home rule in Washington

2019King County Council, 93 Wn.2d at 562-63 .

2006Id. at 562-63 .

2014Carroll v. King County, 78 Wn.2d 452, 457-58 , 474 P.2d 877 (1970) (holding a home rule charter county could hold elections at a different time than specified by state statute).

2014Carroll v. King County, 78 Wn.2d 452, 457-58 , 474 P.2d 877 (1970) (holding a home rule charter county could hold elections at a different time than specified by state statute).

2011Harris, 495 U.S. at 21 , 110 S.Ct. 1640 .

2011Harris, 495 U.S. at 21 , 110 S.Ct. 1640 .

2006Thus, King County was statutorily required to adopt the ordinances. ¶60 In Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wn.2d 345 , 884 P.2d 1326 (1994), we were presented with the question of whether a critical areas ordinance adopted by the Whatcom County Council pursuant to the GMA was subject to amendment by referendum under the county’s home rule charter.

2006Thus, King County was statutorily required to adopt the ordinances. ¶60 In Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wn.2d 345 , 884 P.2d 1326 (1994), we were presented with the question of whether a critical areas ordinance adopted by the Whatcom County Council pursuant to the GMA was subject to amendment by referendum under the county’s home rule charter.

2003Ford, 79 Wash.2d at 155 , 483 P.2d 1247 .

2003Ford, 79 Wn.2d at 155 .

2001The court has previously defined a dependent as “one who looks to another for support and maintenance, one who is in fact dependent, [or] one who relies on another for the reasonable necessities of life.” Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d 592, 598 , 575 P.2d 201 (1978).

2001The court has previously defined a dependent as “one who looks to another for support and maintenance, one who is in fact dependent, [or] one who relies on another for the reasonable necessities of life.” Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d 592, 598 , 575 P.2d 201 (1978).

2018City of Tacoma v. Weicker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 683 , 399 P.2d 330 (1965).® Therefore, when interpreting eminent domain statutes, we must strike an appropriate balance between strictly construing authority to condemn property and ensuring that our interpretation does not defeat the legislative purpose to grant condemnation authority. ^ Seattle also argues that its status as a home rule charter city grants it "complete local self- government in municipal affairs" and a special constitutional status with superiority to limited- purpose agencies like Sound Transit.

2018City of Tacoma v. Weicker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 683 , 399 P.2d 330 (1965).® Therefore, when interpreting eminent domain statutes, we must strike an appropriate balance between strictly construing authority to condemn property and ensuring that our interpretation does not defeat the legislative purpose to grant condemnation authority. ^ Seattle also argues that its status as a home rule charter city grants it "complete local self- government in municipal affairs" and a special constitutional status with superiority to limited- purpose agencies like Sound Transit.

2018As a result, we conclude that Seattle's constitutional status does not affect our interpretation of the legislative authority granted to Sound Transit in RCW 81.112.080. ® See also In re Condemnation Proceedings of City of Seattle, 96 Wn.2d 616, 629 , 638 P.2d 549 (Westlake)(1981)("[A] statutory grant of [eminent domain] power is not to be so strictly construed as to thwart or defeat apparent legislative intent or objective."); Devonshire, 70 Wn.2d at 633 ("However.. . a statutory grant of such power is not to be so strictly construed as to thwart or defeat an apparent legislative intent or ob

2018As a result, we conclude that Seattle's constitutional status does not affect our interpretation of the legislative authority granted to Sound Transit in RCW 81.112.080. ® See also In re Condemnation Proceedings of City of Seattle, 96 Wn.2d 616, 629 , 638 P.2d 549 (Westlake)(1981)("[A] statutory grant of [eminent domain] power is not to be so strictly construed as to thwart or defeat apparent legislative intent or objective."); Devonshire, 70 Wn.2d at 633 ("However.. . a statutory grant of such power is not to be so strictly construed as to thwart or defeat an apparent legislative intent or ob

2014Whether or not Kothari testified in this instance had no bearing on the outcome of the case, as the evidence was overwhelming that Kothari entered the home in violation of a protection order and assaulted his ex-wife. 6 State v. Hughes, 106Wn.2d176, 191, 721 P.2d 902 (1986). 7State v. Calvin, Wn.

2014App. , 316 P.3d 496 (2013). 3 No. 69564-9-1 / 4 Kothari's claims of prosecutorial misconduct are baseless.

2007When she called 911, Stinton twice said to her, "Thanks a lot . . . this is a felony." Id. ¶ 31 The State charged Stinton with burglary, on the theory that (1) his intended contact and harassment was a crime, in violation of the no-contact order; and (2) the crime he intended to commit when he unlawfully entered the victim's home was in violation of a separate provision of the no-contact order specifically excluding him from their former joint residence.

2007When she called 911, Stinton twice said to her, “Thanks a lot. . . this is a felony.” Id. ¶31 The State charged Stinton with burglary, on the theory that (1) his intended contact and harassment was a crime, in violation of the no-contact order, and (2) the crime he intended to commit when he unlawfully entered the victim’s home was in violation of a separate provision of the no-contact order specifically excluding him from their former joint residence.

