home rule in Kansas

1996Const, art. 12, § 5(b), the Supreme Court in Claflin stated the general limitations on home rule authority: “The home rule power is subject to optional control by legislative action in four specific areas: (1) Enactments of statewide concern which are applicable uniformly to all cities. (2) Other enactments of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities. (3) Enactments applicable uniformly to all cities of the same class limiting or prohibiting the levying of any tax, excise, fee, charge or other exaction. (4) Enactments of the legislature prescribing limits of indebtedness.” 212 Kan. a

1982In Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1 , 509 P.2d 1130 (1973), we discussed home-rule limitations: “The home rule power of cities is not absolute.

1997Blevins v. Hiebert , 247 Kan. 1 (1990); McCarthy v. City of Leawood , 257 Kan. 566 (1995).

1992As noted above, we held “all general obligation bonds and temporary notes authorized or issued under home rule powers prior to the date of this opinion [July 13, 1990] are hereby declared lawful and validated as to the home rule issue.” 247 Kan. at 14 .

1997Missouri Pacific, 231 Kan. 225 , involved a plaintiff railroad which filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court to determine the validity of a home rule resolution passed by Greeley County to regulate dirt embankments on the railroad’s right-of-way.

1993The defendants base their authority to impose the fuel flowage fee upon the home rule provision of the Kansas Constitution. “[T]be home rule powers granted to cities by constitutional amendment and to counties by legislative act appear to be similar and parallel each other in many particulars.” Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Board of Greeley County Comm’rs, 231 Kan. 225, 226 , 643 P.2d 188 (1982).

1998This court’s opinion in McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 257 Kan. 566 , 894 P.2d 836 (1995), presents a typical issue of a city’s home rule powers.

1998This court’s opinion in McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 257 Kan. 566 , 894 P.2d 836 (1995), presents a typical issue of a city’s home rule powers.

2004The question in Schneider was "whether the home rule amendment, art. 12, § 5, authorizes Kansas City to enforce its building permit and code ordinances upon the Board of Regents who derive their authority through legislative action mandated by art. 6, § 2(b)." 228 Kan. at 31 .

2004The question in Schneider was “whether the home rule amendment, art. 12, § 5, authorizes Kansas City to enforce its building permit and code ordinances upon the Board of Regents who derive their authority through legislative action mandated by art. 6, § 2(b).” 228 Kan. at 31 .

2006As we stated in Board of Lincoln County Comm’rs v. Nielander, 275 Kan. 257, 264 , 62 P.3d 247 (2003): “ ‘Home rule powers are those granted by the Constitution or by legislative act to units of local government to transact local business and perform such local and administrative duties as these local units may deem appropriate, subject to certain limitations imposed upon such grant of power. [Citation omitted.] ...

2006As we stated in Board of Lincoln County Comm’rs v. Nielander, 275 Kan. 257, 264 , 62 P.3d 247 (2003): “ ‘Home rule powers are those granted by the Constitution or by legislative act to units of local government to transact local business and perform such local and administrative duties as these local units may deem appropriate, subject to certain limitations imposed upon such grant of power. [Citation omitted.] ...

2004As to the above, this court observed in Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 673 , 8 P.3d 701 (2000): "In 1961, the home rule amendment to the Kansas Constitution took effect and empowered cities to determine their local affairs.

2004As to the above, this court observed in Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 673 , 8 P.3d 701 (2000): "In 1961, the home rule amendment to the Kansas Constitution took effect and empowered cities to determine their local affairs.

2004Answers to these latter questions determine whether an ordinance is ‘subject to’ state legislation within the meaning of the home rule amendment.” In Lee , this court also discussed whether criminal statutes are subject to home rule, stating: “The further argument that by the enactment of our present criminal code the legislature has preempted for the state the entire field of criminal law was implicitly rejected in City of Lyons v. Suttle, 209 Kan. 735 , 498 P.2d 9 (see dissenting opinion 209 Kan. 742 -743, 498 P.2d 15 ).

2004Answers to these latter questions determine whether an ordinance is ‘subject to’ state legislation within the meaning of the home rule amendment.” In Lee , this court also discussed whether criminal statutes are subject to home rule, stating: “The further argument that by the enactment of our present criminal code the legislature has preempted for the state the entire field of criminal law was implicitly rejected in City of Lyons v. Suttle, 209 Kan. 735 , 498 P.2d 9 (see dissenting opinion 209 Kan. 742 -743, 498 P.2d 15 ).

2004The statute relied upon for the theory of preemption is K.S.A. 21-3102, which states: "`(1) No conduct constitutes a crime against the state of Kansas unless it is made criminal in this code or in another statute of this state ....' "The foregoing is simply codification of prior case law holding there are no common law crimes in Kansas—all crimes are statutory (see State v. Koontz, 124 Kan. 216, 218 , 257 Pac. 944 ).

