12 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Henry Zillon Felts v. State of Tennesseegreen1 sentence2020Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 281 (Tenn. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2014“When the reliability of a witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, the non-disclosure of evidence affecting his credibility may justify a new trial, regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor.” State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 525 (Tenn. 1985). 52 Given the importance of Mr. Hammack’s testimony to the prosecution’s case and the manner in which the defense could have used his third statement to cast the proof at trial in a different light, we have no hesitation in concluding that Mr. Hammack’s third statement was material. | 1 | 1 |
Sherrod v. Wixgreen1 sentence2012They rely upon the cases of Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 785 ([Tenn. Ct. App.] 1992), Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685, 696 (Tenn. 1988), and Wilson Management Co. Star Distributors Co., 745 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tenn. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Kahn v. Kahngreen1 sentence2012They rely upon the cases of Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 785 ([Tenn. Ct. App.] 1992), Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685, 696 (Tenn. 1988), and Wilson Management Co. Star Distributors Co., 745 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tenn. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
People v. McKinnongreen2 sentences2012When potential jurors in McKinnon indicated by their responses to several written questions that they would always vote in a certain manner and defense counsel declined an offer for further examination, the court ruled that removal is proper if there is “sufficient information ... to permit a reliable determination that the juror’s death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties.” Id., 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 , 259 P.3d at 1219 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v. Avila, 38 Cal.4th 491 , 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 133 P.3d 1076, 1105 (2006) 2012When potential jurors in McKinnon indicated by their responses to several written questions that they would always vote in a certain manner and defense counsel declined an offer for further examination, the court ruled that removal is proper if there is “sufficient information ... to permit a reliable determination that the juror’s death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties.” Id., 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 , 259 P.3d at 1219 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v. Avila, 38 Cal.4th 491 , 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 133 P.3d 1076, 1105 (2006) | 1 | 1 |
Wilson Management Co. v. Star Distributors Co.green1 sentence2012They rely upon the cases of Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 785 ([Tenn. Ct. App.] 1992), Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685, 696 (Tenn. 1988), and Wilson Management Co. Star Distributors Co., 745 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tenn. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Avilagreen2 sentences2012When potential jurors in McKinnon indicated by their responses to several written questions that they would always vote in a certain manner and defense counsel declined an offer for further examination, the court ruled that removal is proper if there is “sufficient information ... to permit a reliable determination that the juror’s death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties.” Id., 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 , 259 P.3d at 1219 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v. Avila, 38 Cal.4th 491 , 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 133 P.3d 1076, 1105 (2006) 2012When potential jurors in McKinnon indicated by their responses to several written questions that they would always vote in a certain manner and defense counsel declined an offer for further examination, the court ruled that removal is proper if there is “sufficient information ... to permit a reliable determination that the juror’s death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties.” Id., 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 , 259 P.3d at 1219 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v. Avila, 38 Cal.4th 491 , 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 133 P.3d 1076, 1105 (2006) | 1 | 1 |
JEB v. Alabama Ex Rel. TBgreen2 sentences2006T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 , 114 S.Ct. 1419 , 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.” We analyze a party’s claim that a peremptory challenge is impermissibly gender-based in the same manner as a claim that a challenge is racially motivated. 2006T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 , 114 S.Ct. 1419 , 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.” We analyze a party’s claim that a peremptory challenge is impermissibly gender-based in the same manner as a claim that a challenge is racially motivated. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Callahangreen1 sentence1999See State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Leland v. Oregon
green
2 sentences1993Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S.Ct. 2819 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). 1993Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S.Ct. 2819 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). | 2 | 1983–1993 |
Powell v. Texas
green
2 sentences1993Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S.Ct. 2819 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). 1993Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S.Ct. 2819 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). | 2 | 1983–1993 |
Patterson v. New York
green
2 sentences1993Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S.Ct. 2819 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). 1993Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S.Ct. 2819 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). | 2 | 1983–1993 |
Bara v. Clarksville Memorial Health Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Bara, 104 S.W.3d at 3 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009This is not presented in this appeal and is appropriate for the parties and the court to address on remand. -16- Both parties agree that Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford Inc., 205 S.W.3d 406 (Tenn. 2006) is controlling on this issue. “[A] plaintiff may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees incurred during an appeal on a claim brought under the TCPA where one or more of the TCPA’s provision has been violated” since, as with the award of attorneys’ fees at the trial level, “[t]he same concern with economic viability applies equally to appellate attorney’s fees.” Killingsworth, 205 S.W.3d at 410 2009This is not presented in this appeal and is appropriate for the parties and the court to address on remand. -16- Both parties agree that Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford Inc., 205 S.W.3d 406 (Tenn. 2006) is controlling on this issue. “[A] plaintiff may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees incurred during an appeal on a claim brought under the TCPA where one or more of the TCPA’s provision has been violated” since, as with the award of attorneys’ fees at the trial level, “[t]he same concern with economic viability applies equally to appellate attorney’s fees.” Killingsworth, 205 S.W.3d at 410 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Bell v. Kelso Oil Co.
