15 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1887–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green v. Greengreen1 sentence2014See Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that “[a]s the trial court did not issue findings in the proceeding below, we cannot be certain as to which of the section 8 factors the trial court considered important or as to the manner, if at all, in which each factor was evaluated”). 9 Accordingly, we reverse the October 31, 2013 order and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter an order demonstrating that the court fully considered the relevant statutory factors based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the October 21, 2013 hearing and other incorp | 1 | 1 |
Luna v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Luna, 758 N.E.2d at 518 (holding that the failure to state the ground for her objection that she asserted on appeal waived her ability to raise that issue). | 1 | 1 |
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Munagreen1 sentence2013Id. at 768 (citations omitted). 9 fiduciary relationship is in existence, an employee cannot by resigning and not disclosing all he knows about the negotiations, subsequently continue and consummate the transaction in a manner in violation of his fiduciary duties”) (quoting Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 695 (Utah 1981)); Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 117 N.E.2d 237, 245-46 (N.Y. 1954) (“[n]or is it a defense that the defendants-appellants did not avail themselves of the benefit of the customers…diverted from plaintiff until after defendants [had left employment]”; the benef | 1 | 1 |
Duane Jones Co. v. Burkegreen1 sentence2013Id. at 768 (citations omitted). 9 fiduciary relationship is in existence, an employee cannot by resigning and not disclosing all he knows about the negotiations, subsequently continue and consummate the transaction in a manner in violation of his fiduciary duties”) (quoting Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 695 (Utah 1981)); Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 117 N.E.2d 237, 245-46 (N.Y. 1954) (“[n]or is it a defense that the defendants-appellants did not avail themselves of the benefit of the customers…diverted from plaintiff until after defendants [had left employment]”; the benef | 1 | 1 |
Laker v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Laker v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Stategreen1 sentence1999Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind.1999). 2 In so holding, the court stated: Both probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to commitment to the Department of Correction and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchem v. Stategreen1 sentence1997Broome acknowledges that Mitchem v. State, 503 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ind.1987), sanctions the manner of instruction of which he complains. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Guardianship of Ll
green
2 sentences2002In Froelich v. Clark, 745 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, this court evaluated the relevant case law, statutory amendments, and constitutional concerns, holding that the following is the appropriate standard for court to apply when considering a parent/non-parent child custody dispute: First, there is a presumption in all cases that the natural parent should have custody of his or her child. 2002In Froelich v. Clark, 745 N.E.2d 222 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, this court evaluated the relevant case law, statutory amendments, and constitutional concerns, holding that the following is the appropriate standard for court to apply when considering a parent/non-parent child custody dispute: First, there is a presumption in all cases that the natural parent should have custody of his or her child. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Johnson v. Tipton Community School Corp.
green
2 sentences1995If at the hearing the court determines that the plaintiff cannot establish facts which would entitle him to a temporary injunction, the court shall set the amount of bond to be filed by the plaintiff in an amount found by the judge to cover all damage and costs which may acerue to the defendants by reason of the pendency of the public lawsuit in the event the defendant prevails. 1.C. §4-4-17-5. "[In order to avoid posting a bond, the Remonstrators must introduce evidence *323 sufficient to show that there is a substantial question to be tried." Bell v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs (1995), Ind.Tax, 1995If at the hearing the court determines that the plaintiff cannot establish facts which would entitle him to a temporary injunction, the court shall set the amount of bond to be filed by the plaintiff in an amount found by the judge to cover all damage and costs which may acerue to the defendants by reason of the pendency of the public lawsuit in the event the defendant prevails. 1.C. §4-4-17-5. "[In order to avoid posting a bond, the Remonstrators must introduce evidence *323 sufficient to show that there is a substantial question to be tried." Bell v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs (1995), Ind.Tax, | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bell v. State Board of Tax Commissioners
green
1 sentence1995If at the hearing the court determines that the plaintiff cannot establish facts which would entitle him to a temporary injunction, the court shall set the amount of bond to be filed by the plaintiff in an amount found by the judge to cover all damage and costs which may acerue to the defendants by reason of the pendency of the public lawsuit in the event the defendant prevails. 1.C. §4-4-17-5. "[In order to avoid posting a bond, the Remonstrators must introduce evidence *323 sufficient to show that there is a substantial question to be tried." Bell v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs (1995), Ind.Tax, | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ancich v. Mobil Oil Corp.
