manner defense in California

2015The reviewing court is thus involved in determining the quantum of evidence adduced, not the manner in which factors were applied.” (Id. at p. 1681; see CQL Products, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354 .) The Cal-State decision represents the minority view and has been criticized as inconsistent with Supreme Court authority: “[G]iven existing guidance on this question from our Supreme Court, and the more consistent line of Court of Appeal decisions, which likewise apply the abuse of discretion standard, we disagree with Cal-State’s conclusion that the substantial evidence standard applies instea

2015The reviewing court is thus involved in determining the quantum of evidence adduced, not the manner in which factors were applied.” (Id. at p. 1681, original italics; see CQL Products, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354 .) 6 The Cal-State decision represents the minority view and has been criticized as inconsistent with Supreme Court authority: “[G]iven existing guidance on this question from our Supreme Court, and the more consistent line of Court of Appeal decisions, which likewise apply the abuse of discretion standard, we disagree with Cal-State’s conclusion that the substantial evidence sta

2006“In the absence of any indication that the delay in notice had in some fashion affected the manner in which defense counsel handled the prior proceedings, the appropriate remedy for a violation would ordinarily be to grant a continuance as needed to allow defendant to develop a response.” (People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 334 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ]; accord, Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1153 .) Here, defendant was given a one-week continuance, with the possibility of additional time if needed.

2006“In the absence of any indication that the delay in notice had in some fashion affected the manner in which defense counsel handled the prior proceedings, the appropriate remedy for a violation would ordinarily be to grant a continuance as needed to allow defendant to develop a response.” (People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 334 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ]; accord, Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1153 .) Here, defendant was given a one-week continuance, with the possibility of additional time if needed.

2015The reviewing court is thus involved in determining the quantum of evidence adduced, not the manner in which factors were applied.” (Id. at p. 1681; see CQL Products, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354 .) The Cal-State decision represents the minority view and has been criticized as inconsistent with Supreme Court authority: “[G]iven existing guidance on this question from our Supreme Court, and the more consistent line of Court of Appeal decisions, which likewise apply the abuse of discretion standard, we disagree with Cal-State’s conclusion that the substantial evidence standard applies instea

2015The reviewing court is thus involved in determining the quantum of evidence adduced, not the manner in which factors were applied.” (Id. at p. 1681, original italics; see CQL Products, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354 .) 6 The Cal-State decision represents the minority view and has been criticized as inconsistent with Supreme Court authority: “[G]iven existing guidance on this question from our Supreme Court, and the more consistent line of Court of Appeal decisions, which likewise apply the abuse of discretion standard, we disagree with Cal-State’s conclusion that the substantial evidence sta

2015The reviewing court is thus involved in determining the quantum of evidence adduced, not the manner in which factors were applied.” (Id. at p. 1681; see CQL Products, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354 .) The Cal-State decision represents the minority view and has been criticized as inconsistent with Supreme Court authority: “[G]iven existing guidance on this question from our Supreme Court, and the more consistent line of Court of Appeal decisions, which likewise apply the abuse of discretion standard, we disagree with Cal-State’s conclusion that the substantial evidence standard applies instea

2015The reviewing court is thus involved in determining the quantum of evidence adduced, not the manner in which factors were applied.” (Id. at p. 1681; see CQL Products, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354 .) The Cal-State decision represents the minority view and has been criticized as inconsistent with Supreme Court authority: “[G]iven existing guidance on this question from our Supreme Court, and the more consistent line of Court of Appeal decisions, which likewise apply the abuse of discretion standard, we disagree with Cal-State’s conclusion that the substantial evidence standard applies instea

2015(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1229 ; see People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 253 [applying standard to support felony murder predicated on robbery].) "Under the felony-murder rule, a murder 'committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate' one of several enumerated felonies, including robbery, is first degree murder. [Citation.] The robbery-murder special circumstance applies to a murder 'committed while the defendant was engaged in . . . the commission of, [or] attempted commission of' robbery. [Citation.]" (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27-28 .) When the de

2014(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1229 ; see People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 253 [applying standard to support felony murder predicated on robbery].) B.

2001(Cf. People v. Jackson (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 13, 22 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 ] [deciding between abuse-of-discretion and substantial-evidence standards of review for motions contesting peremptory challenges].)” ( Cal-State, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1680-1681, italics added.) While we understand the distinction intended by Cal-State, we are not persuaded that appellate review of a contract interpretation issue can be properly analogized to review of an unambiguous forum selection clause.

