manner instruction in Washington

1998However, "the use of an erroneous instruction is presumptively prejudicial and is considered harmless error only when the record affirmatively establishes that the manner in which the instruction was worded could have no effect on the outcome...." State v. Crane, 116 Wash.2d 315, 331 , 804 P.2d 10 (emphasis added), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 , 111 S.Ct. 2867 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1991).

1998However, "the use of an erroneous instruction is presumptively prejudicial and is considered harmless error only when the record affirmatively establishes that the manner in which the instruction was worded could have no effect on the outcome...." State v. Crane, 116 Wash.2d 315, 331 , 804 P.2d 10 (emphasis added), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 , 111 S.Ct. 2867 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1991).

1998However, "the use of an erroneous instruction is presumptively prejudicial and is considered harmless error only when the record affirmatively establishes that the manner in which the instruction was worded could have no effect on the outcome...." State v. Crane, 116 Wash.2d 315, 331 , 804 P.2d 10 (emphasis added), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 , 111 S.Ct. 2867 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1991).

1998However, "the use of an erroneous instruction is presumptively prejudicial and is considered harmless error only when the record affirmatively establishes that the manner in which the instruction was worded could have no effect on the outcome...." State v. Crane, 116 Wash.2d 315, 331 , 804 P.2d 10 (emphasis added), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 , 111 S.Ct. 2867 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1991).

1998However, “the use of an erroneous instruction is presumptively prejudicial and is considered harmless error only when the record affirmatively establishes that the manner in which the instruction was worded could have no effect on the outcome . . . .” State v. Crane, 116 Wn.2d 315, 331 , 804 P.2d 10 (emphasis added), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 , 111 S. Ct. 2867 , 115 L.

1998However, "the use of an erroneous instruction is presumptively prejudicial and is considered harmless error only when the record affirmatively establishes that the manner in which the instruction was worded could have no effect on the outcome...." State v. Crane, 116 Wash.2d 315, 331 , 804 P.2d 10 (emphasis added), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 , 111 S.Ct. 2867 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1991).

2008Dist., 96 Wash.App. 118, 123 , 977 P.2d 1265 (1999) (quoting § 214(1) cmt. a). ¶ 19 We adopt section 214 as an accurate statement of the law that applies to trespass claims involving execution of search warrants on private property. ¶ 20 Comment a to section 214(1), explains that [a] privilege to enter land may be unreasonably exercised either by the intentional doing of an act which a reasonable man would not regard as necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the privilege is given, or by any negligence in the manner in which the privilege is exercised.

2008App. 118, 123 , 977 P.2d 1265 (1999) (quoting § 214(1) cmt. a). ¶19 We adopt section 214 as an accurate statement of the law that applies to trespass claims involving execution of search warrants on private property. ¶20 Comment a to section 214(1) explains that [a] privilege to enter land may be unreasonably exercised either by the intentional doing of an act which a reasonable man would not regard as necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the privilege is given, or by any negligence in the manner in which the privilege is exercised.

2005However, the instruction did not direct the manner in which the factors were to be weighed and was therefore contrary to precedent. ¶43 The early case of Burr v. Clark, 30 Wn.2d 149 , 190 P.2d 769 (1948), considered the proper measure of damage for injury to real property.

2005However, the instruction did not direct the manner in which the factors were to be weighed and was therefore contrary to precedent. ¶43 The early case of Burr v. Clark, 30 Wn.2d 149 , 190 P.2d 769 (1948), considered the proper measure of damage for injury to real property.

2021Notwithstanding that this had nothing to do with the elements of the charged crimes, Clark argues that defense counsel stating that there was an argument over the “bacon rations” between Clark and SV contradicted his testimony and violated Clark’s “constitutional right to control [his] own defense.” 5 RP 868-69.11 Clark’s reliance on State v. Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 860 , 10 P.3d 977 (2000), is inapt.

2021Notwithstanding that this had nothing to do with the elements of the charged crimes, Clark argues that defense counsel stating that there was an argument over the “bacon rations” between Clark and SV contradicted his testimony and violated Clark’s “constitutional right to control [his] own defense.” 5 RP 868-69.11 Clark’s reliance on State v. Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 860 , 10 P.3d 977 (2000), is inapt.

2018Id.

2018Id.

2017Id. at 660 .

2014App. 744, 748 , 727 P.2d 262 (1986)). 24 No. 70553-9-1/25 in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'"53 "But the ordinance does not need to 'meet impossible standards of specificity.'"54 In examining a vagueness challenge, this court examines the ordinance as applied, not for facial vagueness.55 An alleged constitutional violation presents a question of law that this court reviews de novo.56 Here, we review the challenge to the CUP in the same manner as a challenge to an ordinance or other law.

1991State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 237 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977); State v. Jackson, 112 Wn.2d 867, 877 , 774 P.2d 1211 (1989).

1991State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 237 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977); State v. Jackson, 112 Wn.2d 867, 877 , 774 P.2d 1211 (1989).