2006The charter expressly reserves to the county's voters initiative and referendum under section 230.40. *631 Those local initiative and referendum provisions reserve a "fundamental right of a governed people to exercise their inherent right and constitutional political power over governmental affairs." Paget v. Logan, 78 Wash.2d 349, 352 , 474 P.2d 247 (1970).

2006The charter expressly reserves to the county's voters initiative and referendum under section 230.40. *631 Those local initiative and referendum provisions reserve a "fundamental right of a governed people to exercise their inherent right and constitutional political power over governmental affairs." Paget v. Logan, 78 Wash.2d 349, 352 , 474 P.2d 247 (1970).

2001Id. at 563 , 807 P.2d 353 . *714 The term "dependent" has been defined in a variety of ways, and the City of Vancouver argues that, as a home rule city, it should be given broad discretion to define this term.

2001Id. at 563 , 807 P.2d 353 . *714 The term "dependent" has been defined in a variety of ways, and the City of Vancouver argues that, as a home rule city, it should be given broad discretion to define this term.

1992We observe parenthetically that the Board in its capacity as the legislative body for a home rule county may have had inherent legislative power to enact an ordinance granting to itself, in its capacity as a quasi-judicial hearing tribunal, quasi-judicial power to reconsider and alter previous decisions (see Bartz v. Board of Adj., 80 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 492 P.2d 1374 (1972) ); but assuming that it had such power, it had not exercised it at the times relevant here. 11 An exception may be fraud "or something of like nature".

1992We observe parenthetically that the Board in its capacity as the legislative body for a home rule county may have had inherent legislative power to enact an ordinance granting to itself, in its capacity as a quasi-judicial hearing tribunal, quasi-judicial power to reconsider and alter previous decisions (see Bartz v. Board of Adj., 80 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 492 P.2d 1374 (1972) ); but assuming that it had such power, it had not exercised it at the times relevant here. 11 An exception may be fraud "or something of like nature".

1992Abraham v. Department of Labor & Indus., 178 Wash. 160, 163 , 34 P.2d 457 (1934); Knestis v. Unemployment Comp. & Placement Div., 16 Wn.2d 577, 583 , 134 P.2d 76 (1943). 12 Implied quasi-judicial power to reconsider may have been recognized in Hall v. Seattle, 24 Wn.

1992Abraham v. Department of Labor & Indus., 178 Wash. 160, 163 , 34 P.2d 457 (1934); Knestis v. Unemployment Comp. & Placement Div., 16 Wn.2d 577, 583 , 134 P.2d 76 (1943). 12 Implied quasi-judicial power to reconsider may have been recognized in Hall v. Seattle, 24 Wn.

1992Abraham v. Department of Labor & Indus., 178 Wash. 160, 163 , 34 P.2d 457 (1934); Knestis v. Unemployment Comp. & Placement Div., 16 Wn.2d 577, 583 , 134 P.2d 76 (1943). 12 Implied quasi-judicial power to reconsider may have been recognized in Hall v. Seattle, 24 Wn.

1992Abraham v. Department of Labor & Indus., 178 Wash. 160, 163 , 34 P.2d 457 (1934); Knestis v. Unemployment Comp. & Placement Div., 16 Wn.2d 577, 583 , 134 P.2d 76 (1943). 12 Implied quasi-judicial power to reconsider may have been recognized in Hall v. Seattle, 24 Wn.

1992Abraham v. Department of Labor & Indus., 178 Wash. 160, 163 , 34 P.2d 457 (1934); Knestis v. Unemployment Comp. & Placement Div., 16 Wn.2d 577, 583 , 134 P.2d 76 (1943). 12 Implied quasi-judicial power to reconsider may have been recognized in Hall v. Seattle, 24 Wn.

1985They contend that Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772 , 666 P.2d 329 (1983) holds that a charter municipality's home rule authority is narrow and that, absent a specific delegation of authority from the Legislature, the County has no power to act where the State's interest is paramount to or joint with that of the municipal corporation.

1985They contend that Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772 , 666 P.2d 329 (1983) holds that a charter municipality's home rule authority is narrow and that, absent a specific delegation of authority from the Legislature, the County has no power to act where the State's interest is paramount to or joint with that of the municipal corporation.

1976The City concedes that cities are subject to general laws of the state (citing Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wn.2d 211 , 163 P.2d 594 (1945)), and that RCW 41.56.450 et seq. is such a law.

1976The City concedes that cities are subject to general laws of the state (citing Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wn.2d 211 , 163 P.2d 594 (1945)), and that RCW 41.56.450 et seq. is such a law.

1971Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wn.2d 138 , 146 P.2d 543 (1944), where, under strikingly similar circumstances and remarkably similar constitutional provisions, we held •that the home rule charter of a city could be amended by initiative if statutory notice requirements were met.

1971Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wn.2d 138 , 146 P.2d 543 (1944), where, under strikingly similar circumstances and remarkably similar constitutional provisions, we held •that the home rule charter of a city could be amended by initiative if statutory notice requirements were met.

1932Town of Pelham v. Village of Pelham, 215 N. Y. 374 , 109 N. E. 513 , it was held under the home rule provision of the New York constitution —a provision like Art.

1932Town of Pelham v. Village of Pelham, 215 N. Y. 374 , 109 N. E. 513 , it was held under the home rule provision of the New York constitution —a provision like Art.