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28 Missouri opinions name it 3 courts 1963–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeaugreen2 sentences2023Now, “[u]nder Missouri’s new model of home rule [laid out in section 19(a)], even in the absence of an express delegation by the people of a home rule municipality in their charter, the municipality possesses all powers which are not limited or denied by the constitution, by statute, or by the charter itself.” Id. 4 In other words, “[u]nder section 19(a), the emphasis no longer is whether a home rule city has the authority to exercise the power involved; the emphasis is whether the exercise of that power conflicts with the Missouri Constitution, state statutes or the charter itself.” Cape Moto 2017Thus, “the emphasis no longer is whether a home rule city has the authority to exercise the power involved; the emphasis is whether the exercise of that power conflicts with the Missouri Constitution, state statutes or the charter itself.” Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Mo. banc 1986). | 5 | 5 |
State Ex Inf. Hannah Ex Rel. Christ v. City of St. Charlesgreen2 sentences2023Now, “[u]nder Missouri’s new model of home rule [laid out in section 19(a)], even in the absence of an express delegation by the people of a home rule municipality in their charter, the municipality possesses all powers which are not limited or denied by the constitution, by statute, or by the charter itself.” Id. 4 In other words, “[u]nder section 19(a), the emphasis no longer is whether a home rule city has the authority to exercise the power involved; the emphasis is whether the exercise of that power conflicts with the Missouri Constitution, state statutes or the charter itself.” Cape Moto 1987Under § 19)a), a constitutional charter city is prohibited from exercising its home rule power in a manner that is inconsistent with a state statute. . . . 676 S.W.2d at 513 ( Id. ) Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. et al. v. City of Cape Girardeau et al., 706 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. banc 1986) Under section 19(a), the emphasis no longer is whether a home rule city has the authority to exercise the power involved; the emphasis is whether the exercise of that power conflicts with the Missouri constitution; state statute, or the charter itself. . . . | 1 | 2 |
Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing MacHine Co.green2 sentences1965These may be delegated to or taken away from the city in whole or in part, within the wisdom of the Legislature. [ 337 Mo. at 926, 927 , 87 S.W.2d at 202, 203 .] "Despite the court's patent inconsistency and lack of preciseness in terminology, it now appeared from this series of cases that the constitutional ambiguities of the home rule provisions had finally been resolved in favor of the governmental-corporate functions doctrine, with the problem of distinguishing between the activities which fall into these respective categories remaining." State ex rel. 1965These may be delegated to or taken away from the city in whole or in part, within the wisdom of the Legislature. [ 337 Mo. at 926, 927 , 87 S.W.2d at 202, 203 .] "Despite the court's patent inconsistency and lack of preciseness in terminology, it now appeared from this series of cases that the constitutional ambiguities of the home rule provisions had finally been resolved in favor of the governmental-corporate functions doctrine, with the problem of distinguishing between the activities which fall into these respective categories remaining." State ex rel. | 1 | 2 |
City of Kansas City v. Carlsongreen1 sentence2023City v. Carlson, 292 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (Kansas City is a home rule city). | 1 | 1 |
Kirk King, King Construction, Inc. v. Continental Western Insurance Co.green1 sentence2021Co., 123 S.W.3d 259, 266 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (settlement agreement between 26 underlying plaintiff and insured requiring insured to pay damages for building a home in violation of underlying plaintiff’s copyright, which was committed as part of the insured’s advertising, established insurer’s duty to indemnify under advertising injury coverage of insurance policy). | 1 | 1 |
Cohen v. Poelkergreen1 sentence2012See also Cohen v. Poelker, 520 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. banc 1975) (holding that chapter 610, RSMo, which requires public governmental bodies to open their meetings to the public when conducting the people’s business, does not violate the home rule law because it does not regulate powers, duties, or compensation). . | 1 | 1 |
City of Los Angeles v. Lyonsgreen2 sentences2008See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 , 103 S.Ct. 1660 , 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (“the capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subject to the alleged illegality”). 2008See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 , 103 S.Ct. 1660 , 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (“the capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subject to the alleged illegality”). | 1 | 1 |
Construction Management Systems, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2003(Continental has not argued that the amount King agreed to pay exceeded any damages to Wiley from the construction of the copyright-infringing home.) Construction Management Systems Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America does not help Continental. 135 Idaho 680 , 23 P.3d 142, 146 (2001). 2003(Continental has not argued that the amount King agreed to pay exceeded any damages to Wiley from the construction of the copyright-infringing home.) Construction Management Systems Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America does not help Continental. 135 Idaho 680 , 23 P.3d 142, 146 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Flower Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Louis Countygreen1 sentence1999“We recognize that Article VI, Section 18(b) of the Constitution, ‘in authorizing the adoption of home rule charters, ... carries with it an implied grant of such powers as are reasonably necessary to the exercise of the powers granted ....”’ Flower Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. St Louis County, 528 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Mo.1975). | 1 | 1 |
