home rule in Illinois

2026“Home rule is based on the assumption that municipalities should be allowed to address problems with solutions tailored to their local needs.” Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 29 .

2026Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 36 . ¶ 34 However, the legislature “may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit ***.” Ill.

2025Thus, Figgs’s claim that “[n]o Constitutional authority exists for the State Legislature to take away that power delegated directly to the people,” is belied by section 6(i), which expressly authorizes the legislature to “limit the concurrent exercise [of power] or specifically declare the State’s exercise [of power] to be exclusive.” Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Condominium Association, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (holding that the General Assembly can “preempt the exercise of a municipality’s home rule powers by expressly limiting that authority” and can do so by including an “express statement to that

2022Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 33 . ¶ 70 Moreover, our supreme court has consistently recognized that the home rule provisions of the Illinois Constitution are intended to “ ‘eliminate or at least reduce to a bare minimum the circumstances under which local home rule powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intention.’ ” Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 34 (quoting Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 186 , [Citation.]); Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 288 .

2024This is required because, as this court made clear in Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 186-89 (1992), if a statute does not expressly state that there is a limitation on home rule units specifically, the concurrent exercise of governmental power by a home rule unit will not be read to be restricted.

2024(Emphasis added.) Subsection (c) of that section specifically provides that it is “a denial and limitation of home rule powers and functions under subsection (g) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution.” Id. § 1-2-1.2(c); see also id. § 1-2-1.5 (prohibiting a municipality, including a home rule unit, from enacting an ordinance penalizing tenants who contact police or other emergency services and specifying that it is a -9- limitation on such authority that was exercised by the General Assembly pursuant to subsection (g)).

2022Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (citing City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 108 (1981)); see also 5 ILCS 70/7 (West 2012) (“No law enacted after January 12, 1977, denies or limits any power or function of a home rule unit, pursuant to paragraphs (g), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, unless there is specific language limiting or denying the power or function and the language specifically sets forth in what manner and to what extent it is a limitation on or denial of the power or function of a home rule unit.”).

2022Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (citing City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 108 (1981)); see also 5 ILCS 70/7 (West 2012) (“No law enacted after January 12, 1977, denies or limits any power or function of a home rule unit, pursuant to paragraphs (g), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, unless there is specific language limiting or denying the power or function and the language specifically sets forth in what manner and to what extent it is a limitation on or denial of the power or function of a home rule unit.”).

2022Accordingly, we do not believe that the requirements of section 6(h) have been met in the present case.” Id. at 138 . ¶ 21 In Roman, at issue was whether a home rule unit had authority to create a mandatory minimum sentence for violating an ordinance. 184 Ill. 2d at 511-12 .

2022Accordingly, we do not believe that the requirements of section 6(h) have been met in the present case.” Id. at 138 . ¶ 21 In Roman, at issue was whether a home rule unit had authority to create a mandatory minimum sentence for violating an ordinance. 184 Ill. 2d at 511-12 .

2024But, unless a State law specifically states that a home rule unit’s power is limited, then the authority of a home rule unit to act concurrently with the State cannot be considered restricted.’ ” (Internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted.) City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 516-17 (1998) (quoting Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 187-88 (1992)). - 10 - No. 1-22-1530 ¶ 25 The supreme court addressed how a home rule unit can “exercise” its home rule authority in Sommer v. Village of Glenview, 79 Ill. 2d 383 (1980).

2022Accordingly, we do not believe that the requirements of section 6(h) have been met in the present case.” Id. at 138 . ¶ 21 In Roman, at issue was whether a home rule unit had authority to create a mandatory minimum sentence for violating an ordinance. 184 Ill. 2d at 511-12 .

2017Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 29 ; Schillerstrom Homes, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 286 ; Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 502 (1984). ¶ 26 Section 6(a) of article VII provides as follows: “Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill.

2016Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 29 ; Schillerstrom Homes, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 286 ; Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 502 (1984). ¶ 26 Section 6(a) of article VII provides as follows: “Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill.

2024Home rule units consist of local government in this State that have “an elected chief executive officer, any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000, and any other municipality which elects to become a home rule unit by referendum.” Commercial National Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45, 50 (1982).

2024Home rule units consist of local government in this State that have “an elected chief executive officer, any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000, and any other municipality which elects to become a home rule unit by referendum.” Commercial National Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45, 50 (1982).

2017Id. at 558 . ¶ 20 This court noted in Commercial National Bank that in all its prior decisions on home rule unit taxing power, the products or services taxed were purchased or used within the territorial limits of the home rule unit.

