home rule in Maine

2007Maine Power Co., Town of Lebanon, 571 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Me. 1990) (citing 30-A M.R.S.A 5 3001 (Supp. 1988)).~There exists "a rebuttable presumption that any ordinance enacted under this section is a valid exercise of a municipality's home rule authority." 30-A M.R.S.A. 5 3001(2) (2005).

1993Title 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001(3) sets out the following standard of preemption: “The Legislature shall not be held to have implicitly denied any power granted to municipalities under [section 3001] unless the municipal ordinance in question would frustrate the purpose of any state law.” The Legislative Committee Report further clarifies that a municipality’s home rule power should not be restricted unless the munici *941 pal legislation “prevents the efficient accomplishment of a defined state purpose.” Legislative Committee Report at 11. “[0]nly where the ‘legislature intend[s] to create a compr

2010"Only where the municipal ordinance prevents the efficient accomplishment of a defined state purpose should a municipality's home rule power be restricted, otherwise municipalities are free to act to promote the well­ being of their citizens." Id. (quoting School Comm. v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935 ,938 n.8 (Me. 1993); 30-A M.R.S. § 3001(3)) (brackets omitted). 'There is a rebuttable presumption that action taken pursuant to the home rule statute is a valid exercise of authority." Id. at ~ 24, 941 A.2d at 464 .

2008“Only where the municipal ordinance prevents the efficient accomplishment of a defined state purpose should a municipality’s home rule power be restricted, otherwise [municipalities] are free to act to promote the well-being of their citizens.” School Comm. v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935 , 938 n. 8 (Me.1993); 30-A M.R.S. § 3001(3). [¶ 15] “[T]he inquiry on a preemption question is whether the local action would frustrate the purpose of any state law.” Sawyer Envtl.

2001The court does not reach this issue, because the Board's decision appears to have been timely. 3 section 107.3(q) of the City's ordinances is not covered by the state statute either directly or by implication, and because this additional requirement does not appear to frustrate any state objective, see International Paper, © 665 A.2d at 1002 , it falls within the City’s home rule authority.

1998International Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, 665 A.2d 998, 1001-02 (Me.1995). [¶ 8] The first section of the subchapter on Land Use Regulation, which authorizes local zoning regulation and zoning boards of appeals, is entitled “§ 4351 Home rule limitations,” and provides that “[t]his subchapter, provides express limitations on municipal home rule authority.” Title 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4351 (West 1996 & Supp.1997).

1993Title 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001(3) sets out the following standard of preemption: “The Legislature shall not be held to have implicitly denied any power granted to municipalities under [section 3001] unless the municipal ordinance in question would frustrate the purpose of any state law.” The Legislative Committee Report further clarifies that a municipality’s home rule power should not be restricted unless the munici *941 pal legislation “prevents the efficient accomplishment of a defined state purpose.” Legislative Committee Report at 11. “[0]nly where the ‘legislature intend[s] to create a compr

1988These provisions together support the Superior Court’s conclusion that the Solid Waste Management Act, by its “comprehensive and exclusive regulatory scheme,” Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d at 570 , manifested a clear legislative intention to remove any authority a municipality may have had to prohibit the establishment and operation of a private facility within its borders for the disposal of out-of-town solid waste. 4 We affirm the Superior Court’s declaration that the enactment of article II, sections 1 and 5.1 of the Town’s solid waste disposal ordinance exceeded the Town’s home rule

2022See, State v. Gdovin, 2008 ME 195 , Pl1, 961 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Citing, State v. Crowley, 1998 ME 187 , PP 2, 8, 714 A.2d 834, 836, 837 (holding that the observation of suspicious behavior by the defendant's wife contributed to a finding of probable cause)).

2022See, State v. Gdovin, 2008 ME 195 , Pl1, 961 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Citing, State v. Crowley, 1998 ME 187 , PP 2, 8, 714 A.2d 834, 836, 837 (holding that the observation of suspicious behavior by the defendant's wife contributed to a finding of probable cause)).

2022See, State v. Gdovin, 2008 ME 195 , Pl1, 961 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Citing, State v. Crowley, 1998 ME 187 , PP 2, 8, 714 A.2d 834, 836, 837 (holding that the observation of suspicious behavior by the defendant's wife contributed to a finding of probable cause)).

2022See, State v. Gdovin, 2008 ME 195 , Pl1, 961 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Citing, State v. Crowley, 1998 ME 187 , PP 2, 8, 714 A.2d 834, 836, 837 (holding that the observation of suspicious behavior by the defendant's wife contributed to a finding of probable cause)).

2021See Albert, 597 A.2d at 1354-55 ; Burkett, 135 Me. at 463-67 , 199 A. 619 . [¶14] We disagree with the Chamber’s assertion that the home rule provision is irrelevant to this case.

2008Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, 2000 ME 179, ¶ 27 , 760 A.2d 257, 263-64 (quotation marks omitted).

2008Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, 2000 ME 179, ¶ 27 , 760 A.2d 257, 263-64 (quotation marks omitted).

2006New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1990).

1998When the Superior Court functions as an appellate court reviewing the action of a town board, “we review the record directly to determine if the Board abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence.” LaBay v. Town of Paris, 659 A.2d 263, 265 (Me.1995); see also Town of Union v. Strong, 681 A.2d 14, 17 (Me.1996) (“Interpretation of provisions in a zoning ordinance is a question of law.”). [¶ 6] Scanlon argues that the home rule statutory provisions in 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 6 grant municipalities plenary authority to enact regulations, and

1998When the Superior Court functions as an appellate court reviewing the action of a town board, “we review the record directly to determine if the Board abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence.” LaBay v. Town of Paris, 659 A.2d 263, 265 (Me.1995); see also Town of Union v. Strong, 681 A.2d 14, 17 (Me.1996) (“Interpretation of provisions in a zoning ordinance is a question of law.”). [¶ 6] Scanlon argues that the home rule statutory provisions in 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 6 grant municipalities plenary authority to enact regulations, and

1988See Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Institute, 535 A.2d 421 , 423 n. 1 (Me.1987). 3 .

1988See Ullis v. Town of Boothbay Harbor, 459 A.2d at 160 .

1983See Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir.1981) (“A proper assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege requires, at a minimum, a good faith effort to provide the trial judge with sufficient information from which he can make an intelligent evaluation of the claim”).

1981Absent some explicit indication in the charter to the contrary, our ruling that the Town Council of the Town of Old Orchard Beach is vested with the power to reenact ordinances, orders and resolves that have been repealed by the voters in referendum elections is consistent with the statutory and charter mandate that the home rule provisions be liberally construed to effectuate their purposes. 6 See 1426 Woodward Avenue Corporation v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352 , 20 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1945).

1981Absent some explicit indication in the charter to the contrary, our ruling that the Town Council of the Town of Old Orchard Beach is vested with the power to reenact ordinances, orders and resolves that have been repealed by the voters in referendum elections is consistent with the statutory and charter mandate that the home rule provisions be liberally construed to effectuate their purposes. 6 See 1426 Woodward Avenue Corporation v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352 , 20 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1945).

1979Since subsection (H) of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 defines “zoning” as the “division of a municipality into districts and the prescription and reasonable application of different regulations in each district”, cf. In re Spring Valley Development, Me., 300 A.2d 736, 753-54 (1973), defendant Town maintains that under municipal home-rule an ordinance such as that involved here plainly should not be looked upon as a purported exercise of zoning power and as »uch held unlawful.