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. v. Mayor's Commission on Human Rights of Springfieldgreen1 sentence1994Home rule status grants a city all legislative powers incident to that city’s affairs, unless “limited or denied by the constitution, by statute, or by the charter itself.” Yellow Freight Systems v. Mayor’s Com’n, 791 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Mo. banc 1990) quoting State ex inf. | 1 | 1 |
Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reedgreen1 sentence1980Co. v. Reed, supra, at p. 476 [2]. *948 The motion of Ford and Liberty Mutual to dismiss the appeal for failure of Home’s brief to comply with Rule 84.04(d) is overruled. | 1 | 1 |
Seibert v. City of Columbiagreen1 sentence1974See also White v. City of Columbia, 461 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. banc 1970), and Seibert v. City of Columbia, 461 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. banc 1970), where the City of Columbia, a constitutional charter city, submitted proposed charter amendments extending the corporate limits of Columbia to the voters at special elections called for that purpose. | 1 | 1 |
White v. City of Columbiagreen1 sentence1974See also White v. City of Columbia, 461 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. banc 1970), and Seibert v. City of Columbia, 461 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. banc 1970), where the City of Columbia, a constitutional charter city, submitted proposed charter amendments extending the corporate limits of Columbia to the voters at special elections called for that purpose. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Harris
green
2 sentences2008The Court found that the statement should not be suppressed because “where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton.” Id. at 21, 110 S.Ct. 1640 . 2007The Court in Harris held that “where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an *136 arrest made in the home in violation of Payton.” Harris, 495 U.S. at 21 , 110 S.Ct. 1640 . | 3 | 1990–2008 |
City of Cape Girardeau v. Jett
neutral
1 sentence1995Springfield also relies on City of Cape Girardeau v. Jett, 851 S.W.2d 114 (Mo.App.1993), which holds that a home rule city can condemn land within its county but outside the city limits. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Payton v. New York
green
2 sentences1993Relying on State v. Woods, 790 S.W.2d 253 (Mo.App.1990), and this court’s opinion in State v. Peters, 695 S.W.2d 140 (Mo.App.1985), Rank asserts the trial court erred when it admitted diary evidence because the police found this evidence only after making the initial warrantless entry into the defendant’s home in violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), which states under the Fourth Amendment, [A]bsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. 1993Relying on State v. Woods, 790 S.W.2d 253 (Mo.App.1990), and this court’s opinion in State v. Peters, 695 S.W.2d 140 (Mo.App.1985), Rank asserts the trial court erred when it admitted diary evidence because the police found this evidence only after making the initial warrantless entry into the defendant’s home in violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), which states under the Fourth Amendment, [A]bsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Woods
green
1 sentence1993Relying on State v. Woods, 790 S.W.2d 253 (Mo.App.1990), and this court’s opinion in State v. Peters, 695 S.W.2d 140 (Mo.App.1985), Rank asserts the trial court erred when it admitted diary evidence because the police found this evidence only after making the initial warrantless entry into the defendant’s home in violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), which states under the Fourth Amendment, [A]bsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Peters
green
1 sentence1993Relying on State v. Woods, 790 S.W.2d 253 (Mo.App.1990), and this court’s opinion in State v. Peters, 695 S.W.2d 140 (Mo.App.1985), Rank asserts the trial court erred when it admitted diary evidence because the police found this evidence only after making the initial warrantless entry into the defendant’s home in violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), which states under the Fourth Amendment, [A]bsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Glidewell v. Hughey
green
1 sentence1990Article XVI of the home rule Charter of the City of Springfield is entitled “Board of Public Utilities.” Section 16.7 of that Charter, entitled “Powers,” provides: The said board of directors shall have all the powers necessary, desirable, or convenient to manage, control, and operate such public utilities, and by way of description but not of limitation, the board shall have the power to hire such persons in the manner herein provided as are necessary to operate the said utilities_ (Emphasis added.) In Section 16.14 of the Charter, the “manner” of hiring and discharging public utility employe | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State ex rel. Cheek v. Rollings
neutral
2 sentences1984The Court said: “The home rule amendment to Article XI, Section 9 was not designed to give to the voters of a county affected the right to veto Acts of the Legislature with State Courts or the salaries to be paid out of the Treasury of the State of Tennessee to the Judges and Chancellors thereof.” 202 Tenn. at 618-19 , 308 S.W.2d at 397 . 1984The Court said: “The home rule amendment to Article XI, Section 9 was not designed to give to the voters of a county affected the right to veto Acts of the Legislature with State Courts or the salaries to be paid out of the Treasury of the State of Tennessee to the Judges and Chancellors thereof.” 202 Tenn. at 618-19 , 308 S.W.2d at 397 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Jones v. Haynes
green
