manner defense (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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manner defense in Illinois

48 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1886–2026 8 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Steiner v. Eckertgreen
illappct · 2013 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2021
2 sentences

2021See Steiner v. Eckert, 2013 IL App (2d) 121290, ¶ 15 (recognizing that a party may not acquiesce in procedure followed in the trial court and then complain about that procedure on appeal).

2020See Steiner v. Eckert, 2013 IL App (2d) 121290, ¶ 15 (recognizing that a party may not acquiesce in procedure followed in the trial court and then complain about that procedure on appeal).

22
People v. Segovianogreen
ill · 2000 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000) (a defendant cannot ask the trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then claim on appeal that it was error for the trial court to do so). ¶ 23 CONCLUSION ¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County. ¶ 25 Affirmed. ¶ 26 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring. ¶ 27 I concur with the decision of this panel that “shall” in section 2-10.1 of the Act actually means “may.” I concur because the unambiguous supreme court precedent cited by the author compels a finding that in this statute “shall”

2016See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000) (a defendant cannot ask the trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then claim on appeal that it was error for the trial court to do so). ¶ 23 CONCLUSION ¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County. ¶ 25 Affirmed. ¶ 26 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring. ¶ 27 I concur with the decision of this panel that “shall” in section 2-10.1 of the Act actually means “may.” I concur because the unambiguous supreme court precedent cited by the author compels a finding that in this statute “shall”

22
Ores v. Kennedygreen
illappct · 1991 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2014–2015
2 sentences

2015See also Ores, 218 Ill.

2014See also Ores, 218 Ill.

22
Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.green
ill · 1970 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1976–1978
2 sentences

1978(See Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 418 , 261 N.E.2d 305 ; Steffa v. Stanley (1976), 39 Ill.

1976And compare Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, at 176-77 with Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 431-32 (1970).) Considering that injury is a necessary element of a cause of action in negligence, to so hold would be to construe section 15 of the statute of limitations in a manner which would bar an action for negligent injury to property before it arises.

12
People v. Sandhamgreen
ill · 1996 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023People v. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d 379, 382 (1996).

11
People v. Cosbygreen
ill · 2008 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 271 (2008). -5- by Prucnicki) or the context in relation to when exactly defendant refused to submit to testing (was defendant advised prior to his refusal or after).2 While we find these unanswered questions troubling, we call attention to the fact that it was defendant’s burden at the hearing to prove a prima facie case for rescission.

11
Pekin Insurance Company v. Roszak/ADCgreen
illappct · 2010 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012Pekin Insurance Co. v. Roszak/ADC, LLC, 402 Ill.

11
Ganley v. City of Chicagogreen
illappct · 1974 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012Ganley v. City of Chicago, 18 Ill.

11
The PEOPLE v. Santuccigreen
ill · 1962 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
11
The PEOPLE v. Zaccagninigreen
ill · 1963 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987App. 2d 302, 312-13 , 179 N.E.2d 415, 420 (a personal injury case), People v. Santucci (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 93, 99 , 180 N.E.2d 491, 493-94 (court interrogated each and every witness who testified, in some instances causing reiteration and emphasis on testimony which pointed to defendant’s guilt and, in another, casting discredit upon a key witness for the defense, and also made remarks to defense counsel of a nature as to show impatience, if not hostility, to the manner in which the defense was conducted), and People v. Zaccagnini (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 408, 410 , 194 N.E.2d 286, 287 (conduct of tr

1987App. 2d 302, 312-13 , 179 N.E.2d 415, 420 (a personal injury case), People v. Santucci (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 93, 99 , 180 N.E.2d 491, 493-94 (court interrogated each and every witness who testified, in some instances causing reiteration and emphasis on testimony which pointed to defendant’s guilt and, in another, casting discredit upon a key witness for the defense, and also made remarks to defense counsel of a nature as to show impatience, if not hostility, to the manner in which the defense was conducted), and People v. Zaccagnini (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 408, 410 , 194 N.E.2d 286, 287 (conduct of tr

11
Reske v. Kleingreen
illappct · 1961 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
11
McKinnie v. Lanegreen
ill · 1907 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
11
Skinner v. Andersongreen
ill · 1967 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (44)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Skillom green
illappct · 2017
2 sentences

2019Skillom, 2017 IL App (2d) 150681, ¶ 25 . ¶ 87 The defendant argues that the State’s participation at the preliminary inquiry in this case was adversarial and “more than de minimis.” This is so, he contends, because the State was permitted to make direct arguments against his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2018Skillom , 2017 IL App (2d) 150681 , ¶ 25, 411 Ill.Dec. 808 , 74 N.E.3d 117 . ¶ 87 The defendant argues that the State's participation at the preliminary inquiry in this case was adversarial and "more than de minimis ." This is so, he contends, because the State was permitted to make direct arguments against his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

22018–2019
Enright v. National Council Knights & Ladies of Security neutral
ill · 1912
2 sentences

1934(Enright v. Knights and Ladies of Security, 253 Ill. 460 .) Restrictions upon the power of an agent of an insurance company to waive any of the conditions of the contract or upon the manner of such waiver are themselves conditions of the contract, which may be waived the same as any other condition of the policy. ’ ’ In Zeman v. North American Union, 263 Ill. 304 , on p. 312, the court held: “The law is well settled in this State that the provisions of the by-laws of mutual benefit societies of this character may be waived by the society; that the local lodge or council of such society is the

1913(Enright v. Knights and Ladies of Security, 253 Ill. 460 .) Restrictions upon the power of an agent of an insurance company to waive any of the conditions of the contract or upon the manner of such waiver are themselves conditions of the contract, which may be waived, the same as any other condition of the policy.

