manner rule in Connecticut

2017A proper request to charge cannot, therefore, under our practice merely be a statement of an abstract proposition of law ...." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 482-83 , 569 A.2d 10 ; see also Konover Development Corp. v. Zeller , 228 Conn. 206 , 214 n.5, 635 A.2d 798 (1994) ("[t]he purpose of [ Practice Book § 16-23 ] is to require parties to inform the trial court of the manner in which a rule of law applies to a particular case, rather than simply stating an abstract proposition of law").

2017A proper request to charge cannot, therefore, under our practice merely be a statement of an abstract proposition of law ...." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 482-83 , 569 A.2d 10 ; see also Konover Development Corp. v. Zeller , 228 Conn. 206 , 214 n.5, 635 A.2d 798 (1994) ("[t]he purpose of [ Practice Book § 16-23 ] is to require parties to inform the trial court of the manner in which a rule of law applies to a particular case, rather than simply stating an abstract proposition of law").

2007See State v. Carty, 100 Conn. App. 40, 44 , 45 n.5 and 48 n.7, 916 A.2d 852 (trial court could properly have joined cases under either factors in State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 722-24 , 529 A.2d 1260 [1987], or under *263 theory that evidence from each case would be cross admissible), cert. denied, 282 Conn. 917 , 925 A.2d 1100 (2007). 6 Practice Book § 44-7 provides in relevant part: “An . . . incarcerated witness shall not be required during the course of a trial to appear in court in the distinctive attire of a prisoner or convict.” “In the minds of the jurors the credibility of [incarc

2007See State v. Carty, 100 Conn. App. 40, 44 , 45 n.5 and 48 n.7, 916 A.2d 852 (trial court could properly have joined cases under either factors in State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 722-24 , 529 A.2d 1260 [1987], or under *263 theory that evidence from each case would be cross admissible), cert. denied, 282 Conn. 917 , 925 A.2d 1100 (2007). 6 Practice Book § 44-7 provides in relevant part: “An . . . incarcerated witness shall not be required during the course of a trial to appear in court in the distinctive attire of a prisoner or convict.” “In the minds of the jurors the credibility of [incarc

2015The court noted that ‘‘[t]he form of the warning, i.e., by posting a notice or fence or barricade and by lighting the hazard at night, as well as the timing of the warning, i.e., immediately upon discovery of the unsafe condition and until necessary repairs are made, are set forth explicitly in the ordi- nance.’’ Id., 658 ; cf. Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates, LLC, 135 Conn. App. 262, 272 , 41 A.3d 1147 (2012) (maintenance of road, drains and storm sewers discretionary because tax district bylaws did not ‘‘pre- scribe the specific manner in which the duty to maintain and repair the

2015The court noted that ‘‘[t]he form of the warning, i.e., by posting a notice or fence or barricade and by lighting the hazard at night, as well as the timing of the warning, i.e., immediately upon discovery of the unsafe condition and until necessary repairs are made, are set forth explicitly in the ordi- nance.’’ Id., 658 ; cf. Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates, LLC, 135 Conn. App. 262, 272 , 41 A.3d 1147 (2012) (maintenance of road, drains and storm sewers discretionary because tax district bylaws did not ‘‘pre- scribe the specific manner in which the duty to maintain and repair the

2015The court in Bonington relied on Grignano v. Mil- ford, 106 Conn. App. 648, 658 , 943 A.2d 507 (2008), in which this court found ministerial the duty to warn invitees of known hazards because the ordinance in question prescribed the manner in which the warning was required to be issued.

2015The court in Bonington relied on Grignano v. Mil- ford, 106 Conn. App. 648, 658 , 943 A.2d 507 (2008), in which this court found ministerial the duty to warn invitees of known hazards because the ordinance in question prescribed the manner in which the warning was required to be issued.

2012The defendant did not claim, however, that. . . assigned counsel was unprepared to go forward, unskilled in the issues at hand, or unresponsive to the defendant's wishes about the manner in which his defense should proceed." Id., at 249 , 636 A.2d 760 .