green
1 sentence1987Creighton v. Caylor-Nickel Hospital, Inc. (1985), Ind. App., 484 N.E.2d 1303, 1305-1306 ; Ancich v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 1320, 1822 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Creighton v. Caylor-Nickel Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence1987Creighton v. Caylor-Nickel Hospital, Inc. (1985), Ind. App., 484 N.E.2d 1303, 1305-1306 ; Ancich v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 1320, 1822 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Kincaid v. State
green
2 sentences1980A similar question was presented to this Court in Kincaid v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 345 , 354 N.E.2d 199 . 1980A similar question was presented to this Court in Kincaid v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 345 , 354 N.E.2d 199 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Morrison v. Kramer
neutral
1 sentence1950Frazer, Executor v. Boss (1879), 66 Ind. 1 ; Morrison, Adm’r. v. Kramer (1877), 58 Ind. 38 ; Sanders, Admx. v. Hartge, et al. (1896), 17 Ind. App. 243 at page 249, 46 N. E. 604 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Frazer v. Boss
neutral
1 sentence1950Frazer, Executor v. Boss (1879), 66 Ind. 1 ; Morrison, Adm’r. v. Kramer (1877), 58 Ind. 38 ; Sanders, Admx. v. Hartge, et al. (1896), 17 Ind. App. 243 at page 249, 46 N. E. 604 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Sanders v. Hartge
green
2 sentences1950Frazer, Executor v. Boss (1879), 66 Ind. 1 ; Morrison, Adm’r. v. Kramer (1877), 58 Ind. 38 ; Sanders, Admx. v. Hartge, et al. (1896), 17 Ind. App. 243 at page 249, 46 N. E. 604 . 1950Frazer, Executor v. Boss (1879), 66 Ind. 1 ; Morrison, Adm’r. v. Kramer (1877), 58 Ind. 38 ; Sanders, Admx. v. Hartge, et al. (1896), 17 Ind. App. 243 at page 249, 46 N. E. 604 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Moss v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences1944Moss v. Jenkins (1897), 146 Ind. 589 , 45 N. E. 789 ; Wagner v. Barden (1895), 13 Ind. App. 571 , 41 N. E. 1067 ; Kahn v. Hayes (1899), 22 Ind. App. 182 , 53 N. E. 430 ; H. 1944Moss v. Jenkins (1897), 146 Ind. 589 , 45 N. E. 789 ; Wagner v. Barden (1895), 13 Ind. App. 571 , 41 N. E. 1067 ; Kahn v. Hayes (1899), 22 Ind. App. 182 , 53 N. E. 430 ; H. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Wagner v. Barden
neutral
2 sentences1944Moss v. Jenkins (1897), 146 Ind. 589 , 45 N. E. 789 ; Wagner v. Barden (1895), 13 Ind. App. 571 , 41 N. E. 1067 ; Kahn v. Hayes (1899), 22 Ind. App. 182 , 53 N. E. 430 ; H. 1944Moss v. Jenkins (1897), 146 Ind. 589 , 45 N. E. 789 ; Wagner v. Barden (1895), 13 Ind. App. 571 , 41 N. E. 1067 ; Kahn v. Hayes (1899), 22 Ind. App. 182 , 53 N. E. 430 ; H. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Kahn v. Hayes
neutral
2 sentences1944Moss v. Jenkins (1897), 146 Ind. 589 , 45 N. E. 789 ; Wagner v. Barden (1895), 13 Ind. App. 571 , 41 N. E. 1067 ; Kahn v. Hayes (1899), 22 Ind. App. 182 , 53 N. E. 430 ; H. 1944Moss v. Jenkins (1897), 146 Ind. 589 , 45 N. E. 789 ; Wagner v. Barden (1895), 13 Ind. App. 571 , 41 N. E. 1067 ; Kahn v. Hayes (1899), 22 Ind. App. 182 , 53 N. E. 430 ; H. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Chism v. State
neutral
2 sentences1941Chism v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 241, 244 , 179 N. E. 718 ; State, ex rel. v. Board (1925), 196 Ind. 472, 482 , 149 N. E. 69 . *257 *256 A consideration of the other provisions of this definition also leads us to believe that this particular pro *257 vision was intended to cover only profits or earnings from invested capital. 1941Chism v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 241, 244 , 179 N. E. 718 ; State, ex rel. v. Board (1925), 196 Ind. 472, 482 , 149 N. E. 69 . *257 *256 A consideration of the other provisions of this definition also leads us to believe that this particular pro *257 vision was intended to cover only profits or earnings from invested capital. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