21913–1934
Dromgold v. Royal Neighbors of America neutral
ill · 1913
2 sentences

1932(Dromgold v. Royal Neighbors, 261 Ill. 60 ; Zeman v. North American Union, 263 id. 304; Guter v. Security Benefit Ass’n, supra.) A general agent clothed with power to solicit insurance, receive the application and forward it to the company, receive and deliver the policy and collect the premium, has power to waive a condition of the policy notwithstanding that power is negatived by provisions in the policy and his contract of employment.

1929(Dromgold v. Royal Neighbors, 261 Ill. 60 ; Zeman v. North American Union, 263 id. 304.) The rule as to what constitutes a warranty in an application for a mutual benefit certificate differs where the application is filled out and the questions answered by the insured and where the questions are asked and the application is filled out by an agent of the society, and in the former case, where the answers are false and no information as to their falsity is given to the agent, the benefit certificate may be declared void by the society.

21929–1932
David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 green
ca7 · 2017
1 sentence

2026Although Ortiz and David demonstrate that this framework is not an end-all-be-all for assessing circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the critical takeaway from Ortiz and David is that all evidence of discrimination, no matter direct or indirect, must be evaluated together in a single pile. - 16 - No. 1-25-0147 Given that the only alleged evidence of the Association discriminating against the Schoffs was circumstantial and the Commission analyzed that evidence using the McDonnell Douglas framework, which is a proper manner of analysis (see David, 846 F.3d at 224 ), to determine whether th

12026–2026
Roman v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board green
illappct · 2014
1 sentence

2026He contends that such a “comparator analysis” is pertinent here because -7- No. 1-24-1876 this court employed a similar manner of analysis in Roman v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2014 IL App (1st) 123308 , ¶¶ 144-152. ¶ 24 However, Officer Marrero’s reliance on Roman is completely unavailing, as that case is readily distinguishable from the one at hand.

12026–2026
People v. Phillips green
illappct · 2017
1 sentence

2024People v. Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 58 .

12024–2024
People v. Lawson green
illappct · 2019
1 sentence

2024Defendant argues Holmes’s handwritten affidavit would have been strong evidence for defense counsel to use to disavow Holmes’s inculpation of defendant. ¶ 90 While the failure to impeach a key witness can constitute deficient performance (People v. Lawson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180452, ¶ 53 ), the manner in which defense counsel impeaches a witness is considered a matter of trial strategy and is generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

12024–2024
People v. Jackson green
ill · 2020
1 sentence

2022Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90 . ¶ 39 3.

12022–2022
People v. Jolly green
ill · 2014
1 sentence

2022People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 28 . ¶ 25 At the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence, the circuit court asked the defendant for a specific example of what had displeased him about defense counsel.

12022–2022
People v. Lerma green
ill · 2016
1 sentence

2021This record simply does not support defendant’s claim that “the court’s rulings effectively neutered the expertise of the sole defense witness.” ¶ 30 Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly “restricted the substance of Dr. Loftus’s testimony.” Defendant relies heavily on People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496 , where our supreme court “reiterate[d] *** that eyewitness identification is an appropriate subject for expert testimony.” Id. ¶ 28.

12021–2021
Giles v. California green
scotus · 2008
2 sentences

2018Giles , 554 U.S. at 361 -62 , 128 S.Ct. 2678 ("The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.

2018Giles , 554 U.S. at 361 -62 , 128 S.Ct. 2678 ("The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.

12018–2018
Tersavich v. First National Bank & Trust Co. green
illappct · 1990
1 sentence

2013In any event, for that and other reasons,1 I would decline to apply it here. 1 For example, the Tersavich court redefined the manner in which a claim under the Act accrues, in the parlance of the discovery rule, and that newly created standard was in large part “derived from firmly rooted principles of the law of trusts.” Tersavich, 194 Ill.

12013–2013
Pekin Insurance v. Wilson green
ill · 2010
1 sentence

2012Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d at 455 . ¶ 60 The alleged conduct, rather than the manner in which the claim is labeled in the underlying complaint, determines whether the insurer has a duty to defend.

12012–2012
People v. Reid green
illappct · 1995
2 sentences

1995As Justice Wolfson aptly said in People v. Reid (1995), 272 Ill.

1995As Justice Wolfson aptly said in People v. Reid (1995), 272 Ill.App.3d 301, 309 , 208 Ill.

11995–1995
People v. Whaley green
illappct · 1989
1 sentence

1992People v. Whaley (1989), 184 Ill.