2004The statute relied upon for the theory of preemption is K.S.A. 21-3102, which states: “ ‘(1) No conduct constitutes a crime against the state of Kansas unless it is made criminal in this code or in another statute of this state. . . .’ “The foregoing is simply codification of prior case law holding there are no common law crimes in Kansas — all crimes are statutory (see State v. Koontz, 124 Kan. 216, 218 , 257 Pac. 944 ).

2004The statute relied upon for the theory of preemption is K.S.A. 21-3102, which states: "`(1) No conduct constitutes a crime against the state of Kansas unless it is made criminal in this code or in another statute of this state ....' "The foregoing is simply codification of prior case law holding there are no common law crimes in Kansas—all crimes are statutory (see State v. Koontz, 124 Kan. 216, 218 , 257 Pac. 944 ).

2004The statute relied upon for the theory of preemption is K.S.A. 21-3102, which states: “ ‘(1) No conduct constitutes a crime against the state of Kansas unless it is made criminal in this code or in another statute of this state. . . .’ “The foregoing is simply codification of prior case law holding there are no common law crimes in Kansas — all crimes are statutory (see State v. Koontz, 124 Kan. 216, 218 , 257 Pac. 944 ).

1997Since K.S.A. 19-206 was not a uniform statute, the court determined that it did not limit the authority of the county to increase the definition of a quorum beyond the majority of its members and found the resolution raising the quorum was a valid exercise of the county’s home rule authority. 244 Kan. at 544 .

1993In Stephan v. Board of Sedwick County Commissioners , 244 Kan. 536 (1989), the Supreme Court held that "the resolution raising the quorum of the five-member county commission from three to four members was a valid excercise of the commission's home rule authority." This case, however, is distinguishable from the question before us.

1995Unreasonable features and effects alleged by the landowners include the percentage of Leawood’s share of improvement costs to be paid by impact fees, the ordinance’s providing for increases in the impact fee rate, and the rate’s being defined as “the amount of the applicable impact fee per trip generated by new development in the Highway K-150 corridor.” The landowners rely on Restaurants of Wichita, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 215 Kan. 636, 640 , 527 P.2d 969 (1974), for the principle that “the home rule amendment in broadening the powers of municipalities did not extend to them the power to ena

1995Unreasonable features and effects alleged by the landowners include the percentage of Leawood’s share of improvement costs to be paid by impact fees, the ordinance’s providing for increases in the impact fee rate, and the rate’s being defined as “the amount of the applicable impact fee per trip generated by new development in the Highway K-150 corridor.” The landowners rely on Restaurants of Wichita, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 215 Kan. 636, 640 , 527 P.2d 969 (1974), for the principle that “the home rule amendment in broadening the powers of municipalities did not extend to them the power to ena

1990The case law which gives rise to the argument that a state statute must make a positive statement of its intent to preempt a field comes from the rationales in City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495 ; Hutchinson Human Relations Comm. v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 213 Kan. 308 ; Blue Star Supper Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 208 Kan. 731 ; and City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360 , 311 P.2d 306 (1957).

1989It should also be noted that City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360 , was decided prior to the adoption of the home rule statute, K.S.A. 19-101a, and thus it is irrelevant to the issue *653 of whether a county may utilize home rule power when statutory authority on the subject matter exists.

1973(Capitol *7 Cable, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 209 Kan. 152, 161 , 495 P. 2d 885 ; Hampton v. City of Wichita, 192 Kan. 534 , 389 P. 2d 757 .) The home rule power of cities is not absolute.

1973(Capitol *7 Cable, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 209 Kan. 152, 161 , 495 P. 2d 885 ; Hampton v. City of Wichita, 192 Kan. 534 , 389 P. 2d 757 .) The home rule power of cities is not absolute.

2019Prior to 1961, the general rule was that "the superior power is with the state" and "the city's only power is that delegated to it by the state." Trimble , 147 Kan. at 114 , 75 P.2d 241 .

2019Prior to 1961, the general rule was that "the superior power is with the state" and "the city's only power is that delegated to it by the state." Trimble , 147 Kan. at 114 , 75 P.2d 241 .

2007Kline, 277 Kan. at 517 . *520 This court held that the charter ordinances were valid exercises of the home rule authority granted to cities under the Kansas Constitution.