2 sentences1984In the ease of Jones v. Haynes, 221 Tenn. 50 , 424 S.W.2d 197 (1968) it was held that the Home Rule Amendment has no relation to the enactment of criminal statutes, nor can it be left to the vote of the people in a particular county as to whether a specified criminal statute shall be operative therein. 1984In the ease of Jones v. Haynes, 221 Tenn. 50 , 424 S.W.2d 197 (1968) it was held that the Home Rule Amendment has no relation to the enactment of criminal statutes, nor can it be left to the vote of the people in a particular county as to whether a specified criminal statute shall be operative therein. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State Ex Rel. Rothrum v. Darby
green
2 sentences1972Rothrum v. Darby, 345 Mo. 1002 , 137 S.W.2d 532 , which applied the separation of powers clause to municipalities, one to a city of the second class and the other to a home rule charter city. 1972Rothrum v. Darby, 345 Mo. 1002 , 137 S.W.2d 532 , which applied the separation of powers clause to municipalities, one to a city of the second class and the other to a home rule charter city. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1971When matters of this nature are adopted in a charter, as prescribed by a Constitution, such charter provisions have the force and effect of a statute of the Legislature and can only be declared invalid for the same reason, namely, if they violate constitutional limitations or prohibitions * * * ” In City of Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458 , 41 S.W. 943, 945 , we said, of the home rule charter provisions authorized by the state constitution: “ * * Such a right is entirely in accord with the genius of our institutions, bringing the regulation and government of local affairs within the 1971When matters of this nature are adopted in a charter, as prescribed by a Constitution, such charter provisions have the force and effect of a statute of the Legislature and can only be declared invalid for the same reason, namely, if they violate constitutional limitations or prohibitions * * * ” In City of Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458 , 41 S.W. 943, 945 , we said, of the home rule charter provisions authorized by the state constitution: “ * * Such a right is entirely in accord with the genius of our institutions, bringing the regulation and government of local affairs within the | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Grant v. Kansas City
green
1 sentence1971In Grant v. Kansas City (Mo.Sup. banc) 431 S.W.2d 89, 92 , in discussing the area in which a home rule charter city has control, we quoted with approval the following from Kansas City, Mo. v. J. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Kansas City v. Bacon
green
2 sentences1968Either construction would be extreme and unthinkable. * * * The above constitutional limitation was construed by Judge Gantt, speaking for this court in banc in Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259 , l.c. 272, 48 S.W. 860 , 863: “‘Consistent with” does not import exact conformity, but means substantial harmony with the principles of the Constitution and the general laws of the state.’ ” Certainly the provision that charters must be consistent with the constitution and laws of the state means that some sort of restriction is placed upon the home rule grant to special charter cities. 1968Either construction would be extreme and unthinkable. * * * The above constitutional limitation was construed by Judge Gantt, speaking for this court in banc in Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259 , l.c. 272, 48 S.W. 860 , 863: “‘Consistent with” does not import exact conformity, but means substantial harmony with the principles of the Constitution and the general laws of the state.’ ” Certainly the provision that charters must be consistent with the constitution and laws of the state means that some sort of restriction is placed upon the home rule grant to special charter cities. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
State v. City of North Kansas City
green
2 sentences1967Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374 , 228 S.W. 2d 762 , goes into detail as to the procedure to be followed in determining the sufficiency of a petition to amend a home rule charter. 1967Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374 , 228 S.W. 2d 762 , goes into detail as to the procedure to be followed in determining the sufficiency of a petition to amend a home rule charter. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences1965Telephone Co., 189 Mo. 83 , 88 S.W. 41 ] insofar as that ruling would deny a home rule city control over any governmental function in the absence of statutory delegation. 1965Telephone Co., 189 Mo. 83 , 88 S.W. 41 ] insofar as that ruling would deny a home rule city control over any governmental function in the absence of statutory delegation. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Bowler v. Nagel
green
2 sentences1965Bowler v. Nagel, 228 Mich. 434 , 200 N.W. 258 , 259[1], 37 A.L.R. 1154 . 1965Bowler v. Nagel, 228 Mich. 434 , 200 N.W. 258 , 259[1], 37 A.L.R. 1154 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Hardy v. McNary
green
1 sentence1963Hardy v. McNary, supra. The “reason” lettered (e), heretofore quoted, which is a statement to the effect that ordinance 1059 was not lawfully adopted in that it did not pass by an affirmative vote of all the members of the council in accordance with the provisions of the applicable statute, cannot constitute a claim upon which relief can be granted because our recent case, Casper v. Hetlage, Mo., 359 S.W.2d 781 , specifically ruled that the statutory provision requiring the unanimous vote of all members of a county court where a protest had been lodged against rezoning had been superseded and | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Casper Ex Rel. Residents of Warson View Subdivision v. Hetlage
green
1 sentence1963Hardy v. McNary, supra. The “reason” lettered (e), heretofore quoted, which is a statement to the effect that ordinance 1059 was not lawfully adopted in that it did not pass by an affirmative vote of all the members of the council in accordance with the provisions of the applicable statute, cannot constitute a claim upon which relief can be granted because our recent case, Casper v. Hetlage, Mo., 359 S.W.2d 781 , specifically ruled that the statutory provision requiring the unanimous vote of all members of a county court where a protest had been lodged against rezoning had been superseded and | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.