home rule in California

2025The Home Rule Provision The home rule provision provides that charter cities “may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws.” (Section 5(a).) Pursuant to Section 5(a), city charters enacted “with respect to municipal affairs . . . supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court in City of Vista applied a four-part “analytical framework for resolving whether or not a matter falls within

2025City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.’ ” (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 555 .) “Home rule authority under article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution does not mean charter cities can never be subject to state laws that concern or regulate municipal affairs. ‘[A] charter city’s authority to enact legislation is not unlimited.’ [Citation.] The Legislature may legislate as to matters of statewide concern and, if the statute is not overbroad,

2017XI, § 5, subd. (a).) A charter city " 'ha[s] exclusive power to legislate over "municipal affairs." ' " ( Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212 , 1218, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 , citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644 , 704, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 .) The home rule represents "an 'affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of "all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess ..." and [includes] the important corollary that "so far as 'municipal affairs' are concerned," charter cities are "supreme and beyond the reach *211 of legislative enac

2017XI, § 5, subd. (a).) A charter city " 'ha[s] exclusive power to legislate over "municipal affairs." ' " ( Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212 , 1218, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 , citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644 , 704, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 .) The home rule represents "an 'affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of "all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess ..." and [includes] the important corollary that "so far as 'municipal affairs' are concerned," charter cities are "supreme and beyond the reach *211 of legislative enac

2017XI, § 5, subd. (a).) A charter city " 'ha[s] exclusive power to legislate over "municipal affairs." ' " ( Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212 , 1218, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 , citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644 , 704, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 .) The home rule represents "an 'affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of "all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess ..." and [includes] the important corollary that "so far as 'municipal affairs' are concerned," charter cities are "supreme and beyond the reach *211 of legislative enac

2017XI, § 5, subd. (a).) A charter city " 'ha[s] exclusive power to legislate over "municipal affairs." ' " ( Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212 , 1218, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 , citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644 , 704, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 .) The home rule represents "an 'affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of "all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess ..." and [includes] the important corollary that "so far as 'municipal affairs' are concerned," charter cities are "supreme and beyond the reach *211 of legislative enac

2022City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.’” (Id. at p. 555; italics omitted.) Known as the home rule doctrine, the broad authority of charter cities was originally “‘enacted upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and needed than the state at large, and to give that municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.’ [Citation.] The provision repres

2020City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.’” (Italics omitted.) Known as the home rule doctrine, the broad authority of charter cities was originally “‘enacted upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and needed than the state at large, and to give that municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.’ [Citation.] The provision represents an ‘affirm

1995In so doing they have overlooked the source of the authority to tax for municipal purposes which, in a charter city, is derived from the home rule provisions of article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) (Weekes v. City of Oakland (1978) 21 Cal.3d 386, 392 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 558 , 579 P.2d 449 ]), and has no restriction comparable to the statute on which the Myers court relied. 12 In only one of the cases which cites the Myers rule was a restriction on the initiative power arguably justified and that is because the initiative sought to accomplish the repeal of an ordinance where there would be an imp

1995In so doing they have overlooked the source of the authority to tax for municipal purposes which, in a charter city, is derived from the home rule provisions of article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) (Weekes v. City of Oakland (1978) 21 Cal.3d 386, 392 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 558 , 579 P.2d 449 ]), and has no restriction comparable to the statute on which the Myers court relied. 12 In only one of the cases which cites the Myers rule was a restriction on the initiative power arguably justified and that is because the initiative sought to accomplish the repeal of an ordinance where there would be an imp

2025Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 13 [levying taxes is a municipal affair under the home rule doctrine].) Indeed, “section 2 of the [DTT Act], which was not codified . . . recognizes that . . . charter cities have authority under the home rule doctrine to impose transfer taxes that do not conform to [the DTT Act].” 6 (CIM, at p. 957.) Accordingly, because the “subject of property taxes is not one of statewide concern, it is a municipal affair which lies ‘“beyond the reach of legislative enactment”’ in the case of charter cities.” (Fielder, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at