2001(Cf. People v. Jackson (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 13, 22 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 ] [deciding between abuse-of-discretion and substantial-evidence standards of review for motions contesting peremptory challenges].)” ( Cal-State, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1680-1681, italics added.) While we understand the distinction intended by Cal-State, we are not persuaded that appellate review of a contract interpretation issue can be properly analogized to review of an unambiguous forum selection clause.

2013To the contrary, the Rosenthal court held that the issue can be determined by the court via summary procedures in the manner provided for the hearing and deciding of motions, on the basis of affidavits or declarations, and without a jury, all without violating any rights to due process or a jury 29 trial under the California Constitution8 (although it held that a trial court has the discretion to resolve material conflicts in the written evidence by hearing live testimony, a matter we discuss further, post). ( Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 410-414.) The Elkins court ruled that evidence i

2008(Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 972-973; Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 414 .) “[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413 .) The issues of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement “are to be resolved by the trial court in the manner provided for the hearing and deci

2020Ineffective Assistance of Counsel The Sixth Amendment guarantees the “ ‘right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 685-686 .) “ ‘[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Garcia] bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient because it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [¶] ... under prevailing professional norms.” [Citations.] Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel's performance fell within the wide range of professional competence

2013Defendant claims that by failing to object when the trial court imposed the criminal justice administration fee, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. ―In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel‘s performance was deficient because it ‗fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [¶] . . . under prevailing professional norms.‘ [Citations.] Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that ‗counsel‘s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence

2015(See, e.g., Trident Labs, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Commercial Finance Corp. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 147 , 154 & fn. 3 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 ]; Schlessinger v. Holland America (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 552, 557 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 5 ]; Intershop Communications, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 198-199; Bancomer, S. A. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1450 , 1457 & fn. 7 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 435 ].) B.

2015(See, e.g., Trident Labs, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Commercial Finance Corp. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 147 , 154 & fn. 3 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 ]; Schlessinger v. Holland America (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 552, 557 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 5 ]; Intershop Communications, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 198-199; Bancomer, S. A. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1450 , 1457 & fn. 7 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 435 ].) B.

2022(See People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 807 [a juror’s inability to perform a juror’s functions must be shown by the record to be a “demonstrable reality”; the court will not presume bias and will uphold the court’s exercise of discretion on determining justification for discharging a juror if supported by substantial evidence].) C.

2022(See generally Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 592 [“ ‘the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard the court’s instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, and that no other proper ground for discharge exists’ ”].) On this record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in the manner of inquiry into Juror No. 8’s disclosure of his son’s abuse or in failing to remove Juror No. 8 without a “demonstrable reality” that Juror No. 8 was unable to fulfill his function a

2022(See generally Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 592 [“ ‘the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard the court’s instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, and that no other proper ground for discharge exists’ ”].) On this record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in the manner of inquiry into Juror No. 8’s disclosure of his son’s abuse or in failing to remove Juror No. 8 without a “demonstrable reality” that Juror No. 8 was unable to fulfill his function a

2020(Id. at p. 687; see Estate of Westerman (1968) 68 Cal.2d 267, 279 [issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal].) Unlike in Zywiciel, this is not a spousal support case in which the trial court calculated spousal support by merely plugging numbers, unsupported by evidence, into the DissoMaster temporary support guideline and by making “some sort of dead- reckoning adjustment.” The instant case involves child support in which the record shows the trial court made reasonable factual determinations and appropriately exercised its independent judgment based

2020It is “improper for the prosecutor to imply that defense counsel has fabricated evidence or otherwise to portray defense counsel as the villain in the case.” (People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 183 .) But it is not misconduct to challenge “the persuasive force of defense counsel’s closing argument.” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1155 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) In the referenced rebuttal argument, the prosecutor did not imply defense counsel “fabricated a defense.” Rather, she was arguing the evidence should be re

2020Ineffective Assistance of Counsel The Sixth Amendment guarantees the “ ‘right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 685-686 .) “ ‘[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Garcia] bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient because it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [¶] ... under prevailing professional norms.” [Citations.] Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel's performance fell within the wide range of professional competence