home rule in Pennsylvania

2025IX, § 2, “[m]unicipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters . . . . [and a] municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.” In other words, “[t]he essential principle underlying home rule is the transfer of authority to control certain municipal affairs from the state to the local level.” Hartman v. City of Allentown, 880 A.2d 737, 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (citation omitted). “[S]uch grants of municipal power shall be lib

2025“Thus, in analyzing a home rule municipality’s exercise of power, . . . [courts should] begin with the view that it is valid absent a limitation found in the Constitution, the acts of the General Assembly, or the charter itself, and [courts] resolve ambiguities in favor of the municipality.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

2023Thus, “[i]n analyzing a home rule municipality’s exercise of power, . . . we begin with the view that it is valid absent a limitation found in the Constitution, the acts of the General Assembly, or the charter itself, and we resolve ambiguities in favor of the municipality.” Nutter v. Dougherty, 938 A.2d 401, 411 (Pa. 2007) (quoting County of Delaware v. Township of Middletown, 511 A.2d 811, 813 (Pa. 1986)).

2021Thus, “[i]n analyzing a home rule municipality’s exercise of power, . . . we begin with the view that it is valid absent a limitation found in the [Pennsylvania] Constitution, the acts of the General Assembly, or the charter itself, and we resolve ambiguities in favor of the municipality.” Id. at 813 .

2016Thus, in the absence of explicit constraint or collateral effect on another municipality, there will be no conflict between the home rule municipality’s actions and the former code provisions, since the latter no longer apply.” Wecht, 815 A.2d at 1152 (citation omitted). .

2016Thus, in the absence of explicit constraint or collateral effect on another municipality, there will be no conflict between the home rule municipality’s actions and the former code provisions, since the latter no longer apply.” Wecht, 815 A.2d at 1152 (citation omitted). 7 bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions and other benefits, and shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act

2025IX, § 2, “[m]unicipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters . . . . [and a] municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.” In other words, “[t]he essential principle underlying home rule is the transfer of authority to control certain municipal affairs from the state to the local level.” Hartman v. City of Allentown, 880 A.2d 737, 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (citation omitted). “[S]uch grants of municipal power shall be lib

2016The grant of municipal power to a municipality governed by a home rule charter is "liberally construed in favor of the municipality." 53 Pa.C.S. § 2961 ; accord Hartman, 880 A.2d at 742 .

2019Additionally, "pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing home rule, a home rule municipality's exercise of power is presumed to be valid absent a specific constitutional or statutory limitation, and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the municipality." In re Petition to Recall Reese , 542 Pa. 114 , 665 A.2d 1162 , 1164 (1995) ; see also Devlin v. City of Philadelphia , 580 Pa. 564 , 862 A.2d 1234 , 1242 (2004), citing PA.

2019Additionally, "pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing home rule, a home rule municipality's exercise of power is presumed to be valid absent a specific constitutional or statutory limitation, and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the municipality." In re Petition to Recall Reese , 542 Pa. 114 , 665 A.2d 1162 , 1164 (1995) ; see also Devlin v. City of Philadelphia , 580 Pa. 564 , 862 A.2d 1234 , 1242 (2004), citing PA.

2020Nonetheless, “[a]lthough a home rule municipality is not restrained by its former municipal code, it is not prohibited from exercising powers provided thereunder.” Id.

2019See Danzilli , 944 A.2d at 814-16 ; cf. Ziegler v. City of Reading , 142 A.3d 119 , 134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) ("[A]lthough home rule cities may not be limited or restrained by their former municipal codes, there is no law preventing a home rule charter from exercising powers bestowed by its former code.").

2019We must also acknowledge the decision to become a home rule municipality is accomplished "by the affirmative vote of the electors of the City" and "[w]here [a home rule charter] is adopted by a constitutionally empowered electorate, it affords an example of pure democracy - the sovereign people legislating directly and not by representatives in respect of the organization and administration of their local government." In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48 , 122 A.2d 272 , 275-76 (1956).

