home rule in Colorado

2016Thus, as noted above, "in matters of mixed local and state concern, a charter or ordinance provision of a home rule municipality may coexist with a state statute as long as there is no conflict . . . ." City & Cty. of Denver, 788 P.2d at 767 .

2016Thus, as noted above, "in matters of mixed local and state concern, a charter or ordinance provision of a home rule municipality may coexist with a state statute as long as there is no conflict . . . ." City & Cty. of Denver, 788 P.2d at 767.

2025See Baum, 90 P.3d at 850 n.6; see also, e.g., Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Colo. 1992) (recognizing that the exercise of zoning authority within a home rule city’s municipal border is a matter of local concern). ¶ 26 Yet plaintiffs contend that because they brought their complaint under Rule 106(a)(4), it is necessarily a matter of statewide concern.

2025See Baum, 90 P.3d at 850 n.6; see also, e.g., Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Colo. 1992) (recognizing that the exercise of zoning authority within a home rule city’s municipal border is a matter of local concern). ¶ 26 Yet plaintiffs contend that because they brought their complaint under Rule 106(a)(4), it is necessarily a matter of statewide concern.

2025It also relied on People v. Wade , 757 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Colo. 1988), which stated that "a city's choice of a sentencing scheme different from the state's is well within the city's constitutional power as a home rule city." 15 ¶19 The Aurora Municipal Court further observed that section 13-10-113(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025), generally authorizes municipal penalties of up to 364 days' imprisonment, a $2,650 fine, or both.

2002This approach clearly contravenes People v. Wade in which, a decade after *1287 deciding Hizhniak , we confirmed that "[a] city's choice of a sentencing scheme different from the state's is well within the city's constitutional power as a home rule city." 757 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Colo.1988).

2025The Board argues that because the General Assembly "cannot prohibit the exercise of constitutional home rule powers," Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp. , 185 P.3d 161, 170 (Colo. 2008), home rule counties aren't subject to the redistricting statutes. ¶30 To assess this claim, we must examine its constitutional underpinnings. [2] The Colorado Constitution vests the registered electors of each county with "the power to adopt a home rule charter establishing the organization and structure of county government consistent with this article and statutes enacted pursuant hereto." Colo. Con

2018A. Condemnation Law ¶ 12 Home rule municipalities may “condemn property for any lawful, public, local, and municipal purpose.” Id. at 164 (discussing Colo. Const. art.

1999See, e.g., In re Proposed Initiative for 1999-2000 No. 29, 972 P.2d at 264 ; In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d at 1198; Francis v. County Court, 175 Colo. 308, 314-17 , 487 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1971) (treating Article VI, Section 26 as a home rule provision).

1999See, e.g., In re Proposed Initiative for 1999-2000 No. 29, 972 P.2d at 264 ; In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d at 1198; Francis v. County Court, 175 Colo. 308, 314-17 , 487 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1971) (treating Article VI, Section 26 as a home rule provision).

2025Id. ¶ 17 The supreme court held that a home rule town possesses the authority under the Colorado Constitution and Colorado statutes to define the jurisdiction of its municipal court over matters that are of local or municipal concern — not over matters of state or mixed concern.

2025See Baum, 90 P.3d at 850 n.6; see also, e.g., Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Colo. 1992) (recognizing that the exercise of zoning authority within a home rule city’s municipal border is a matter of local concern). ¶ 26 Yet plaintiffs contend that because they brought their complaint under Rule 106(a)(4), it is necessarily a matter of statewide concern.

2009Because home rule land use authority has a basis in the Colorado Constitution, we utilize a four-part test when examining the validity of a local ordinance or regulation enacted by a home rule city or county, in the face of an alleged state conflict: "whether there is a need for statewide uniformity of regulation; whether the municipal regulation has an extraterritorial impact; whether the subject matter is one traditionally governed by state or local government; and whether the Colorado Constitution specifically commits the particular matter to state or local regulation." Voss v. Lundvall Bro

2009In Ibarra , we utilized implied preemption to void a local home rule ordinance upon finding that the state's interest was "sufficiently dominant" to override the home rule city's ordinance. 62 P.3d at 163 .

1982The defendant counters that municipal use taxes are a purely local and municipal concern, relying on Berman v. Denver, 156 Colo. 538 , 400 P.2d 434 (1965), and that under the home rule provisions of Article XX, § 6 of the Colorado Constitution, Denver may establish procedures for review of decisions by the Manager of Revenue.

1982The defendant counters that municipal use taxes are a purely local and municipal concern, relying on Berman v. Denver, 156 Colo. 538 , 400 P.2d 434 (1965), and that under the home rule provisions of Article XX, § 6 of the Colorado Constitution, Denver may establish procedures for review of decisions by the Manager of Revenue.

2016See City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. , 194 Colo. 526, 534 , 575 P.2d 382, 388-89 (1978) (citing Colo. Const. art.

2016See City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. , 194 Colo. 526, 534 , 575 P.2d 382, 388-89 (1978) (citing Colo. Const. art.

1971We have already determined in Duffy, supra, that business occupational privilege taxes imposed -solely for the purpose of raising revenue for city governmental activities is strictly of local concern, and consequently that Denver, as a home rule city, has the power to impose such taxation under Article XX, section 6, supra. Jackson v. Glenwood Springs, 122 Colo. 323 , 221 P.2d 1083 (1950); Post v. Grand, Junction, 118 Colo. 434 , 195 P.2d 958 (1948); see Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537 , 364 P.2d 569 (1961); Ping v. Cortez, 139 Colo. 575 , 342 P.2d 657 (1959).