2022(Ex Parte Braun (1903) 141 Cal. 204, 209 [“That the power of taxation is a power appropriate for a municipality to possess is too obvious to merit discussion.”]; California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 13 (CalFed) [“levying taxes to support local expenditures qualifies as a ‘municipal affair’ within the meaning of the home rule provision of our Constitution”].) Nonetheless, if a local measure is in actual conflict with a state law, and the subject of the state law is a matter of statewide concern and the state statute is not overbroad, the conflicting

2018(Id. at p. 601.) Conversely, in Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th 278 , the California Supreme Court held that a state law requiring the county to enter into mandatory arbitration with the union representing its employees violated the county’s home rule authority as it was a substantive law permitting an arbitration panel rather than the governing body to establish local salaries.

2018(Id. at p. 601.) Conversely, in Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th 278 , the California Supreme Court held that a state law requiring the county to enter into mandatory arbitration with the union representing its employees violated the county’s home rule authority as it was a substantive law permitting an arbitration panel rather than the governing body to establish local salaries.

2022(Ex Parte Braun (1903) 141 Cal. 204, 209 [“That the power of taxation is a power appropriate for a municipality to possess is too obvious to merit discussion.”]; California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 13 (CalFed) [“levying taxes to support local expenditures qualifies as a ‘municipal affair’ within the meaning of the home rule provision of our Constitution”].) Nonetheless, if a local measure is in actual conflict with a state law, and the subject of the state law is a matter of statewide concern and the state statute is not overbroad, the conflicting

2022(Ex Parte Braun (1903) 141 Cal. 204, 209 [“That the power of taxation is a power appropriate for a municipality to possess is too obvious to merit discussion.”]; California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 13 (CalFed) [“levying taxes to support local expenditures qualifies as a ‘municipal affair’ within the meaning of the home rule provision of our Constitution”].) Nonetheless, if a local measure is in actual conflict with a state law, and the subject of the state law is a matter of statewide concern and the state statute is not overbroad, the conflicting

2020Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 600 (Seal Beach), quoting Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 292 (Professional Fire Fighters); see Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 136 (Baggett) [“‘As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters’”].) The California Supreme Court has developed a four-part “analytical framework” to determine whether a state law unconstitutional

2013(See also Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276 , 294- 295 [right of charter city employees to join unions is matter of statewide concern, not subject to local control]; City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 242 [state laws governing amount of injured workers’ pension payments trumps local ordinances dealing with employee pensions and compensation]; Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th 1074 [state employment-discrimination laws preempt charter cities’ local provisions on that subject].) 11 County of Los Angeles (1987)

1991Co. v. San Francisco (1939) 14 Cal.2d 516 [ 95 P.2d 138 ], we in effect revisited Ex Parte Braun by construing a 1914 amendment to article XI, section 5, of the Constitution as transforming a municipal charter from an instrument granting powers to one limiting powers implicit within the home rule clause; no conflict with a state statute was presented.

1991Co. v. San Francisco (1939) 14 Cal.2d 516 [ 95 P.2d 138 ], we in effect revisited Ex Parte Braun by construing a 1914 amendment to article XI, section 5, of the Constitution as transforming a municipal charter from an instrument granting powers to one limiting powers implicit within the home rule clause; no conflict with a state statute was presented.

2025(Cf. Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1155 [comparing Public Resources Code, section 4516.5, subd. (d) to Gov.

2025(See Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 897 & fn. 1.) In conducting our analysis, we 9 bear in mind “[t]he party claiming that general state law preempts a local ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption.” (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149 (Big Creek Lumber).) As noted above, “‘[a] conflict exists if the local legislation “‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.’”’” (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 897 .) According to Tesoro, “[t]he latter two ty

1975(City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal.2d 595, 599 [ 212 P.2d 894 ]; City of Roseville v. Terry, 158 Cal.App.2d 75, 76 [ 322 P.2d 44 ]; City of Santa Monica v. Grubb, 245 Cal.App.2d 718, 724 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 210 ].) However, “The municipal affairs doctrine does not foreclose state legislation with respect to municipal affairs of a home rule city; it is only in the event of a conflict between local and state regulations or state preemption of local regulation that the question whether the matter regulated is a municipal affair or of statewide concern becomes determinative.