2019We must also acknowledge the decision to become a home rule municipality is accomplished "by the affirmative vote of the electors of the City" and "[w]here [a home rule charter] is adopted by a constitutionally empowered electorate, it affords an example of pure democracy - the sovereign people legislating directly and not by representatives in respect of the organization and administration of their local government." In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48 , 122 A.2d 272 , 275-76 (1956).

2019Additionally, "pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing home rule, a home rule municipality's exercise of power is presumed to be valid absent a specific constitutional or statutory limitation, and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the municipality." In re Petition to Recall Reese , 542 Pa. 114 , 665 A.2d 1162 , 1164 (1995) ; see also Devlin v. City of Philadelphia , 580 Pa. 564 , 862 A.2d 1234 , 1242 (2004), citing PA.

2019Additionally, "pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing home rule, a home rule municipality's exercise of power is presumed to be valid absent a specific constitutional or statutory limitation, and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the municipality." In re Petition to Recall Reese , 542 Pa. 114 , 665 A.2d 1162 , 1164 (1995) ; see also Devlin v. City of Philadelphia , 580 Pa. 564 , 862 A.2d 1234 , 1242 (2004), citing PA.

2024City of Phila. v. Schweiker, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (Pa. 2004). 19 The Pennsylvania Constitution specifically permits a municipality to govern by a home rule charter and, in doing so, expressly authorizes the General Assembly to limit a home rule municipality’s power.

2009As a general rule, the Legislature may restrict a city’s home rule powers by simply amending the appropriate enabling act, see Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 279, 285 , 681 A.2d 152, 156 (1996); Cali v. City of Phila., 406 Pa. 290, 297-98 , 177 A.2d 824, 828 (1962); see also City of Phila. v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 611 , 858 A.2d 75, 87 (2004) (noting that the General Assembly “retains express constitutional authority to limit the scope of any municipality's home rule governance”), or, indeed, by amending any enactment affecting only that class of city, see id. at 611 , 858 at 87-88 (distingu

2024Nutter, 938 A.2d at 411 ; Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass’n, 211 A.3d at 817 ; see also 53 Pa. C.S. § 2961 (“All grants of municipal power to municipalities governed by a home rule charter under this subchapter, whether in the form of specific enumeration or general terms, shall be liberally construed in favor of the municipality.”).

2024Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Pittsburgh, 211 A.3d 810, 817 (Pa. 2019); accord Nutter v. Dougherty, 938 A.2d 401, 414 (Pa. 2007) (“We cannot stress enough that a home rule municipality’s exercise of its local authority is not lightly intruded upon, with ambiguities regarding such authority resolved in favor of the municipality.”).

2008Cox's v. Municipality of Monroeville, 506 Pa. 167 , 484 A.2d 737 (Pa. 1984); see also County of Delaware v. Township of Middletown, 511 Pa. 66 , 511 A.2d 811 (1986); Wecht v. Roddey, 815 A.2d 1146 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002) (the adoption of a home rule charter acts to remove a municipality from the operation of the code provisions enumerating the powers of that particular class of municipality, and the Second Class County Code is not applied to every part of the Commonwealth); Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 v. City of Pittsburgh, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 83 , 644 A.2d 246 (1994) (City of Pittsb

2008Cox's v. Municipality of Monroeville, 506 Pa. 167 , 484 A.2d 737 (Pa. 1984); see also County of Delaware v. Township of Middletown, 511 Pa. 66 , 511 A.2d 811 (1986); Wecht v. Roddey, 815 A.2d 1146 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002) (the adoption of a home rule charter acts to remove a municipality from the operation of the code provisions enumerating the powers of that particular class of municipality, and the Second Class County Code is not applied to every part of the Commonwealth); Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 v. City of Pittsburgh, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 83 , 644 A.2d 246 (1994) (City of Pittsb

2019See Danzilli , 944 A.2d at 814-16 ; cf. Ziegler v. City of Reading , 142 A.3d 119 , 134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) ("[A]lthough home rule cities may not be limited or restrained by their former municipal codes, there is no law preventing a home rule charter from exercising powers bestowed by its former code.").

