manner defense in Georgia

2016Legacy Academy v. JLK, Inc., 330 Ga. App. 397, 402 (2) ( 765 SE2d 472 ) (2014).

2016Legacy Academy v. JLK, Inc., 330 Ga. App. 397, 402 (2) ( 765 SE2d 472 ) (2014).

2025And the second presumption likely applies, too: Hill definitively con- strued the manner clause of what is now Paragraph VIII, which first appeared in the 1868 Constitution and has been readopted in five more Georgia Constitutions since then, including the current one, 53 Ga. at 479-483 (2); Strickland applied Hill and definitively con- strued the same language that was readopted into the next four con- stitutions including the current one, 137 Ga. at 11-12 (1); and Car- son confirmed and applied that construction to the same language in 1978, just five years before our current constitution re

2025And the second presumption likely applies, too: Hill definitively con- strued the manner clause of what is now Paragraph VIII, which first appeared in the 1868 Constitution and has been readopted in five more Georgia Constitutions since then, including the current one, 53 Ga. at 479-483 (2); Strickland applied Hill and definitively con- strued the same language that was readopted into the next four con- stitutions including the current one, 137 Ga. at 11-12 (1); and Car- son confirmed and applied that construction to the same language in 1978, just five years before our current constitution re

2025And the second presumption likely applies, too: Hill definitively con- strued the manner clause of what is now Paragraph VIII, which first appeared in the 1868 Constitution and has been readopted in five 15 more Georgia Constitutions since then, including the current one, 53 Ga. at 479-483 (2); Strickland applied Hill and definitively con- strued the same language that was readopted into the next four Con- stitutions including the current one, 137 Ga. at 11-12 (1); and Car- son confirmed and applied that construction to the same language in 1978, just five years before our current Constitution

2025And the second presumption likely applies, too: Hill definitively con- strued the manner clause of what is now Paragraph VIII, which first appeared in the 1868 Constitution and has been readopted in five more Georgia Constitutions since then, including the current one, 53 Ga. at 479-483 (2); Strickland applied Hill and definitively con- strued the same language that was readopted into the next four con- stitutions including the current one, 137 Ga. at 11-12 (1); and Car- son confirmed and applied that construction to the same language in 1978, just five years before our current constitution re

2025And the second presumption likely applies, too: Hill definitively con- strued the manner clause of what is now Paragraph VIII, which first appeared in the 1868 Constitution and has been readopted in five 15 more Georgia Constitutions since then, including the current one, 53 Ga. at 479-483 (2); Strickland applied Hill and definitively con- strued the same language that was readopted into the next four Con- stitutions including the current one, 137 Ga. at 11-12 (1); and Car- son confirmed and applied that construction to the same language in 1978, just five years before our current Constitution

2016See, e.g., Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 202 (3) ( 647 SE2d 54 ) (2007) (“[T]he provision of medical care [to an inmate by the sheriff] is a ministerial act because the duty [to provide medical care] is imposed by statute.”).

2016See, e.g., Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 202 (3) ( 647 SE2d 54 ) (2007) (“[T]he provision of medical care [to an inmate by the sheriff] is a ministerial act because the duty [to provide medical care] is imposed by statute.”).

2014Id.; see also id. at 361 (II) (B) (“The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”); id. at 365 (II) (B) (“But as the evidence amply shows, the ‘wrong’ and the ‘evil Practices’ to which these statements referred was conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying.”). 98 U. S. 145 (25 LE 244) (1878).

2014Giles, 554 U. S. at 366-67 (II) (C) (noting adoption of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine in Reynolds)-, see Reynolds, 98 U. S. at 158 (4) (“The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away.

2014Giles, 554 U. S. at 366-67 (II) (C) (noting adoption of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine in Reynolds)-, see Reynolds, 98 U. S. at 158 (4) (“The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away.

2011Therefore, the trial court's "inquiries were appropriate to [its] determination as to how to exercise its discretion." Berry v. State, 282 Ga. 376, 377 (2), 651 S.E.2d 1 (2007). 7.

2011Therefore, the trial court's "inquiries were appropriate to [its] determination as to how to exercise its discretion." Berry v. State, 282 Ga. 376, 377 (2), 651 S.E.2d 1 (2007). 7.

2008“This presumption arises when the employee’s death is ‘unexplained.’ This does not mean, however, that the immediate cause of death must be unexplained; it means that the precipitating cause, rather than the immediate cause, of death must be unexplained.” Buschel v. Kysor/Warren, 213 Ga. App. 91, 94 (4) ( 444 SE2d 105 ) (1994).

2008“This presumption arises when the employee’s death is ‘unexplained.’ This does not mean, however, that the immediate cause of death must be unexplained; it means that the precipitating cause, rather than the immediate cause, of death must be unexplained.” Buschel v. Kysor/Warren, 213 Ga. App. 91, 94 (4) ( 444 SE2d 105 ) (1994).

