home claim in Kentucky

2021To this end, the Court noted that Ordway had failed to produce any evidence that he “legally resided with [his girlfriend], enjoyed unrestricted access to the apartment, had a key to the apartment, or paid bills there.” Id.; see also Hawley v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 61 (Ky. App. 2014). “[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the -8- householder may not.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 , 119 S.Ct. 469, 473 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998).

2021To this end, the Court noted that Ordway had failed to produce any evidence that he “legally resided with [his girlfriend], enjoyed unrestricted access to the apartment, had a key to the apartment, or paid bills there.” Id.; see also Hawley v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 61 (Ky. App. 2014). “[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the -8- householder may not.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 , 119 S.Ct. 469, 473 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998).

2026KRS 92.340. -7- Defendants’ duty under KRS 92.330 is ministerial because it involved “merely [the] execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001).

2025Additionally, Kentucky precedent has long recognized the subject of public education “requires different provisions for localities differing in density of population.” City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 488 , 121 S.W. 411, 412 (1909).

2025Additionally, Kentucky precedent has long recognized the subject of public education “requires different provisions for localities differing in density of population.” City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 488 , 121 S.W. 411, 412 (1909).

2025Under the new classification system, Lexington was permitted to retain the existing benefits of the urban-county merger and is now classified as a home rule city under KRS 81.005(1)(b)2 because it operates under the “[m]ayor-council plan of government in accordance with KRS 83A.130.” Thus, the Lexington is not a city of the first class and currently falls outside the scope of SB 1. 46 Elliott v. Garner, 140 Ky. 157 , 130 S.W. 997, 998 (1910).

2025Under the new classification system, Lexington was permitted to retain the existing benefits of the urban-county merger and is now classified as a home rule city under KRS 81.005(1)(b)2 because it operates under the “[m]ayor-council plan of government in accordance with KRS 83A.130.” Thus, the Lexington is not a city of the first class and currently falls outside the scope of SB 1. 46 Elliott v. Garner, 140 Ky. 157 , 130 S.W. 997, 998 (1910).

2021Turning to applicable Kentucky case law, the Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Ordway v. Commonwealth, while decided before Warick and -8- couched in terms of “standing,” discussed the concept of an individual having a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in a specific premises. 352 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Ky. 2011) (citation omitted).

2021To this end, the Court noted that Ordway had failed to produce any evidence that he “legally resided with [his girlfriend], enjoyed unrestricted access to the apartment, had a key to the apartment, or paid bills there.” Id.; see also Hawley v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 61 (Ky. App. 2014). “[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the -8- householder may not.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 , 119 S.Ct. 469, 473 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998).