2019See Danzilli, 944 A.2d at 814-16 ; cf. Ziegler v. City of Reading, 142 A.3d 119, 134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (“[A]lthough home rule cities may not be limited or restrained by their former municipal codes, there is no law preventing a home rule charter from exercising powers bestowed by its former code.”).

2024The Plurality added that, more importantly, Philadelphia is a home rule municipality “prohibited from ‘exercis[ing] powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly which are . . . [a]pplicable in every part of the Commonwealth.’” Id. at 677 (quoting 53 P.S. § 13133(b)).

2009As a general rule, the Legislature may restrict a city’s home rule powers by simply amending the appropriate enabling act, see Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 279, 285 , 681 A.2d 152, 156 (1996); Cali v. City of Phila., 406 Pa. 290, 297-98 , 177 A.2d 824, 828 (1962); see also City of Phila. v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 611 , 858 A.2d 75, 87 (2004) (noting that the General Assembly “retains express constitutional authority to limit the scope of any municipality's home rule governance”), or, indeed, by amending any enactment affecting only that class of city, see id. at 611 , 858 at 87-88 (distingu

2017City Commissioners . . . .”); Lennox v. Clark, 93 A.2d 834, 838 (Pa. 1953) (“It will be further noted that [upon the adoption of the constitutional provision], all the functions of county government, that is to say, all the activities or duties theretofore performed by the county officers, are thenceforth to be performed by the city; the city is to take over then and there, as part of its own government, the performance of the functions of the county government.”) (emphasis in original). 6 Rule Charter” provision in Section 301(c) applies to the City’s Charter because: (1) Section 301(b) of th

2017City Commissioners . . . .”); Lennox v. Clark, 93 A.2d 834, 838 (Pa. 1953) (“It will be further noted that [upon the adoption of the constitutional provision], all the functions of county government, that is to say, all the activities or duties theretofore performed by the county officers, are thenceforth to be performed by the city; the city is to take over then and there, as part of its own government, the performance of the functions of the county government.”) (emphasis in original). 6 Rule Charter” provision in Section 301(c) applies to the City’s Charter because: (1) Section 301(b) of th

2002“Thus, a presumption exists ‘that the exercise [of power] is valid if no restriction is found in the Constitution, the charter itself, or the acts of the General Assembly.’ ” Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 v. City of Pittsburgh, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 83 , 644 A.2d 246, 249 (1994), quoting Norristown Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 31 v. DeAngelis, 148 Pa.Cmwlth. 285 , 611 A.2d 322, 326 (1992).

2002“Thus, a presumption exists ‘that the exercise [of power] is valid if no restriction is found in the Constitution, the charter itself, or the acts of the General Assembly.’ ” Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 v. City of Pittsburgh, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 83 , 644 A.2d 246, 249 (1994), quoting Norristown Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 31 v. DeAngelis, 148 Pa.Cmwlth. 285 , 611 A.2d 322, 326 (1992).

2007See Commonwealth, Department of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, 505 Pa. 614 , 483 A.2d 448, 451 (1984) (recognizing that Philadelphia, as a home rule city, derives its power generally to govern itself and to enact zoning regulations from the Home Rule Act, 53 P.S. § 13101, but that to the extent that provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act, 53 P.S. § 14752, are not inconsistent with Philadelphia’s zoning regulations, they remain in force.) Thus, while the Board and only the Board is authorized to decide where Philadelphia’s licensed facilities will be placed, the question as to

2007See Commonwealth, Department of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, 505 Pa. 614 , 483 A.2d 448, 451 (1984) (recognizing that Philadelphia, as a home rule city, derives its power generally to govern itself and to enact zoning regulations from the Home Rule Act, 53 P.S. § 13101, but that to the extent that provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act, 53 P.S. § 14752, are not inconsistent with Philadelphia’s zoning regulations, they remain in force.) Thus, while the Board and only the Board is authorized to decide where Philadelphia’s licensed facilities will be placed, the question as to