1975(City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal.2d 595, 599 [ 212 P.2d 894 ]; City of Roseville v. Terry, 158 Cal.App.2d 75, 76 [ 322 P.2d 44 ]; City of Santa Monica v. Grubb, 245 Cal.App.2d 718, 724 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 210 ].) However, “The municipal affairs doctrine does not foreclose state legislation with respect to municipal affairs of a home rule city; it is only in the event of a conflict between local and state regulations or state preemption of local regulation that the question whether the matter regulated is a municipal affair or of statewide concern becomes determinative.

2020Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 600 (Seal Beach), quoting Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 292 (Professional Fire Fighters); see Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 136 (Baggett) [“‘As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters’”].) The California Supreme Court has developed a four-part “analytical framework” to determine whether a state law unconstitutional

2012Neville argues that even if the home rule doctrine applies, an exception to this doctrine exists because the legislative regulation of commissioners and sealers is justified as a matter of statewide concern. “[Gjeneral laws seeking to accomplish an objective of statewide concern may prevail over conflicting local regulations even if they impinge to a limited extent upon some phase of local control.” (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 139 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 R2d 874].) She contends that commissioners have the responsibility to enforce law and regulations related to the eradication of

2008This occurs in three situations: when ‘ “(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the p

2000If there is no conflict, the home rule doctrine is not brought into play. “ ‘A conflict exists if the local legislation “ ‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 , 844 P.2d 534 ] (Sherwin-Williams).) “[L]ocal legislation enters an area that is ‘fully occupied’ by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to ‘fully occupy’ the area [citation], or when it has impliedly done so i

2018XI, § 5, subd. (a).) A charter city “ ‘ha[s] exclusive power to legislate over “municipal affairs.” ’ ” (Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218 , citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 704 .) The home rule represents “an ‘affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of “all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess . . .” and [includes] the important corollary that “so far as ‘municipal affairs’ are concerned,” charter cities are “supreme and beyond the reach of legislative enactment.” ’ ” (State Building & Construction Trades Council of

2017XI, § 5, subd. (a).) A charter city " 'ha[s] exclusive power to legislate over "municipal affairs." ' " ( Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212 , 1218, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 , citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644 , 704, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 .) The home rule represents "an 'affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of "all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess ..." and [includes] the important corollary that "so far as 'municipal affairs' are concerned," charter cities are "supreme and beyond the reach *211 of legislative enac

1997(Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61-62 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 460 P.2d 137 ).) “As is made clear in the leading case of Pipoly v. Benson [(1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 369-370 ( 125 P.2d 482 , 147 A.L.R. 515 )], local governments (whether chartered or not) do not lack the power, nor are they forbidden by the Constitution, to legislate upon matters which are not of a local nature, nor is the Legislature forbidden to legislate with respect to the local municipal affairs of a home rule municipality.

1997(Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61-62 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 460 P.2d 137 ).) “As is made clear in the leading case of Pipoly v. Benson [(1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 369-370 ( 125 P.2d 482 , 147 A.L.R. 515 )], local governments (whether chartered or not) do not lack the power, nor are they forbidden by the Constitution, to legislate upon matters which are not of a local nature, nor is the Legislature forbidden to legislate with respect to the local municipal affairs of a home rule municipality.

2021Savings) wherein the court “set forth an analytical framework for resolving whether or not a matter falls within the home rule authority of charter cities.” (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556 .) 19 local governance [citation].”15 (City of Vista, at p. 556.) In answering this four-part test in favor of enforcing the minimum wage law against the charter city, the appellate court emphasized that “the express terms of” the subject wage orders (one of which was Wage Order No. 4) make their minimum wage provisions applicable to “ ‘any city.’ ” (Marquez, at p. 569, citing Cal. Code Regs., ti

2019(See, e.g., ibid. [prevailing wage law applied only to contracts for public works projects]; County of Riverside, supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 282 , 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 , 66 P.3d 718 [statute requiring binding arbitration of wage disputes *74 with firefighter and police unions]; *573 San Francisco Labor Council, supra , 26 Cal.3d at p. 790 , 163 Cal.Rptr. 460 , 608 P.2d 277 [law requiring Regents of the University of California to pay prevailing wages]; Sonoma County, supra , 23 Cal.3d at p. 302 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 591 P.2d 1 [law nullifying agreements between localities and their public employe

