the defendant for a specific example of what had displeased him about defense counsel. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Lerma
green
1 sentence2021This record simply does not support defendant’s claim that “the court’s rulings effectively neutered the expertise of the sole defense witness.” ¶ 30 Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly “restricted the substance of Dr. Loftus’s testimony.” Defendant relies heavily on People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496 , where our supreme court “reiterate[d] *** that eyewitness identification is an appropriate subject for expert testimony.” Id. ¶ 28. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Giles v. California
green
2 sentences2018Giles , 554 U.S. at 361 -62 , 128 S.Ct. 2678 ("The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. 2018Giles , 554 U.S. at 361 -62 , 128 S.Ct. 2678 ("The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Tersavich v. First National Bank & Trust Co.
green
1 sentence2013In any event, for that and other reasons,1 I would decline to apply it here. 1 For example, the Tersavich court redefined the manner in which a claim under the Act accrues, in the parlance of the discovery rule, and that newly created standard was in large part “derived from firmly rooted principles of the law of trusts.” Tersavich, 194 Ill. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Pekin Insurance v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2012Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d at 455 . ¶ 60 The alleged conduct, rather than the manner in which the claim is labeled in the underlying complaint, determines whether the insurer has a duty to defend. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Reid
green
2 sentences1995As Justice Wolfson aptly said in People v. Reid (1995), 272 Ill. 1995As Justice Wolfson aptly said in People v. Reid (1995), 272 Ill.App.3d 301, 309 , 208 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Whaley
green
1 sentence1992People v. Whaley (1989), 184 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Rock v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences1991(Rock v. Arkansas (1987), 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 , 97 L. 1991(Rock v. Arkansas (1987), 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 , 97 L. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Badoud
green
2 sentences1989Thus, the supreme court concluded that the trial court can, in a section 2— 118.1 hearing, consider whether an officer’s report is sworn. ( 122 Ill. 2d at 54 , 521 N.E.2d at 886 .) The court went on to hold that, in light of legislative intent and the seriousness of the public hazard that summary suspension legislation addresses, “the General Assembly intended an officer’s good-faith failure to initially swear to the report to be curable.” 122 Ill. 2d at 59 , 521 N.E.2d at 888-89 . 1989Thus, the supreme court concluded that the trial court can, in a section 2— 118.1 hearing, consider whether an officer’s report is sworn. ( 122 Ill. 2d at 54 , 521 N.E.2d at 886 .) The court went on to hold that, in light of legislative intent and the seriousness of the public hazard that summary suspension legislation addresses, “the General Assembly intended an officer’s good-faith failure to initially swear to the report to be curable.” 122 Ill. 2d at 59 , 521 N.E.2d at 888-89 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences1988The Illinois Supreme Court discussed what evidence is necessary to correct a record in People v. Allen (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 177 , 486 N.E.2d 873 . 1988The Illinois Supreme Court discussed what evidence is necessary to correct a record in People v. Allen (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 177 , 486 N.E.2d 873 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Riccitelli v. Sternfeld
green
1 sentence1988App. 63, 67 , 109 N.E.2d 921, 922 .) Each case involving natural or unnatural accumulations of ice and snow turns largely on its own facts rather than on the manner in which the rule of law is stated. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Sims v. Block
green
1 sentence1988(Sims v. Block (1968), 94 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
The PEOPLE v. Long
green
2 sentences1987The State argues (1) defendant has waived this issue since he neither objected to the remarks when they were made, nor raised them in his post-trial motion, citing People v. Long (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 40, 43 , 233 N.E.2d 389, 391 , and other cases; and (2) the cases relied on by defendant are distinguishable. 1987The State argues (1) defendant has waived this issue since he neither objected to the remarks when they were made, nor raised them in his post-trial motion, citing People v. Long (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 40, 43 , 233 N.E.2d 389, 391 , and other cases; and (2) the cases relied on by defendant are distinguishable. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Dilger neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Catalano v. Pechous green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Carlson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Coslet green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Echols green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Precup green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Barker neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Steffa v. Stanley green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co. neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Berezniak neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Janelunas v. Chicago Fraternal Life Ass'n neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Jones v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Zeman v. North American Union neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| The People v. Crooks neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Domitski v. American Linseed Co. neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinnare neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Morton v. Pusey neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.