State Ex Rel. Hopper v. Board of Election Commissioners
neutral
2 sentences1941Chism v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 241, 244 , 179 N. E. 718 ; State, ex rel. v. Board (1925), 196 Ind. 472, 482 , 149 N. E. 69 . *257 *256 A consideration of the other provisions of this definition also leads us to believe that this particular pro *257 vision was intended to cover only profits or earnings from invested capital. 1941Chism v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 241, 244 , 179 N. E. 718 ; State, ex rel. v. Board (1925), 196 Ind. 472, 482 , 149 N. E. 69 . *257 *256 A consideration of the other provisions of this definition also leads us to believe that this particular pro *257 vision was intended to cover only profits or earnings from invested capital. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen of America
neutral
2 sentences1915Co. v. Tuttle (1915), 58 Ind. App. 98 , 107 N. E. 22 ; Modern Woodmen, etc. v. Coleman (1902), 64 Neb. 162 , 89 N. W. 641 ; Pringle v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1906), 76 Neb. 384 , 107 N. W. 756 , 113 N. W. 231 ; Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1903), 100 Mo. App. 138 , 73 S. W. 326 . 8. 1915Co. v. Tuttle (1915), 58 Ind. App. 98 , 107 N. E. 22 ; Modern Woodmen, etc. v. Coleman (1902), 64 Neb. 162 , 89 N. W. 641 ; Pringle v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1906), 76 Neb. 384 , 107 N. W. 756 , 113 N. W. 231 ; Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1903), 100 Mo. App. 138 , 73 S. W. 326 . 8. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Modern Woodmen of America v. Colman
neutral
2 sentences1915Co. v. Tuttle (1915), 58 Ind. App. 98 , 107 N. E. 22 ; Modern Woodmen, etc. v. Coleman (1902), 64 Neb. 162 , 89 N. W. 641 ; Pringle v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1906), 76 Neb. 384 , 107 N. W. 756 , 113 N. W. 231 ; Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1903), 100 Mo. App. 138 , 73 S. W. 326 . 8. 1915Co. v. Tuttle (1915), 58 Ind. App. 98 , 107 N. E. 22 ; Modern Woodmen, etc. v. Coleman (1902), 64 Neb. 162 , 89 N. W. 641 ; Pringle v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1906), 76 Neb. 384 , 107 N. W. 756 , 113 N. W. 231 ; Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1903), 100 Mo. App. 138 , 73 S. W. 326 . 8. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Pringle v. Modern Woodmen of America
green
2 sentences1915Co. v. Tuttle (1915), 58 Ind. App. 98 , 107 N. E. 22 ; Modern Woodmen, etc. v. Coleman (1902), 64 Neb. 162 , 89 N. W. 641 ; Pringle v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1906), 76 Neb. 384 , 107 N. W. 756 , 113 N. W. 231 ; Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1903), 100 Mo. App. 138 , 73 S. W. 326 . 8. 1915Co. v. Tuttle (1915), 58 Ind. App. 98 , 107 N. E. 22 ; Modern Woodmen, etc. v. Coleman (1902), 64 Neb. 162 , 89 N. W. 641 ; Pringle v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1906), 76 Neb. 384 , 107 N. W. 756 , 113 N. W. 231 ; Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1903), 100 Mo. App. 138 , 73 S. W. 326 . 8. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Majestic Life Assurance Co. v. Tuttle
neutral
2 sentences1915Co. v. Tuttle (1915), 58 Ind. App. 98 , 107 N. E. 22 ; Modern Woodmen, etc. v. Coleman (1902), 64 Neb. 162 , 89 N. W. 641 ; Pringle v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1906), 76 Neb. 384 , 107 N. W. 756 , 113 N. W. 231 ; Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1903), 100 Mo. App. 138 , 73 S. W. 326 . 8. 1915Co. v. Tuttle (1915), 58 Ind. App. 98 , 107 N. E. 22 ; Modern Woodmen, etc. v. Coleman (1902), 64 Neb. 162 , 89 N. W. 641 ; Pringle v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1906), 76 Neb. 384 , 107 N. W. 756 , 113 N. W. 231 ; Shotliff v. Modern Woodmen, etc. (1903), 100 Mo. App. 138 , 73 S. W. 326 . 8. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Bever v. North
neutral
1 sentence1887Bever v. North, 107 Ind. 544 . | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.