11992–1992
Rock v. Arkansas green
scotus · 1987
2 sentences

1991(Rock v. Arkansas (1987), 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 , 97 L.

1991(Rock v. Arkansas (1987), 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 , 97 L.

11991–1991
People v. Badoud green
ill · 1988
2 sentences

1989Thus, the supreme court concluded that the trial court can, in a section 2— 118.1 hearing, consider whether an officer’s report is sworn. ( 122 Ill. 2d at 54 , 521 N.E.2d at 886 .) The court went on to hold that, in light of legislative intent and the seriousness of the public hazard that summary suspension legislation addresses, “the General Assembly intended an officer’s good-faith failure to initially swear to the report to be curable.” 122 Ill. 2d at 59 , 521 N.E.2d at 888-89 .

1989Thus, the supreme court concluded that the trial court can, in a section 2— 118.1 hearing, consider whether an officer’s report is sworn. ( 122 Ill. 2d at 54 , 521 N.E.2d at 886 .) The court went on to hold that, in light of legislative intent and the seriousness of the public hazard that summary suspension legislation addresses, “the General Assembly intended an officer’s good-faith failure to initially swear to the report to be curable.” 122 Ill. 2d at 59 , 521 N.E.2d at 888-89 .

11989–1989
People v. Allen green
ill · 1985
2 sentences

1988The Illinois Supreme Court discussed what evidence is necessary to correct a record in People v. Allen (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 177 , 486 N.E.2d 873 .

1988The Illinois Supreme Court discussed what evidence is necessary to correct a record in People v. Allen (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 177 , 486 N.E.2d 873 .

11988–1988
Riccitelli v. Sternfeld green
illappct · 1953
1 sentence

1988App. 63, 67 , 109 N.E.2d 921, 922 .) Each case involving natural or unnatural accumulations of ice and snow turns largely on its own facts rather than on the manner in which the rule of law is stated.

11988–1988
Sims v. Block green
illappct · 1968
1 sentence

1988(Sims v. Block (1968), 94 Ill.

11988–1988
The PEOPLE v. Long green
ill · 1968
2 sentences

1987The State argues (1) defendant has waived this issue since he neither objected to the remarks when they were made, nor raised them in his post-trial motion, citing People v. Long (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 40, 43 , 233 N.E.2d 389, 391 , and other cases; and (2) the cases relied on by defendant are distinguishable.

1987The State argues (1) defendant has waived this issue since he neither objected to the remarks when they were made, nor raised them in his post-trial motion, citing People v. Long (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 40, 43 , 233 N.E.2d 389, 391 , and other cases; and (2) the cases relied on by defendant are distinguishable.

11987–1987
People v. Dilger neutral
illappct · 1984
11986–1986
Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc. green
ill · 1985
11985–1985
Catalano v. Pechous green
illappct · 1979
11984–1984
People v. Carlson green
ill · 1980
11980–1980
People v. Coslet green
ill · 1977
11980–1980
People v. Echols green
ill · 1978
11980–1980
People v. Precup green
ill · 1978
11979–1979
People v. Barker neutral
illappct · 1973
11979–1979
Steffa v. Stanley green
illappct · 1976
11978–1978
Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District green
ill · 1972
11978–1978
Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co. neutral
tenn · 1906
11956–1956
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Berezniak neutral
ill · 1920
11956–1956
Janelunas v. Chicago Fraternal Life Ass'n neutral
illappct · 1936
11940–1940
Jones v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor green
ill · 1908
11934–1934
Zeman v. North American Union neutral
ill · 1914
11934–1934
The People v. Crooks neutral
ill · 1927
11929–1929
Domitski v. American Linseed Co. neutral
ill · 1906
11929–1929
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinnare neutral
ill · 1903
11913–1913
Morton v. Pusey neutral
ill · 1908
11912–1912

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 142 (1859–2026) CA 92 (1911–2025) TX 84 (1923–2026) IL 48 (1886–2026) PA 47 (1869–2025) OH 39 (1962–2025) FL 31 (1922–2024) MI 30 (1934–2023) GA 27 (1889–2026) AL 24 (1906–2025) CT 24 (1859–2020) NC 22 (1905–2024) NJ 19 (1939–2024) MO 19 (1884–2023) MN 17 (1902–2019) WA 15 (1980–2021) IN 15 (1887–2014) WV 12 (1873–2023) TN 12 (1975–2025) LA 12 (1953–2020) RI 12 (1965–2022) OK 11 (1913–2020) MS 10 (1993–2023) AZ 9 (1966–2026) WI 9 (1950–2019) ND 9 (1945–2022) CO 8 (1981–2026) OR 8 (1961–2023) IA 7 (1895–2019) KS 7 (1918–2014) MD 7 (1968–2024) AR 5 (1983–2019) UT 5 (1996–2019) MA 4 (1974–2015) VA 4 (1963–2016) DC 4 (1979–1990) MT 3 (1928–2023) ID 3 (1910–1989) KY 3 (2014–2021) HI 3 (1978–2022) SD 3 (1928–2013) VT 3 (1933–1991) NE 2 (1896–1939) DE 2 (1972–1987) NV 2 (1965–2013) PR 2 (1954–1986)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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