2005Mullinax, supra, 273 Ga. at 759 (2).

2005Mullinax, supra, 273 Ga. at 759 (2).

2003Holmes v. State, 273 Ga. 644, 648 (5) (c) ( 543 SE2d 688 ) (2001). (e) The manner in which defense counsel dealt with the eyewitnesses on direct and cross-examination is urged as ineffective in several particulars.

2003Holmes v. State, 273 Ga. 644, 648 (5) (c) ( 543 SE2d 688 ) (2001). (e) The manner in which defense counsel dealt with the eyewitnesses on direct and cross-examination is urged as ineffective in several particulars.

1997Even if the state undertakes to provide such services, its failure to render same in a proper manner or in violation of state law does not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, unless the state created the medical emergency or the person was in state custody or control at the time of the emergency. [Cits.]” Hendon, supra at 757 (3), citing Cleveland, supra. Because there is no evidence that DeKalb County created Thomas’ emergency, and she was not in the county’s custody or control, the plaintiffs have failed to establish this threshold element necessary to their 42

1997See generally Luallen v. State, 266 Ga. 174 (3) (b) ( 465 SE2d 672 ) (1996).

1997See generally Luallen v. State, 266 Ga. 174 (3) (b) ( 465 SE2d 672 ) (1996).

1997Even if the state undertakes to provide such services, its failure to render same in a proper manner or in violation of state law does not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, unless the state created the medical emergency or the person was in state custody or control at the time of the emergency. [Cits.]” Hendon, supra at 757 (3), citing Cleveland, supra. Because there is no evidence that DeKalb County created Thomas’ emergency, and she was not in the county’s custody or control, the plaintiffs have failed to establish this threshold element necessary to their 42

1997Cleveland, supra at 169-170 (1). 4.

1995OCGA § 16-1-7(c). [5] Because the indictment charging kidnapping with bodily injury recites an injury inflicted on the victim other than the injury that caused the victim's death, the record before this Court does not establish that the kidnapping is an included offense as a matter of fact, see Potts v. State, supra, 261 Ga. at 716 (1), 410 S.E.2d 89 , and we have recognized that these crimes are not included as a matter of law.

1995OCGA § 16-1-7(c). [5] Because the indictment charging kidnapping with bodily injury recites an injury inflicted on the victim other than the injury that caused the victim's death, the record before this Court does not establish that the kidnapping is an included offense as a matter of fact, see Potts v. State, supra, 261 Ga. at 716 (1), 410 S.E.2d 89 , and we have recognized that these crimes are not included as a matter of law.

1983The defendants complain that plaintiff’s counsel prejudiced their case by repeatedly making denigrating remarks concerning both the integrity of defense counsel and the manner in which the defense was being conducted and that the trial court erred in “failing to control the conduct of plaintiffs counsel” or “to rebuke counsel properly when requested and when the situation demanded such a rebuke ...” “ ‘[W]hat has transpired in a case from its inception to its conclusion, and the conduct of the party or his counsel with respect to the case is the subject of legitimate comment,’ ” Miller v. Cole

1983The defendants complain that plaintiff’s counsel prejudiced their case by repeatedly making denigrating remarks concerning both the integrity of defense counsel and the manner in which the defense was being conducted and that the trial court erred in “failing to control the conduct of plaintiffs counsel” or “to rebuke counsel properly when requested and when the situation demanded such a rebuke ...” “ ‘[W]hat has transpired in a case from its inception to its conclusion, and the conduct of the party or his counsel with respect to the case is the subject of legitimate comment,’ ” Miller v. Cole

1982See White v. State, 243 Ga. 250, 251 ( 253 SE2d 694 ); Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 408 ( 271 SE2d 802 ).

1982See White v. State, 243 Ga. 250, 251 ( 253 SE2d 694 ); Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 408 ( 271 SE2d 802 ).

1982See White v. State, 243 Ga. 250, 251 ( 253 SE2d 694 ); Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 408 ( 271 SE2d 802 ).

1982See White v. State, 243 Ga. 250, 251 ( 253 SE2d 694 ); Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 408 ( 271 SE2d 802 ).

1981Where the evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions is properly tendered and admitted without objection, “a subsequent review of that phase is eliminated.” Bradshaw v. State, 145 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 244 SE2d 600 ) (1978).

1981Where the evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions is properly tendered and admitted without objection, “a subsequent review of that phase is eliminated.” Bradshaw v. State, 145 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 244 SE2d 600 ) (1978).

1971See West View Corp. v. Alston, 208 Ga. 122 ( 65 SE2d 406 ); Goodwin v. Candace, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 438 ( 88 SE2d 723 ). 3.

1971See West View Corp. v. Alston, 208 Ga. 122 ( 65 SE2d 406 ); Goodwin v. Candace, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 438 ( 88 SE2d 723 ). 3.