2009As a general rule, the Legislature may restrict a city’s home rule powers by simply amending the appropriate enabling act, see Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 279, 285 , 681 A.2d 152, 156 (1996); Cali v. City of Phila., 406 Pa. 290, 297-98 , 177 A.2d 824, 828 (1962); see also City of Phila. v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 611 , 858 A.2d 75, 87 (2004) (noting that the General Assembly “retains express constitutional authority to limit the scope of any municipality's home rule governance”), or, indeed, by amending any enactment affecting only that class of city, see id. at 611 , 858 at 87-88 (distingu

2009As a general rule, the Legislature may restrict a city’s home rule powers by simply amending the appropriate enabling act, see Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 279, 285 , 681 A.2d 152, 156 (1996); Cali v. City of Phila., 406 Pa. 290, 297-98 , 177 A.2d 824, 828 (1962); see also City of Phila. v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 611 , 858 A.2d 75, 87 (2004) (noting that the General Assembly “retains express constitutional authority to limit the scope of any municipality's home rule governance”), or, indeed, by amending any enactment affecting only that class of city, see id. at 611 , 858 at 87-88 (distingu

2002Attorney, 756 A.2d 711 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), we concluded that, where a home rule charter was in direct conflict with a provision of the Election Code pertaining to the length of an interim appointment, the state statute would prevail.

2002Attorney, 756 A.2d 711 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), we concluded that, where a home rule charter was in direct conflict with a provision of the Election Code pertaining to the length of an interim appointment, the state statute would prevail.

2024Case law abounds with instances in which local and state government have disputed their respective authority to act in a given area.13 As the instant matter makes 13 See, e.g., Schweiker, 858 A.2d at 78-88 (rejecting claim that Philadelphia’s home rule powers included appointment authority over members of Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA), a Commonwealth agency; General Assembly had authority to enact provisions transferring control of PPA from Philadelphia mayor to Commonwealth); Holt’s Cigar Co., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 10 A.3d 902, 904-05 (Pa. 2011) (holding that state law preempte

2011Holt’s Cigar Co. v. City of Phila., 10 A.3d 902, 907-08 (Pa. 2011) (“Holt’s ”); Nutter v. Dougherty, 595 Pa. 340 , 938 A.2d 401, 411 (2007); see 53 Pa.C.S. § 2961.

2021Municipalities are creatures of the state and have no inherent powers of their own, see Naylor v. Township of Hellam, . . . 773 A.2d 770, 773 ([Pa.] 2001); rather, they “possess only such powers of government as are expressly granted to [them] and as are necessary to carry the same into effect.” Appeal of Gagliardi, . . . 163 A.2d 418, 419 ([Pa.] 1960); see also Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. (14 Smith) 169, 180-81 (1870).

2004They submit that the Legislature was therefore free to modify the structure and mandate of the Parking *84 Authority when it enacted Act 22. [10] Municipalities are creatures of the state and have no inherent powers of their own, see Naylor v. Township of Hellam, 565 Pa. 397, 403 , 773 A.2d 770, 773 (2001); rather, they "possess only such powers of government as are expressly granted to [them] and as are necessary to carry the same into effect." Appeal of Gagliardi, 401 Pa. 141, 143 , 163 A.2d 418, 419 (1960); see also Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. (14 Smith) 169, 180-81 (1870).

2021Municipalities are creatures of the state and have no inherent powers of their own, see Naylor v. Township of Hellam, . . . 773 A.2d 770, 773 ([Pa.] 2001); rather, they “possess only such powers of government as are expressly granted to [them] and as are necessary to carry the same into effect.” Appeal of Gagliardi, . . . 163 A.2d 418, 419 ([Pa.] 1960); see also Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. (14 Smith) 169, 180-81 (1870).

2004They submit that the Legislature was therefore free to modify the structure and mandate of the Parking *84 Authority when it enacted Act 22. [10] Municipalities are creatures of the state and have no inherent powers of their own, see Naylor v. Township of Hellam, 565 Pa. 397, 403 , 773 A.2d 770, 773 (2001); rather, they "possess only such powers of government as are expressly granted to [them] and as are necessary to carry the same into effect." Appeal of Gagliardi, 401 Pa. 141, 143 , 163 A.2d 418, 419 (1960); see also Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. (14 Smith) 169, 180-81 (1870).

