home rule in Ohio

2019In addition, R.C. 743.03(A) is not a general law. {¶27} To constitute a general law for purposes of Home Rule analysis, “a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149 , 2002-Ohio-20

2016Id. at ¶ 6. {¶ 12} The home rule to the Ohio Constitution provides that “municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” In other words, a state law will take precedence over a municipal ordinance only where “(1) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, and (3) the statute is a general law.” Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 O

2019In addition, R.C. 743.03(A) is not a general law. {¶27} To constitute a general law for purposes of Home Rule analysis, “a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149 , 2002-Ohio-20

2016Id. at ¶ 6. {¶ 12} The home rule to the Ohio Constitution provides that “municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” In other words, a state law will take precedence over a municipal ordinance only where “(1) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, and (3) the statute is a general law.” Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 O

2013But in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 , 119 S.Ct. 469 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998), the court stated that “an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.” (Emphasis sic.) {¶13} Brown testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress.

2013But in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 , 119 S.Ct. 469 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998), the court stated that “an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.” (Emphasis sic.) {¶13} Brown testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress.

2016The state also urges that the trial court erred in examining the 11. constitutionality of S.B. 342 under a rational basis framework, which it argues is inapplicable in a home rule analysis. {¶ 22} The city responds by asserting that the relevant provisions of S.B. 342 are unconstitutional because they “serve only to limit municipal legislative power.” It describes S.B. 342 as a de facto ban on the use of cameras. {¶ 23} In expounding on the third element of the “general law” analysis, the court in Canton explained that this “‘principle of law is that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a

2016The state also urges that the trial court erred in examining the 11. constitutionality of S.B. 342 under a rational basis framework, which it argues is inapplicable in a home rule analysis. {¶ 22} The city responds by asserting that the relevant provisions of S.B. 342 are unconstitutional because they “serve only to limit municipal legislative power.” It describes S.B. 342 as a de facto ban on the use of cameras. {¶ 23} In expounding on the third element of the “general law” analysis, the court in Canton explained that this “‘principle of law is that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a

2004Consequently, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified: {¶ 38} “Taken together, paragraph two of the syllabus of Clermont and its holding should mean that no municipal ordinance may be enacted which conflicts with the state statute. * * * {¶ 39} “If the provisions of * * * [the legislation in question] do preclude a home rule municipality, with police powers guaranteed it by the Ohio Constitution, from enacting any and all legislation, then that provision of state law must be ruled unconstitutional.” Id., 23 Ohio St.3d at 216 , 23 OBR 372, 492 N.E.2d 797 . {¶ 40} While this may have temporarily reconc

2004Consequently, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified: {¶ 38} “Taken together, paragraph two of the syllabus of Clermont and its holding should mean that no municipal ordinance may be enacted which conflicts with the state statute. * * * {¶ 39} “If the provisions of * * * [the legislation in question] do preclude a home rule municipality, with police powers guaranteed it by the Ohio Constitution, from enacting any and all legislation, then that provision of state law must be ruled unconstitutional.” Id., 23 Ohio St.3d at 216 , 23 OBR 372, 492 N.E.2d 797 . {¶ 40} While this may have temporarily reconc

1989In Weir v. Rimmelin (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 55, 56 , 15 OBR 151, 152, 472 N.E.2d 341, 343 , the court succinctly summarized the holding of Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 44 , 2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278 , as follows: “Where the General Assembly has enacted legislation pursuant to the state’s police power which governs a statewide concern, the statute takes precedence over ordinances enacted under the home rule authority of municipalities.” See, also, Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution. *424 In South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police v. D’Amico (1

1989In Weir v. Rimmelin (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 55, 56 , 15 OBR 151, 152, 472 N.E.2d 341, 343 , the court succinctly summarized the holding of Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 44 , 2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278 , as follows: “Where the General Assembly has enacted legislation pursuant to the state’s police power which governs a statewide concern, the statute takes precedence over ordinances enacted under the home rule authority of municipalities.” See, also, Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution. *424 In South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police v. D’Amico (1

2006Contrary to the City's argument, the trial court did not find that the City was required to expressly enunciate the home rule powers reserved per Bardo , supra. Instead, the court found that the language of the Charter expressed "* * * intent to exercise home rule powers." Thus, the crux of this appeal involves the second factor of the analysis discussed above. {¶ 25} The City contends that the Resolution was a proper exercise of its power of home rule.