2006L. 1974, ch. 110. [See K.S.A. 19-101 et seq.] “Counties in Kansas are now empowered to transact all county business and perform such powers of local legislation and administration as may be appropriate, subject, however, to the restrictions and prohibitions set forth in K.S.A. 19-101a.” [Citation omitted.]’ ” (Quoting Board of Trepo County Comm’rs v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 261 Kan. 927, 930 , 933 P.2d 691 [1997].) Moreover, the board’s home rule powers “shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving to counties the largest measure of self-government.” K.S.A. 19-101c. *809 Although th

2006L. 1974, ch. 110. [See K.S.A. 19-101 et seq.] “Counties in Kansas are now empowered to transact all county business and perform such powers of local legislation and administration as may be appropriate, subject, however, to the restrictions and prohibitions set forth in K.S.A. 19-101a.” [Citation omitted.]’ ” (Quoting Board of Trepo County Comm’rs v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 261 Kan. 927, 930 , 933 P.2d 691 [1997].) Moreover, the board’s home rule powers “shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving to counties the largest measure of self-government.” K.S.A. 19-101c. *809 Although th

2003As we stated in Moore v. City of Lawrence, 232 Kan. 353, 357 , 654 P.2d 445 (1982), when discussing the predecessor statute to K.S.A. 12-741: “While the application of the statutes may be optional, it is clear that once a city chooses to adopt this method the legislature intended for those statutes ... to be binding. ...

2003As we stated in Moore v. City of Lawrence, 232 Kan. 353, 357 , 654 P.2d 445 (1982), when discussing the predecessor statute to K.S.A. 12-741: “While the application of the statutes may be optional, it is clear that once a city chooses to adopt this method the legislature intended for those statutes ... to be binding. ...

2000The League and Bonner Springs place great reliance on Clark v. City of Overland Park, 226 Kan. 609 , 602 P.2d 1292 (1979).

2000The League and Bonner Springs place great reliance on Clark v. City of Overland Park, 226 Kan. 609 , 602 P.2d 1292 (1979).

1997See City of Junction City v. Griffin , 227 Kan. 332 (1980); Claflin v. Walsh , 212 Kan. 1 , 8 (1973); Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Board of Greeley County Commissioners , 231 Kan. 225 , 226 (1982) (case law dealing with city home rule powers is instructive when determining county home rule powers); Home Builders Association of Greater Kansas City v. City of Overland Park , 22 Kan.

1996In Board of Sedgwick County Commissioners v. Noone , 235 Kan. 777 (1984), a county resolution that required the clerk of the district court to pay over to the county treasurer all fines and costs collected for violation of county resolutions was determined to be an invalid use of county home rule power because it affected the courts.

1995Unreasonable features and effects alleged by the landowners include the percentage of Leawood’s share of improvement costs to be paid by impact fees, the ordinance’s providing for increases in the impact fee rate, and the rate’s being defined as “the amount of the applicable impact fee per trip generated by new development in the Highway K-150 corridor.” The landowners rely on Restaurants of Wichita, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 215 Kan. 636, 640 , 527 P.2d 969 (1974), for the principle that “the home rule amendment in broadening the powers of municipalities did not extend to them the power to ena

1995Unreasonable features and effects alleged by the landowners include the percentage of Leawood’s share of improvement costs to be paid by impact fees, the ordinance’s providing for increases in the impact fee rate, and the rate’s being defined as “the amount of the applicable impact fee per trip generated by new development in the Highway K-150 corridor.” The landowners rely on Restaurants of Wichita, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 215 Kan. 636, 640 , 527 P.2d 969 (1974), for the principle that “the home rule amendment in broadening the powers of municipalities did not extend to them the power to ena

1990The case law which gives rise to the argument that a state statute must make a positive statement of its intent to preempt a field comes from the rationales in City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495 ; Hutchinson Human Relations Comm. v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 213 Kan. 308 ; Blue Star Supper Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 208 Kan. 731 ; and City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360 , 311 P.2d 306 (1957).

1990The case law which gives rise to the argument that a state statute must make a positive statement of its intent to preempt a field comes from the rationales in City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495 ; Hutchinson Human Relations Comm. v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 213 Kan. 308 ; Blue Star Supper Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 208 Kan. 731 ; and City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360 , 311 P.2d 306 (1957).

1990The case law which gives rise to the argument that a state statute must make a positive statement of its intent to preempt a field comes from the rationales in City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495 ; Hutchinson Human Relations Comm. v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 213 Kan. 308 ; Blue Star Supper Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 208 Kan. 731 ; and City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360 , 311 P.2d 306 (1957).

1990The case law which gives rise to the argument that a state statute must make a positive statement of its intent to preempt a field comes from the rationales in City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495 ; Hutchinson Human Relations Comm. v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 213 Kan. 308 ; Blue Star Supper Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 208 Kan. 731 ; and City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360 , 311 P.2d 306 (1957).