home rule in Texas

2025Initially,"a home rule city derives its power not from the Legislature but from Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution.... [I]t is necessary to look to the acts of the legislature not for grants of power to such cities but only for limitations on their powers." Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729,733 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641,643 (Tex.1975)) (internal quotations omitted).

2018Thus, the legislature may, by general law, withdraw a particular subject from a home rule city's domain." (citation omitted) ); City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Tex. , 794 S.W.2d 17 , 19 (Tex. 1990) (home-rule cities have broad discretionary powers provided that no ordinance conflicts with the Texas Constitution or state law); Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos , 523 S.W.2d 641 , 643-644 (Tex. 1975) (home-rule cities have "full authority to do anything the legislature could theretofore have authorized them to do" subject to legislatively expressed limitations on their

2025Initially,"a home rule city derives its power not from the Legislature but from Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution.... [I]t is necessary to look to the acts of the legislature not for grants of power to such cities but only for limitations on their powers." Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729,733 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641,643 (Tex.1975)) (internal quotations omitted).

2015Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.072 (West 2008) (stating that a home-rule municipality “has full power of local self-government”); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1998) (op. on reh’g) (“While a home rule city . . . has all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Constitution, the general laws, or the city’s charter, Tex. Const. art.

2015XI, § 5, these broad powers may be limited by statute when the Legislature’s intention to do so appears ‘with unmistakable clarity.’ ”); Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 167 , 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (1948) (explaining that a home rule municipality has full authority to do anything the legislature could have authorized it to do).

2015Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 216.902, 372.003, 377.002, 382.109, 395.011. 14 unmistakable clarity.’”); Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 167 , 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (1948) (explaining that a home rule municipality has full authority to do anything the legislature could have authorized it to do).

2015Accordingly, Texas home-rule cities have “broad discretionary powers,” and, absent legislation or constitutional provisions to the contrary, “a home rule municipality is free to regulate itself in any manner it chooses.”2 Id. at 490 ; Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1975). 2 In contrast, counties and general law cities have only those powers prescribed by the legislature by general law.

2014To preempt subject matter normally within a home- rule municipality's authority, however, the Legislature must do so with "unmistakable clarity." Id. (quoting Dallas Merch. 's & Concessionaire's Ass 'n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1993)).

2003"While a home rule city thus has all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Constitution, the general laws, or the city's charter . . . these broad powers may be limited by statute when the Legislature's intention to do so appears `with unmistakable clarity.'" Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 732 ; see also Dallas Merchant's Concessionaire's Ass'n v. City of Dallas , 852 S.W.2d 489 , 490-91 (Tex. 1993); City of Sweetwater v. Geron , 380 S.W.2d 550 , 552 (Tex. 1964).

2003“While a home rule city thus has all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Constitution, the general laws, or the city’s charter . . . these broad powers may be limited by statute when the Legislature’s intention to do so appears ‘with unmistakable clarity.“’ Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 732 ; see also Dallas Merchant’s & Concessionaire k Ass ‘n v. City ofDallas, 852 S.W.2d 489,490-91 (Tex. 1993); City of S weetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550,552 (Tex. 1964).

2015“Adopted in 1912, the home rule amendment ‘altered the longstanding practice of having special charters individually granted and amended by the legislature’ for the State's larger cities.” Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied) (quoting 22 David B.

2005“Adopted in 1912, the home rule amendment ‘altered the longstanding practice of having special charters individually granted and amended by the legislature’ for the State’s larger cities.” Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied) (quoting 22 David B.

2002Standard of Review We presume a home rule charter provision is valid and will not interfere with matters of municipal government unless the provision is shown to be "unreasonable and arbitrary, amounting to a clear abuse of municipal discretion." Dallas Merchant's & Concessionaire's Ass'n v. City of Dallas , 852 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. 1993); see also City of Brookside Village v. Comeau , 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982) ("A city ordinance is presumed to be valid[.]") (citing Thompson v. City of Palestine , 510 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1974); Hunt v. City of San Antonio , 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex

2002See id. ' 30-102(b)(2). 2 Standard of Review We presume a home rule charter provision is valid and will not interfere with matters of municipal government unless the provision is shown to be Aunreasonable and arbitrary, amounting to a clear abuse of municipal discretion.@ Dallas Merchant=s & Concessionaire=s Ass=n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. 1993); see also City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982) (AA city ordinance is presumed to be valid[.]@) (citing Thompson v. City of Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1974); Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 46