2012The defendant did not claim, however, that . . . assigned counsel was unprepared to go forward, unskilled in the issues at hand, or unresponsive to the defendant’s wishes about the manner in which his defense should proceed.” Id., 249 .

2011A In support of their claim that Montigny does not have standing in this court to challenge the manner in which the hearing on remand was held, the plaintiff and the defendant cite Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143 , 953 A.2d 1 (2008).

2011A In support of their claim that Montigny does not have standing in this court to challenge the manner in which the hearing on remand was held, the plaintiff and the defendant cite Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143 , 953 A.2d 1 (2008).

2001Id.

2001No less importantly, they gave Aetna complete control over the manner in which the defense would be managed and conducted, explicitly empowering it, inter alia, to investigate and/or settle the case "as it deem[ed] expedient." Id.

2000Id., 237-38 .

1999In Barrett v. Danbury Hospital, 232 Conn. 242 (1995), although the Supreme Court did not adopt the "actual exposure" test, they sustained a defendant's summary judgment because the plaintiffs had failed to show any contact with blood in the manner that they claim to have caused their fear.

1999Hughes v. Town Planning Zoning Commission , 156 Conn. 505 , 508 (1968); Maloney v. Taplin , 154 Conn. 247 , 249-50 (1966); I.R.

1999Hughes v. Town Planning Zoning Commission , 156 Conn. 505 , 508 (1968); Maloney v. Taplin , 154 Conn. 247 , 249-50 (1966); I.R.

1996Board of Education v. Local 1282, 31 Conn. App. 629 , 632-33 (1993).

1993The motion for summary judgment is designed to "test for the presence of contested factual issues." Burke v. Avitabile, 32 Conn. App. 765 , 722, ___ A.2d ___ (1993).

1985Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, supra, 360 ; cf. Baskin’s Appeal from Probate, 194 Conn. 635, 640-41 , 484 A.2d 934 (1984).

1985Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, supra, 360 ; cf. Baskin’s Appeal from Probate, 194 Conn. 635, 640-41 , 484 A.2d 934 (1984).

1977Co. v. Somers, 146 Conn. 708 , 156 A.2d 146 ; but since the plaintiff did not complain of the manner in which the challenge was raised and since both parties appear to have thoroughly understood the issues presented on appeal, we conclude that no purpose would be served by returning the case to the Superior Court for further pleading.

1977Co. v. Somers, 146 Conn. 708 , 156 A.2d 146 ; but since the plaintiff did not complain of the manner in which the challenge was raised and since both parties appear to have thoroughly understood the issues presented on appeal, we conclude that no purpose would be served by returning the case to the Superior Court for further pleading.

1975At the conclusion of the court’s charge to the jury, the state took exception to the court’s failure to charge that “the jury may justifiably imply malice from the use of a deadly weapon.” After some reflection and relying on State v. Guilfoyle, *260 109 Conn. 124, 138 , 145 A. 761 , the court agreed that the “law presumes malice from the unlawful use of a deadly weapon such as a revolver or pistol.” The jury were then recalled to receive a supplemental charge.

1975At the conclusion of the court’s charge to the jury, the state took exception to the court’s failure to charge that “the jury may justifiably imply malice from the use of a deadly weapon.” After some reflection and relying on State v. Guilfoyle, *260 109 Conn. 124, 138 , 145 A. 761 , the court agreed that the “law presumes malice from the unlawful use of a deadly weapon such as a revolver or pistol.” The jury were then recalled to receive a supplemental charge.

1934Practice Book, p. 293, § 209; Maisenbacker v. *163 Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 376 , 42 Atl. 67 .

1934Practice Book, p. 293, § 209; Maisenbacker v. *163 Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 376 , 42 Atl. 67 .

1859But the recent case of McGilvray v. Avery, ( 30 Verm., 538 ,) is precisely in point here, even as to the manner of applying the principle.