2017Id. at 558 . ¶ 20 This court noted in Commercial National Bank that in all its prior decisions on home rule unit taxing power, the products or services taxed were purchased or used within the territorial limits of the home rule unit.

2024App. 3d 919, 926 (1994) (“the method by which a home rule unit procures its contracts is a matter pertaining to its government and affairs” and thus falls within the general grant of home rule power as set forth in section 6(a) of article VII). ¶ 23 “The concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the 1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter the relationship which previously existed between local and State government.” Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166 (1972).

2012Op. No. 91-010, at 4. -10- occurs and to promote better relations among the County’s diverse racial, ethnic, religious, cultural and social groups.” Cook County Ordinance No. 93-O-13, Introduction (1993). ¶ 39 “The home rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution drastically altered the relationship between our state and local governments, giving municipalities more autonomy to chart the course of their own growth.” Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d 281, 286-87 (2001) (citing Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166 (1972)).

2016The court also considered the charge of the fee to be a "condition to the right to litigate in the courts *** which cannot be imposed by a home rule unit." Id. at 543 .

2016The court also considered the charge of the fee to be a "condition to the right to litigate in the courts *** which cannot be imposed by a home rule unit." Id. at 543 .

2022“Accordingly, ‘[i]f a subject pertains to local government and affairs, and the legislature has not expressly preempted home rule, municipalities may exercise their power.’ ” Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 36 (quoting StubHub, 2011 IL 111127 , ¶ 22 n.2). ¶ 35 We note that, in the case of the Illinois Municipal Code, there is no indication that the legislature intended to expressly preempt a municipality’s home rule powers.

2022Pursuant to that dual inquiry, “ ‘[i]f a subject pertains to local government and affairs, and the legislature has not expressly preempted home rule, municipalities may exercise their power.’ ” Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 36 (quoting City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 2011 IL 111127 , ¶ 22 n.2). ¶ 16 We must first address the City’s contention that it is not bound to follow Krohe’s definition of the term “catastrophic injury.” The City argues that Krohe’s definition of “catastrophic injury” did not actually become part of the Act because, pursuant to the I

1989The city urges us to address the issue which was not reached in City of Rockford v. Gill (1979), 75 Ill.2d 334, 342 , namely, whether the law as stated in section 1-2-4 of the Illinois Municipal Code is applicable to a home rule unit.

1989The city urges us to address the issue which was not reached in City of Rockford v. Gill (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 334, 342 , namely, whether the law as stated in section 1 — 2—4 of the Illinois Municipal Code is applicable to a home rule unit.

2019Midwest Gaming & Entertainment, LLC v. County of Cook, 2015 IL App (1st) 142786, ¶ 46 . ¶ 13 To determine whether or not the City’s home rule authority to enact the ordinance is preempted by section 8-11-6a(2), we must necessarily begin by discussing our constitution and the power it grants to home rule units.

2018Midwest Gaming & Entertainment, LLC v. County of Cook , 2015 IL App (1st) 142786 , ¶ 46, 395 Ill.Dec. 819 , 39 N.E.3d 286 . ¶ 13 To determine whether or not the City's home rule authority to enact the ordinance is preempted by section 8-11-6a(2), we must necessarily begin by discussing our constitution and the power it grants to home rule units.

2020Plaintiffs do not dispute that streaming services are amusements, which are subject to tax, instead they maintain that the tax has an extraterritorial effect and thus exceeds the City’s home rule authority. ¶ 25 In City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 61 Ill. 2d 483, 485-86 (1975), our supreme court observed that “an examination of the proceedings of the [1970 Illinois Constitutional] convention shows that the intention [of the legislature] was not to confer extraterritorial sovereign or governmental powers directly on home-rule units.

2019In addition, the City has statutory authority to tax amusements. 65 ILCS 5/11-42-5 (West 2016); City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 26 . 9 No. 1-18-1379 Plaintiffs do not dispute that streaming services are amusements which are subject to tax, instead they maintain that the tax has an extraterritorial effect and thus exceeds the City’s home rule authority. ¶ 25 In City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 61 Ill. 2d 483, 485-86 (1975), our supreme court observed that “an examination of the proceedings of the [1970 Illinois Constitutional] convention shows that the intention [of the leg

1991(City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268 (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 353, 365 ; Peters v. City of Springfield (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 142, 147-49 ; see also Dineen v. City of Chicago (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 248, 257 .) The court in City of Decatur recognized that a home rule unit could, if it chose, eliminate features of the civil service system.

1986At oral argument, Local 268 illustrated this argument by reminding us that in Peters v. City of Springfield (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 142 , 311 N.E.2d 107 , the court held that a home rule city which had previously adopted civil-service provisions of article 10 of the Municipal Code of 1961 had the power by ordinance to adopt conflicting requirements which pertained to mandatory retirement.