1971We have already determined in Duffy, supra, that business occupational privilege taxes imposed -solely for the purpose of raising revenue for city governmental activities is strictly of local concern, and consequently that Denver, as a home rule city, has the power to impose such taxation under Article XX, section 6, supra. Jackson v. Glenwood Springs, 122 Colo. 323 , 221 P.2d 1083 (1950); Post v. Grand, Junction, 118 Colo. 434 , 195 P.2d 958 (1948); see Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537 , 364 P.2d 569 (1961); Ping v. Cortez, 139 Colo. 575 , 342 P.2d 657 (1959).

1993XX, § 6 declares that the “charter [of the home rule city] and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in [local and municipal] matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.” It further states: “The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.” In Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 468 , 484 P.2d 1204, 1206 (1971), the supreme

1993XX, § 6 declares that the “charter [of the home rule city] and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in [local and municipal] matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.” It further states: “The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.” In Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 468 , 484 P.2d 1204, 1206 (1971), the supreme

2025State Statutory Law and Due Process ¶ 32 Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that the underlying matter is one of mixed concern because, in addition to zoning — a matter of local concern — the underlying matter also requires the district court to adjudicate issues under the Vested Property Rights Act 4 Plaintiffs rely on City of Englewood v. Parkinson, 703 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Colo. App. 1985), to suggest that divisions of this court are divided as to whether municipal courts have jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of remedial writs.

2025State Statutory Law and Due Process ¶ 32 Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that the underlying matter is one of mixed concern because, in addition to zoning — a matter of local concern — the underlying matter also requires the district court to adjudicate issues under the Vested Property Rights Act 4 Plaintiffs rely on City of Englewood v. Parkinson, 703 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Colo. App. 1985), to suggest that divisions of this court are divided as to whether municipal courts have jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of remedial writs.

2008See City & County of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 754 (Colo.2001).

2006City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, supra; see City & County of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748 (Colo.2001) (concluding that a home rule municipality’s enactment controls when a conflicting state statute addresses a matter of local concern).

2008In Town of Telluride , we held that if a home rule city enacts an ordinance concerning a matter of local concern and that ordinance conflicts with a state statute, the home rule ordinance takes precedence over the state statute. 3 P.3d at 37 .

2004The landlords cite Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo.2000), in support of their argument.

2016The Cities are home rule cities and “[t]he Colorado Constitution confers upon a home rule city a legally protected interest in its local concerns.” Byrne, 618 P.2d at 1381 . “[C]ity budgeting and the assessment and collection of taxes for municipal purposes” are local concerns and each city has a legally protected 4 We reject the County’s argument that Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980), and the other cases the Cities rely on to demonstrate standing are inapposite.

2016The Cities are home rule cities and “[t]he Colorado Constitution confers upon a home rule city a legally protected interest in its local concerns.” Byrne, 618 P.2d at 1381 . “[C]ity budgeting and the assessment and collection of taxes for municipal purposes” are local concerns and each city has a legally protected 4 We reject the County’s argument that Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980), and the other cases the Cities rely on to demonstrate standing are inapposite.

1996We concluded that "[v]esting a home rule municipality with exclusive control over outdoor advertising devices located within the municipality along roads of the state highway system would materially impede, if not destroy, any prospect of achieving those goals." Id. at 636 .

1996We concluded that “[vjesting a home rule municipality with exclusive control over outdoor advertising devices located within the municipality along roads of the state highway system would materially impede, if not destroy, any prospect of achieving those goals.” Id. at 636 .

1990Greenwood Village v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511 (Colo.1982).

1988City of Greenwood Village v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511, 515 (Colo.1982); Pierce v. City and County of Denver, 193 Colo. 347, 349 , 565 P.2d 1337, 1338 (1977).

2025In other words, the supreme court acknowledged that home rule towns can define municipal court jurisdiction to include Rule 106(a)(4) actions seeking review of governmental actions pertaining to matters of local concern. ¶ 30 Further, in Olson, the supreme court rejected the argument that Rule 106 actions had to be filed in district court and concluded 3 Both the Charter and Municipal Code provide that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to all civil actions pending in the Town’s municipal court. 12 that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ a

2025In other words, the supreme court acknowledged that home rule towns can define municipal court jurisdiction to include Rule 106(a)(4) actions seeking review of governmental actions pertaining to matters of local concern. ¶ 30 Further, in Olson, the supreme court rejected the argument that Rule 106 actions had to be filed in district court and concluded 3 Both the Charter and Municipal Code provide that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to all civil actions pending in the Town’s municipal court. 12 that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ a

2008See also Coopersmith v. City & County of Denver, 156 Colo. 469, 474-75 , 899 P.2d 943 , 945 (1965) (decided before the enactment of the single subject constitutional provision; holding that there is no limitation on the number of subjects that may be included in a charter amendment); City & County of Denver v. Mewborn, 143 Colo. 407, 410 , 354 P.2d 155, 157 (1960) (decided before the enactment of the single subject constitutional provision; holding that article XX, section 5 of the Colorado Constitution does not prohibit a home rule charter amendment from containing more than one subject).

2008See also Coopersmith v. City & County of Denver, 156 Colo. 469, 474-75 , 899 P.2d 943 , 945 (1965) (decided before the enactment of the single subject constitutional provision; holding that there is no limitation on the number of subjects that may be included in a charter amendment); City & County of Denver v. Mewborn, 143 Colo. 407, 410 , 354 P.2d 155, 157 (1960) (decided before the enactment of the single subject constitutional provision; holding that article XX, section 5 of the Colorado Constitution does not prohibit a home rule charter amendment from containing more than one subject).