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12 Rhode Island opinions name it 1 courts 1965–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reidgreen2 sentences1998Instead we consider the manner in which the instruction “would be interpreted by a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent lay persons listening to it at the close of the trial.” State v. Reid, 101 R.I. 863 , 366, 223 A.2d 444, 446 (1966). 1982It is our function to consider the manner in which the instruction “would be interpreted by a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent lay persons listening to it at the close of the trial.” State v. Reid, 101 R.I. 363, 366 , 223 A.2d. 444, 446 (1966). | 2 | 2 |
Adam Correia v. John Bettencourt v. James Martitzgreen1 sentence2022Correia v. Bettencourt, 162 A.3d 630, 635 (R.I. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Joseph McNulty v. Kristen Chipgreen1 sentence2019Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the defense of lack of standing constitutes an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) (even though it is not specifically mentioned therein), it is nonetheless our view that Homeland's raising said defense in its motion for summary judgment was sufficient in view of the totality of what transpired in the Superior Court. 5 See Industrial National Bank v. Peloso , 121 R.I. 305 , 309, 397 A.2d 1312 , 1314 (1979) (holding that an affirmative defense raised at summary judgment "could be interposed as a defense upon an amendment of defendant's pleadings, and we bel | 1 | 1 |
State v. Felicianogreen1 sentence2007See id. | 1 | 1 |
Stoll v. Gottliebgreen2 sentences1996As noted by the late Justice Reed in Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 , 59 S.Ct. 134, 138 , 83 L.Ed. 104, 109 (1938), “[i]t is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation.” With these basic concepts of the doctrine of res judicata so stated, we now turn to the manner in which this doctrine is properly applied. 1996As noted by the late Justice Reed in Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 , 59 S.Ct. 134, 138 , 83 L.Ed. 104, 109 (1938), “[i]t is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation.” With these basic concepts of the doctrine of res judicata so stated, we now turn to the manner in which this doctrine is properly applied. | 1 | 1 |
McLain v. Jareckigreen1 sentence1979See McLain v. Jarecki, 107 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
348 Bloomfield Avenue Corp. v. Montclair Mfg. Co.green1 sentence1975Co., 90 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (D.N.J. 1950). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Air-Lite Products, Inc. v. GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY
green
2 sentences2019Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the defense of lack of standing constitutes an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) (even though it is not specifically mentioned therein), it is nonetheless our view that Homeland's raising said defense in its motion for summary judgment was sufficient in view of the totality of what transpired in the Superior Court. 5 See Industrial National Bank v. Peloso , 121 R.I. 305 , 309, 397 A.2d 1312 , 1314 (1979) (holding that an affirmative defense raised at summary judgment "could be interposed as a defense upon an amendment of defendant's pleadings, and we bel 2019Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the defense of lack of standing constitutes an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) (even though it is not specifically mentioned therein), it is nonetheless our view that Homeland's raising said defense in its motion for summary judgment was sufficient in view of the totality of what transpired in the Superior Court. 5 See Industrial National Bank v. Peloso , 121 R.I. 305 , 309, 397 A.2d 1312 , 1314 (1979) (holding that an affirmative defense raised at summary judgment "could be interposed as a defense upon an amendment of defendant's pleadings, and we bel | 2 | 1979–2019 |
Industrial National Bank v. Peloso
green
2 sentences2019Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the defense of lack of standing constitutes an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) (even though it is not specifically mentioned therein), it is nonetheless our view that Homeland's raising said defense in its motion for summary judgment was sufficient in view of the totality of what transpired in the Superior Court. 5 See Industrial National Bank v. Peloso , 121 R.I. 305 , 309, 397 A.2d 1312 , 1314 (1979) (holding that an affirmative defense raised at summary judgment "could be interposed as a defense upon an amendment of defendant's pleadings, and we bel 2019Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the defense of lack of standing constitutes an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) (even though it is not specifically mentioned therein), it is nonetheless our view that Homeland's raising said defense in its motion for summary judgment was sufficient in view of the totality of what transpired in the Superior Court. 5 See Industrial National Bank v. Peloso , 121 R.I. 305 , 309, 397 A.2d 1312 , 1314 (1979) (holding that an affirmative defense raised at summary judgment "could be interposed as a defense upon an amendment of defendant's pleadings, and we bel | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Thornton v. State
green
2 sentences2012This Court’s opinion in Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d 312 (R.I.2008), demonstrates the manner in which a hearing justice may simultaneously apply both the statutory provisions permitting summary dismissal and the mandates of Shatney in considering an applicant’s postconviction-relief endeavor. 2012This Court's opinion in Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d 312 (R.I.2008), demonstrates the manner in which a hearing justice may simultaneously apply both the statutory provisions permitting summary dismissal and the mandates of Shatney in considering an applicant's postconviction-relief endeavor. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Hanes
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Plante
green
2 sentences1987We outlined the manner in which an exception to allegedly improper prosecutorial remarks may be taken in State v. Plante, 111 R.I. 386 , 302 A.2d 804 (1973). 1987We outlined the manner in which an exception to allegedly improper prosecutorial remarks may be taken in State v. Plante, 111 R.I. 386 , 302 A.2d 804 (1973). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Giordano
green
1 sentence1965In State v. Giordano, 121 N.J.L. 469 (at p. 471), this court said: “ ‘The statute under review, if regarded as doing-nothing more than indicating the manner in which a presumption of guilt from .proof of possession of stolen property within one year from the date of theft, may be rebutted, deprives the .citizen of no constitutional *29 guarantee but merely enacts a rule of evidence well within 'the general power of government.’ ” The court in Lisena continued: “The statute does not shift the burden of proof nor deprive the accused of due process nor is it arbitrary and unreasonable. * * * In t | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.