1995It is our opinion that, while the express language of a charter adopted by the people of Cleveland may abrogate or nullify a state law pertaining to the civil service, such result cannot be accomplished by a provision of the charter delegating authority to the civil service commission to nullify the same by the adoption of a rule. “ * * *[W]here the charter contains no express language contradicting an existing state law relating to the civil service, this court must attribute an intention to the framers of the charter to harmonize the provisions of the charter with those of the state law.” In

2023In case after case, the court has examined whether the General Assembly demonstrated its intent to control a subject exclusively to determine whether there is a conflict. {¶ 21} For example, in Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86 , 167 N.E. 158 (1929), the Ohio Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance establishing a 15- mile-per-hour speed limit was in conflict with a state statute establishing a 25-mile-per- hour speed limit.

2023In case after case, the court has examined whether the General Assembly demonstrated its intent to control a subject exclusively to determine whether there is a conflict. {¶ 21} For example, in Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86 , 167 N.E. 158 (1929), the Ohio Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance establishing a 15- mile-per-hour speed limit was in conflict with a state statute establishing a 25-mile-per- hour speed limit.

2016It challenges the trial court’s determination that S.B. 342 does not prescribe a rule of conduct on citizens generally, and it insists that S.B. 342 passes all 7. four prongs of the “general law” test that the court was required to apply in determining whether the legislation runs afoul of the city’s home rule authority. {¶ 11} Before we address the state’s assignments of error, we begin by recognizing the “fundamental principle that a court must ‘presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.’” Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135 , 2010-Ohio-6318 , 942 N.E.2d 370 , ¶ 6, cit

2016It challenges the trial court’s determination that S.B. 342 does not prescribe a rule of conduct on citizens generally, and it insists that S.B. 342 passes all 7. four prongs of the “general law” test that the court was required to apply in determining whether the legislation runs afoul of the city’s home rule authority. {¶ 11} Before we address the state’s assignments of error, we begin by recognizing the “fundamental principle that a court must ‘presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.’” Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135 , 2010-Ohio-6318 , 942 N.E.2d 370 , ¶ 6, cit

2016Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 120 Ohio St.3d 96 , 2008- Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, ¶ 24 , citing Am.

2013This section “is self-executing, and [ ] the power of local self-government is inherent in all 8 municipalities regardless of enabling legislation and the existence of municipal charters.” Id. at 450 . {¶27} The Supreme Court of Ohio reiterated a three-step process for a home- rule analysis in Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 120 Ohio St.3d 96 , 2008-Ohio-4605 .

2016It challenges the trial court’s determination that S.B. 342 does not prescribe a rule of conduct on citizens generally, and it insists that S.B. 342 passes all 7. four prongs of the “general law” test that the court was required to apply in determining whether the legislation runs afoul of the city’s home rule authority. {¶ 11} Before we address the state’s assignments of error, we begin by recognizing the “fundamental principle that a court must ‘presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.’” Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135 , 2010-Ohio-6318 , 942 N.E.2d 370 , ¶ 6, cit

2016It challenges the trial court’s determination that S.B. 342 does not prescribe a rule of conduct on citizens generally, and it insists that S.B. 342 passes all 7. four prongs of the “general law” test that the court was required to apply in determining whether the legislation runs afoul of the city’s home rule authority. {¶ 11} Before we address the state’s assignments of error, we begin by recognizing the “fundamental principle that a court must ‘presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.’” Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135 , 2010-Ohio-6318 , 942 N.E.2d 370 , ¶ 6, cit

2013In instances where such labels are not required under Ohio law, CCO 241.42(c) provides alternative documentation avenues that do not create any new labeling requirements and conflict only with the previously discussed broad grant of authority in favor of the director of agriculture over “food nutrition information” found in R.C. 3717.53(B). {¶16} As the first and third prongs of the home rule test are satisfied we next examine whether R.C. 3717.53 constitutes a general law. {¶17} “A general law has been described as one which promotes statewide uniformity.” Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agen