green
1 sentence1982Frank Piper, Jr., the owner of Piper’s Exxon, expressed the opinion that the driver of the truck, Charles Wilson, and Cora Diane Jamerson, his passenger, had conspired to “get” Cornelia Skinner Person and Frank Piper, Jr. Upon the foregoing facts which are undisputed and upon the authority of Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., Tenn., 597 S.W.2d 731 (1980) and cases therein cited, we affirm the determination of the trial court that the death of the employee in this case was accidental and arose out of and in the course of her employment. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Plager v. Plager
neutral
1 sentence1975By placing the Second Injury Fund Section, supra, into the Workmen’s Compensation Act and by remaining silent as to the manner in which a claim against the Second Injury Fund is to be perfected and considered, the legislature undoubtedly intended that the established procedure of administrative disposition by the Board, and all pertinent provisions of the Act for that matter, be equally applicable to a claim against the Second Injury Fund as they are applicable to claims against insurance carriers. . . .” For decisions of like import see, Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838 (Mo.1964); Ruffin v. Albr | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Ruffin v. Albright
neutral
1 sentence1975By placing the Second Injury Fund Section, supra, into the Workmen’s Compensation Act and by remaining silent as to the manner in which a claim against the Second Injury Fund is to be perfected and considered, the legislature undoubtedly intended that the established procedure of administrative disposition by the Board, and all pertinent provisions of the Act for that matter, be equally applicable to a claim against the Second Injury Fund as they are applicable to claims against insurance carriers. . . .” For decisions of like import see, Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838 (Mo.1964); Ruffin v. Albr | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Ruffin v. Albright
neutral
2 sentences1975By placing the Second Injury Fund Section, supra, into the Workmen’s Compensation Act and by remaining silent as to the manner in which a claim against the Second Injury Fund is to be perfected and considered, the legislature undoubtedly intended that the established procedure of administrative disposition by the Board, and all pertinent provisions of the Act for that matter, be equally applicable to a claim against the Second Injury Fund as they are applicable to claims against insurance carriers. . . .” For decisions of like import see, Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838 (Mo.1964); Ruffin v. Albr 1975By placing the Second Injury Fund Section, supra, into the Workmen’s Compensation Act and by remaining silent as to the manner in which a claim against the Second Injury Fund is to be perfected and considered, the legislature undoubtedly intended that the established procedure of administrative disposition by the Board, and all pertinent provisions of the Act for that matter, be equally applicable to a claim against the Second Injury Fund as they are applicable to claims against insurance carriers. . . .” For decisions of like import see, Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838 (Mo.1964); Ruffin v. Albr | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Special Indemnity Fund v. Barnes
green
1 sentence1975By placing the Second Injury Fund Section, supra, into the Workmen’s Compensation Act and by remaining silent as to the manner in which a claim against the Second Injury Fund is to be perfected and considered, the legislature undoubtedly intended that the established procedure of administrative disposition by the Board, and all pertinent provisions of the Act for that matter, be equally applicable to a claim against the Second Injury Fund as they are applicable to claims against insurance carriers. . . .” For decisions of like import see, Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838 (Mo.1964); Ruffin v. Albr | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Grant v. Neal
green
1 sentence1975By placing the Second Injury Fund Section, supra, into the Workmen’s Compensation Act and by remaining silent as to the manner in which a claim against the Second Injury Fund is to be perfected and considered, the legislature undoubtedly intended that the established procedure of administrative disposition by the Board, and all pertinent provisions of the Act for that matter, be equally applicable to a claim against the Second Injury Fund as they are applicable to claims against insurance carriers. . . .” For decisions of like import see, Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838 (Mo.1964); Ruffin v. Albr | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.