2017After observing that a home rule charter is the equivalent of a constitution, the court relied on Spencer v. City of Reading Charter Bd., 97 A.3d 834, 840 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) for the proposition that “provisions of a home rule charter have the force and status of an enactment of the legislature.” City of Pittsburgh, 129 A.3d at 1289 .

2016Spencer v. City of Reading Charter Bd., 97 A.3d 834, 840 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014). , In accordance with the Home Rule Charter Law, the citizens of the City, by referendum, voted for the adoption of Section 711 of the City’s Home Rule Charter that specifically, requires all city employees, including police officers, be domiciled in the City.

2019Similarly, in Smaller Manufacturers Council v. Council of City of Pittsburgh , 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 533 , 485 A.2d 73 , 74 (1984), the City passed an ordinance requiring manufacturing plant owners to notify the City's Bureau of Business Security of any plans to close, relocate, or reduce operations if such actions would affect more than 15% of their employees.

2007While this Court’s home rule analysis in Smaller may have been brief, we stated unequivocally that Ordinance 21 was contrary to the Home Rule Law’s express limitation on a municipality’s ability to regulate business, emphasizing that “if the City wishes to act in this area it must be empowered to do so by the General Assembly.” Smaller, 485 A.2d at 77 (emphasis added).

1978See, e.g., Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407 , 128 A. 2d 352 (1957), which held that Philadelphia, pursuant to the First Class City Home Rule Act, has authority to enact a disability compensation program for its employes that did not meet the standards mandated by state legislation providing disability compensation to police and fire employes through out the state, and Greenberg v. Bradford City, 432 Pa. 611 , 248 A. 2d 51 (1968), which held that a city which adopted a home rule charter under the optional third class city charter law had authority to enact schedules of compensation for its po

1978See, e.g., Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407 , 128 A. 2d 352 (1957), which held that Philadelphia, pursuant to the First Class City Home Rule Act, has authority to enact a disability compensation program for its employes that did not meet the standards mandated by state legislation providing disability compensation to police and fire employes through out the state, and Greenberg v. Bradford City, 432 Pa. 611 , 248 A. 2d 51 (1968), which held that a city which adopted a home rule charter under the optional third class city charter law had authority to enact schedules of compensation for its po

2025SEPTA v. City of Philadelphia, 101 A.3d 79, 88 (Pa. 2014).

2017As this Court noted in Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia, 627 Pa. 470 , 101 A.3d 79 (2014) (SEPTA): In a series of cases beginning with our decision in [Department of General Services v. ] Ogontz [Area Neighbors Ass’n., 505 Pa. 614 , 483 A.2d 448 (1984)], this Court has held that a Commonwealth agency’s challenge to a municipality’s exercise of authority over it does not represent “a contest between superior and inferior governmental entities, but instead a contest between two instrumentalities of the state.” See Ogontz, supra at 452 ; County of Venango

2017In reaching this conclusion, the court partially overruled its opinion in City of Wilkes-Barre v. City of Wilkes-Barre Police Benevolent Association, 814 A.2d 285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), in which it held that “[w]hen Act 111 applies, neither a home rule charter, nor an enactment by a home rule municipality may change the ability to bargain about residency.” Id. at 290 .

2017In reaching this conclusion, the court partially overruled its opinion in City of Wilkes-Barre v. City of Wilkes-Barre Police Benevolent Association, 814 A.2d 285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), in which it held that “[w]hen Act 111 applies, neither a home rule charter, nor an enactment by a home rule municipality may change the ability to bargain about residency.” Id. at 290 .

2023However, “the amendment creating the district-wide electoral system,” in Lyons, “constituted a change in the form of the [c]ity’s government tantamount to the adoption of a new home rule charter.” Lyons, 586 A.2d at 471 .

2014Pilchesky fails to cite to Lyons v. City of Pittsburgh, 137 Pa.Cmwlth. 330 , 586 A.2d 469, 471 (1991), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 670 , 593 A.2d 845 (1991) wherein the Commonwealth Court held that as more than five years had passed since the city’s home rule charter had been adopted, the five year moratorium relied upon in Warren was inapplicable.