2013In instances where such labels are not required under Ohio law, CCO 241.42(c) provides alternative documentation avenues that do not create any new labeling requirements and conflict only with the previously discussed broad grant of authority in favor of the director of agriculture over “food nutrition information” found in R.C. 3717.53(B). {¶16} As the first and third prongs of the home rule test are satisfied we next examine whether R.C. 3717.53 constitutes a general law. {¶17} “A general law has been described as one which promotes statewide uniformity.” Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agen

2012Indeed, “[t]he existence of adverse extraterritorial effects does not automatically mean an ordinance is not a matter of self-government.” Lima v. State, 122 Ohio St.3d 155 , 2009-Ohio-2597 , 909 N.E.2d 616, ¶ 44 , citing Cleveland v. Shaker Hts., 30 Ohio St.3d 49 , 30 OBR 156, 507 N.E.2d 323 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus (“adverse extraterritorial traffic effects on a neighboring municipality are not, standing alone, enough to overcome the presumption of the validity of a legislative enactment taken under a municipality’s home rule powers”).

2012Indeed, “[t]he existence of adverse extraterritorial effects does not automatically mean an ordinance is not a matter of self-government.” Lima v. State, 122 Ohio St.3d 155 , 2009-Ohio-2597 , 909 N.E.2d 616, ¶ 44 , citing Cleveland v. Shaker Hts., 30 Ohio St.3d 49 , 30 OBR 156, 507 N.E.2d 323 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus (“adverse extraterritorial traffic effects on a neighboring municipality are not, standing alone, enough to overcome the presumption of the validity of a legislative enactment taken under a municipality’s home rule powers”).

1999Rather, state police powers and home rule powers are “equal in dignity,” see Teater, 53 Ohio St.2d at 257 , 7 O.O.3d at 412 , 374 N.E.2d at 157 , only if the statute is of statewide concern, and the statute and the application of the home rule provision establishing a public utility conflict outside the municipal limits.

1999Rather, state police powers and home rule powers are “equal in dignity,” see Teater, 53 Ohio St.2d at 257 , 7 O.O.3d at 412 , 374 N.E.2d at 157 , only if the statute is of statewide concern, and the statute and the application of the home rule provision establishing a public utility conflict outside the municipal limits.

1995Assn., Inc. v. Painesville (Jan. 29, 1973), Lake App. No. 202, unreported, affirmed on other grounds (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 60 , 65 O.O.2d 212 , 303 N.E.2d 870 , this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment declaring that a resolution adopting plans and specifications calling for aggregate bids exclusively in a public works project was an exercise of the city’s home rule authority granted by its charter and that the city was accordingly not bound by the provisions of R.C. 153.50 and 153.51.

1995Assn., Inc. v. Painesville (Jan. 29, 1973), Lake App. No. 202, unreported, affirmed on other grounds (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 60 , 65 O.O.2d 212 , 303 N.E.2d 870 , this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment declaring that a resolution adopting plans and specifications calling for aggregate bids exclusively in a public works project was an exercise of the city’s home rule authority granted by its charter and that the city was accordingly not bound by the provisions of R.C. 153.50 and 153.51.

1995Habe v. S. Euclid (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 117, 118 , 564 N.E.2d 483, 485 , the court relied on Bardo to hold state civil service laws applicable, rather than conflicting civil service commission rules, since “the authority to deviate from the statutory standard was not expressly set forth in the * * * Charter.” See, also, Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 25 v. Lakewood (Nov. 3, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 67196, unreported, 1994 WL 615037 (Since the Lakewood Charter did not expressly authorize the civil service commission to set standards for determining seniority credit for purposes of promotio

1995Habe v. S. Euclid (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 117, 118 , 564 N.E.2d 483, 485 , the court relied on Bardo to hold state civil service laws applicable, rather than conflicting civil service commission rules, since “the authority to deviate from the statutory standard was not expressly set forth in the * * * Charter.” See, also, Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 25 v. Lakewood (Nov. 3, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 67196, unreported, 1994 WL 615037 (Since the Lakewood Charter did not expressly authorize the civil service commission to set standards for determining seniority credit for purposes of promotio

1995Morris, supra, 71 Ohio St.3d at 54 , 641 N.E.2d at 1077 , citing State ex rel.