1994(City of Modesto v. Modesto Irrigation Dist., supra, 34 Cal.App.3d at p. 506 .) The court then stated that the Supreme Court in Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 139 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ], had held that an ordinance requiring a utility company to collect a utility user’s tax “does not constitute forbidden or conflicting regulation of the utility.” (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that “If a city operating under a home rule charter can compel a public utility to collect the city’s utility users’ tax without engaging in impermissible regulation in a field of regula

1994(City of Modesto v. Modesto Irrigation Dist., supra, 34 Cal.App.3d at p. 506 .) The court then stated that the Supreme Court in Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 139 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 490 P.2d 793 ], had held that an ordinance requiring a utility company to collect a utility user’s tax “does not constitute forbidden or conflicting regulation of the utility.” (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that “If a city operating under a home rule charter can compel a public utility to collect the city’s utility users’ tax without engaging in impermissible regulation in a field of regula

2020Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 600 (Seal Beach), quoting Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 292 (Professional Fire Fighters); see Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 136 (Baggett) [“‘As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters’”].) The California Supreme Court has developed a four-part “analytical framework” to determine whether a state law unconstitutional

2020The City maintains, however, the state laws in those cases “impose[d] mere procedural regulations, rather than substantive limitations, on a Charter City’s authority over its municipal affairs.” The City thus asserts “the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that this exception to the home rule supremacy over enumerated Core Municipal Affairs is limited to setting forth procedural standards rather than substantive obligations or prohibitions.” 25 In regards to issues of the compensation, qualification, and removal of charter city employees, which come within Section 5(b)(4), the California Su

2025Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 13 [levying taxes is a municipal affair under the home rule doctrine].) Indeed, “section 2 of the [DTT Act], which was not codified . . . recognizes that . . . charter cities have authority under the home rule doctrine to impose transfer taxes that do not conform to [the DTT Act].” 6 (CIM, at p. 957.) Accordingly, because the “subject of property taxes is not one of statewide concern, it is a municipal affair which lies ‘“beyond the reach of legislative enactment”’ in the case of charter cities.” (Fielder, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at

2022XI, sec. 5(a); see CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 13 [levying taxes is a municipal affair under the home rule doctrine]; Fielder, supra, 14 18 2.

2018XI, § 5, subd. (a).) A charter city “ ‘ha[s] exclusive power to legislate over “municipal affairs.” ’ ” (Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218 , citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 704 .) The home rule represents “an ‘affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of “all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess . . .” and [includes] the important corollary that “so far as ‘municipal affairs’ are concerned,” charter cities are “supreme and beyond the reach of legislative enactment.” ’ ” (State Building & Construction Trades Council of

2017XI, § 5, subd. (a).) A charter city " 'ha[s] exclusive power to legislate over "municipal affairs." ' " ( Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212 , 1218, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 , citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644 , 704, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 .) The home rule represents "an 'affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of "all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess ..." and [includes] the important corollary that "so far as 'municipal affairs' are concerned," charter cities are "supreme and beyond the reach *211 of legislative enac

2000If there is no conflict, the home rule doctrine is not brought into play. “ ‘A conflict exists if the local legislation “ ‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 , 844 P.2d 534 ] (Sherwin-Williams).) “[L]ocal legislation enters an area that is ‘fully occupied’ by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to ‘fully occupy’ the area [citation], or when it has impliedly done so i

2000If there is no conflict, the home rule doctrine is not brought into play. “ ‘A conflict exists if the local legislation “ ‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 , 844 P.2d 534 ] (Sherwin-Williams).) “[L]ocal legislation enters an area that is ‘fully occupied’ by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to ‘fully occupy’ the area [citation], or when it has impliedly done so i

2000The court recognized that a limitation on the ability to levy taxes had a limiting effect on home rule, but stated that nothing in the proposition abrogates home rule “or discloses any intent to undermine or subordinate preexisting constitutional provisions on that subject . . . .” ( 22 Cal.3d at p. 225 .) The key reason that the court found that home rule was not improperly infringed was that the funds at issue in that case were allocated to local agencies on a pro rata basis, “without imposing any condition whatever regarding their ultimate use.” (Id. at p. 227.) In City of Rancho Cucamonga

1991Plaintiffs argue that Amador determined that Proposition 13 did not abrogate the home rule principles of article XIII. ( Amador, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 224-225.) The Amador court stated, “[R]ecent implementing legislation (Stats. 1978, chs. 292, 332) confirms the Legislature’s present intention to preserve home rule and local autonomy respecting the allocation and expenditure of real property tax revenues.