2016The John Sexton court found that although a home rule unit must conform with the minimum standards established by the legislature, unless the legislature limits the exercise of home rule units, " 'home rule units are supposed to be free to carry on activities that relate to their communities even if the state also is interested and is active in the area.' " Id. at 510-11 (quoting David Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. Ill.

2016The John Sexton court found that although a home rule unit must conform with the minimum standards established by the legislature, unless the legislature limits the exercise of home rule units, " 'home rule units are supposed to be free to carry on activities that relate to their communities even if the state also is interested and is active in the area.' " Id. at 510-11 (quoting David Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. Ill.

2024In Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 527 (1976), the supreme court found that “[s]ince the adoption of the Constitution of 1970 this court has consistently held that an ordinance enacted by a home rule unit under the grant of power found in section 6(a) supersedes a conflicting statute enacted prior to the effective date of the Constitution.” The court concluded that the home rule unit in that case was therefore empowered to enact ordinances that conflicted with the Municipal Code.

2020Our supreme court has “consistently held that an ordinance enacted by a home rule unit under the grant of power found in section 6(a) supersedes a conflicting statute enacted prior to the effective date of the Constitution.” Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 527 (1976). 9 No. 19-1414 ¶ 27 Pursuant to its section 6(a) authority, the Village adopted Ordinance 1613 and did not include in its text a provision limiting board membership based on political affiliation.

2024But, unless a State law specifically states that a home rule unit’s power is limited, then the authority of a home rule unit to act concurrently with the State cannot be considered restricted.’ ” (Internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted.) City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 516-17 (1998) (quoting Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 187-88 (1992)). - 10 - No. 1-22-1530 ¶ 25 The supreme court addressed how a home rule unit can “exercise” its home rule authority in Sommer v. Village of Glenview, 79 Ill. 2d 383 (1980).

2024The supreme court first recognized that it had repeatedly held that “a home rule unit’s exercise of its power will supercede [sic] any conflicting pre-1970-Constitution legislation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (collecting cases).

2025However, it does not preempt a home rule entity’s “other taxes not based on the selling or purchase price or gross receipts from the use, sale or purchase of tangible personal property.” Id. § 8-11-6a(7).

1992As the court stated in Stryker v. Village of Oak Park (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 523, 528 , citing Rozner, 55 Ill. 2d 430 , “[a] statute intended to limit or deny home rule powers must contain an express statement to that effect.” Under section 6(i), the General Assembly can restrict the concurrent exercise of a home rule unit’s power by enacting a law which specifically limits such power.

2018The court noted that there was no question of “the general authority of [Peoria] as a home rule unit to enact [the] taxing ordinances.” Id. at 473 .

2018The court could not “say that there exists a pervasive statewide interest in parks and park districts which prohibits a home rule unit from legislating in such a manner as to impose incidental obligations and burdens upon park districts.” Id.

2010Defendants argue that, just as in Landmarks and its progeny, the instant case concerns a home rule municipality exercising its home rule authority in a legislative capacity, so plaintiffs’ claim, which is “ ‘based upon alleged failure to follow requirements imposed by that body itself ” (Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 179 , 531 N.E.2d at 15 , quoting Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 404 , 519 N.E.2d at 452 , quoting Chirikos, 87 Ill.

2010Defendants argue that, just as in Landmarks and its progeny, the instant case concerns a home rule municipality exercising its home rule authority in a legislative capacity, so plaintiffs’ claim, which is “ ‘based upon alleged failure to follow requirements imposed by that body itself ” (Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 179 , 531 N.E.2d at 15 , quoting Gasoline Dealers, 119 Ill. 2d at 404 , 519 N.E.2d at 452 , quoting Chirikos, 87 Ill.

2022Accordingly, the definitions of “catastrophic injury” and “injury” contained in the ordinance were held to be “invalid, null, and void.” By extension, the ordinance’s definition of “gainful work” was stricken as surplusage. ¶7 On appeal, the appellate court observed that the City, as a home rule unit, could properly “adopt procedures for determining claims under the Act.” 2021 IL App (3d) 190758 , ¶ 11 (citing Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402 ).

2022Accordingly, the definitions of “catastrophic injury” and “injury” contained in the ordinance were held to be “invalid, null, and void.” By extension, the ordinance’s definition of “gainful work” was stricken as surplusage. ¶7 On appeal, the appellate court observed that the City, as a home rule unit, could properly “adopt procedures for determining claims under the Act.” 2021 IL App (3d) 190758 , ¶ 11 (citing Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402 ).