1995Morris, supra, 71 Ohio St.3d at 54 , 641 N.E.2d at 1077 , citing State ex rel.

2022The state argued that the city’s arguments based upon the home rule provision fail because the city relied upon cases “resolving the constitutionality of other dissimilar traffic-camera laws.” {¶ 10} Additionally, the state urged that the city’s unconstitutional conditions argument failed because “there is no such thing as an unconstitutional conditions doctrine claim in Ohio law.” Pointing to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in City of Toledo, supra, 154 Ohio St.3d 41 , 2018-Ohio-2358 , 110 N.E.3d 1257 , the state argued that the city’s separation of powers argument must fail.

2022The state argued that the city’s arguments based upon the home rule provision fail because the city relied upon cases “resolving the constitutionality of other dissimilar traffic-camera laws.” {¶ 10} Additionally, the state urged that the city’s unconstitutional conditions argument failed because “there is no such thing as an unconstitutional conditions doctrine claim in Ohio law.” Pointing to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in City of Toledo, supra, 154 Ohio St.3d 41 , 2018-Ohio-2358 , 110 N.E.3d 1257 , the state argued that the city’s separation of powers argument must fail.

2022SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1642 THE VILLAGE OF NEWBURGH HEIGHTS, ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Newburgh Hts. v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1642 .] Home rule—Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3—R.C. 5747.502—No conflict exists between a municipality’s ordinance allowing the use of traffic cameras and state law allowing a reduction of a municipality’s share of the state’s local-government funds—R.C. 4511.099—No conflict exists between a municipality’s ordinance allowin

2022SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1642 THE VILLAGE OF NEWBURGH HEIGHTS, ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Newburgh Hts. v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1642 .] Home rule—Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3—R.C. 5747.502—No conflict exists between a municipality’s ordinance allowing the use of traffic cameras and state law allowing a reduction of a municipality’s share of the state’s local-government funds—R.C. 4511.099—No conflict exists between a municipality’s ordinance allowin

2022(No. 2021-0247—Submitted February 9, 2022—Decided May 19, 2022.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Nos. 109106 and 109114, 2021-Ohio-61 . ________________ KENNEDY, J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, we are asked to decide whether the Ohio Constitution’s Home Rule Amendment, Article XVIII, Section 3, prohibits the General Assembly from enacting statutes that (1) reduce a municipality’s share of the state’s local- government fund by an amount equal to the fines collected based on citations arisi

2022(No. 2021-0247—Submitted February 9, 2022—Decided May 19, 2022.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Nos. 109106 and 109114, 2021-Ohio-61 . ________________ KENNEDY, J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, we are asked to decide whether the Ohio Constitution’s Home Rule Amendment, Article XVIII, Section 3, prohibits the General Assembly from enacting statutes that (1) reduce a municipality’s share of the state’s local- government fund by an amount equal to the fines collected based on citations arisi

2021Ohio St.3d 211, 213, 1992-Ohio-144 , 594 N.E.2d 589 ; R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) (“The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code * * * [c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint * * * is alleged * * * a delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent child.”).

2021Ohio St.3d 211, 213, 1992-Ohio-144 , 594 N.E.2d 589 ; R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) (“The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code * * * [c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint * * * is alleged * * * a delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent child.”).

2020Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2006-Ohio-6573 , ¶ 24 (Cleveland's administrative disposition of civil traffic- law-violation liability was "an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of the administrative proceedings"). {¶18} Though Walker resolves Count 1, the supreme court stated that "administrative procedures must be established in furtherance" of the municipality's home- rule power.

2019Id.

2018In contrast, “[a] warrantless arrest that is based upon probable cause and occurs in a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2007-Ohio-4837 , 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 66 , citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 , 96 S.Ct. 820 , 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). {¶ 17} In Harris, the Supreme Court held that “[w]here the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of

2018In contrast, “[a] warrantless arrest that is based upon probable cause and occurs in a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2007-Ohio-4837 , 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 66 , citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 , 96 S.Ct. 820 , 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). {¶ 17} In Harris, the Supreme Court held that “[w]here the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of