1996The home rule provisions of the state Constitution in article XI, section 4, allow counties to establish the manner of appointment or removal of a county officer (Curphey v. Superior Court (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 261, 265 [ 337 P.2d 169 ]) and the Legislature authorized boards of supervisors in charter counties to establish the office and appoint the director of corrections.

1996The home rule provisions of the state Constitution in article XI, section 4, allow counties to establish the manner of appointment or removal of a county officer (Curphey v. Superior Court (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 261, 265 [ 337 P.2d 169 ]) and the Legislature authorized boards of supervisors in charter counties to establish the office and appoint the director of corrections.

1991Distributing Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 15 Cal.3d 566, 571 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 542 P.2d 625 ]; see also Ainsworth v. Bryant (1949) 34 Cal.2d 465, 469 [ 211 P.2d 564 ].) More recently, in Weekes v. City of Oakland (1978) 21 Cal.3d 386 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 558 , 579 P.2d 449 ], the court declared, “[T]he power to tax for local purposes clearly is one of the privileges accorded chartered cities by the home rule provision of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art.

1991Distributing Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 15 Cal.3d 566, 571 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 542 P.2d 625 ]; see also Ainsworth v. Bryant (1949) 34 Cal.2d 465, 469 [ 211 P.2d 564 ].) More recently, in Weekes v. City of Oakland (1978) 21 Cal.3d 386 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 558 , 579 P.2d 449 ], the court declared, “[T]he power to tax for local purposes clearly is one of the privileges accorded chartered cities by the home rule provision of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art.

2026Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 16 ; accord, Rider v. City of San Diego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1035, 1054-1055 .) 2.

2017"First, a court must determine whether there is a genuine conflict between a state statute and a municipal ordinance. [Citations.] Only after concluding there is an actual conflict should a court proceed with the second question; i.e., does the local legislation impact a municipal or statewide concern?" ( Barajas v. City of Anaheim (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1808 , 1813, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 764 ; see also Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352 , 364, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ; Rider v. City of San Diego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1035 , 1054, 77 Cal.

2024XI, § 4, subd. (f).) Under the home rule doctrine, “county charter provisions concerning the operation of the county, and specifically including the County’s right to provide ‘for the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees’ (that is, a county’s core operations) trump conflicting state laws.” (Holmgren v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 601 ; see Dimon v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281 .) Similarly, under the Charter of the County of Los Angeles, the Board of Supervisors has authority to “appoint all County officers other than el

2013(See also Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276 , 294- 295 [right of charter city employees to join unions is matter of statewide concern, not subject to local control]; City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 242 [state laws governing amount of injured workers’ pension payments trumps local ordinances dealing with employee pensions and compensation]; Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th 1074 [state employment-discrimination laws preempt charter cities’ local provisions on that subject].) 11 County of Los Angeles (1987)

2023XI, § 5, subd. (a).) California voters initially approved the home rule doctrine over 100 years ago “ ‘upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and needed than the state at large, and to give that municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.’ ” ( Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 555-556.) Discussing the doctrine shortly after its adoption, our Supreme Court explained that it “was intended to give municipalities the sole right to regulate, control, and govern their internal cond

2012(Ibid.) The home rule doctrine was “ ‘enacted upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and needed than the state at large, and to give that municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.’ (Fragley v. Phelan (1899) 126 Cal. 383, 387 [ 58 P. 923 ] (lead opn. by Garoutte, J.)” (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556 .) For example, our Supreme Court long ago held that the salaries of charter city employees are a municipal affair and not a statewide concern regardless of any pos