2018Thus, the legislature may, by general law, withdraw a particular subject from a home rule city's domain." (citation omitted) ); City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Tex. , 794 S.W.2d 17 , 19 (Tex. 1990) (home-rule cities have broad discretionary powers provided that no ordinance conflicts with the Texas Constitution or state law); Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos , 523 S.W.2d 641 , 643-644 (Tex. 1975) (home-rule cities have "full authority to do anything the legislature could theretofore have authorized them to do" subject to legislatively expressed limitations on their

2018Thus, the legislature may, by general law, withdraw a particular subject from a home rule city's domain." (citation omitted) ); City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Tex. , 794 S.W.2d 17 , 19 (Tex. 1990) (home-rule cities have broad discretionary powers provided that no ordinance conflicts with the Texas Constitution or state law); Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos , 523 S.W.2d 641 , 643-644 (Tex. 1975) (home-rule cities have "full authority to do anything the legislature could theretofore have authorized them to do" subject to legislatively expressed limitations on their

2010XI, § 5; Tex. Local Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.072 (West 2008); Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex.1975); Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632 , 244 S.W.2d 645, 649 (1951) (legislature may by general law withdraw a particular subject from a home rule city’s domain).

2010XI, § 5; Tex. Local Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.072 (West 2008); Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex.1975); Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632 , 244 S.W.2d 645, 649 (1951) (legislature may by general law withdraw a particular subject from a home rule city’s domain).

2017Tex.Local Gov’t Code Ann. § 5.004 (West 2008); See Moreno v. City of El Paso, 71 S.W.3d 898, 901 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (stating that the City of El Paso is a home rule city existing under Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution). .

2017Tex,Local Gov’t Code Ann. § 5,004 (West 2008); see Moreno v. City of El Paso, 71 S.W.3d 898, 901 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (stating that the City of El Paso is a home rule city existing under Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution). 9 , In her deposition testimony, Monica Lom-brana, the City's current Director of Aviation, recognized this principle when she explained that the City is not allowed to "subsidize” ■ private businesses and is therefore not entitled to dispose of City property without compensation. 10 .

2005Wilson v. Andrews , 10 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex. 1999) (legislature can "limit or augment" a home rule city's self-governance); Dallas Merch. & Concessionaires Ass'n , 852 S.W.2d at 490-91 ; Forwood v. City of Taylor , 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Tex. 1948) ("The result [of the home rule amendment] is that now it is necessary to look to the acts of the legislature not for grants of power to such cities but only for limitations on their powers."); Black , 78 S.W.3d at 692 .

2005Wilson v. Andrews, 10 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex.1999) (legislature can “limit or augment” a home rule city’s self-gover *209 nance); Dallas Merck. & Concessionaire’s Ass’n, 852 S.W.2d at 490-91 ; Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161 , 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (1948) (“The result [of the home rule amendment] is that now it is necessary to look to the acts of the legislature not for grants of power to such cities but only for limitations on their powers.”); Black, 78 S.W.3d at 692.

2003Home rule municipalities differ from Type A, B, and C general-law municipalities in that they "look to acts of the legislature not for grants of power, but only for limitations on their powers." MJR's Fare of Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 792 S.W.2d 569, 572 (1990).

2003Home rule municipalities differ from Type A, B, and C general-law municipalities in that they "look to acts of the legislature not for grants of power, but only for limitations on their powers." MJR's Fare of Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 792 S.W.2d 569, 572 (1990).

2002Standard of Review We presume a home rule charter provision is valid and will not interfere with matters of municipal government unless the provision is shown to be "unreasonable and arbitrary, amounting to a clear abuse of municipal discretion." Dallas Merchant's & Concessionaire's Ass'n v. City of Dallas , 852 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. 1993); see also City of Brookside Village v. Comeau , 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982) ("A city ordinance is presumed to be valid[.]") (citing Thompson v. City of Palestine , 510 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1974); Hunt v. City of San Antonio , 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex

2002See id. ' 30-102(b)(2). 2 Standard of Review We presume a home rule charter provision is valid and will not interfere with matters of municipal government unless the provision is shown to be Aunreasonable and arbitrary, amounting to a clear abuse of municipal discretion.@ Dallas Merchant=s & Concessionaire=s Ass=n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. 1993); see also City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982) (AA city ordinance is presumed to be valid[.]@) (citing Thompson v. City of Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1974); Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 46

2002Standard of Review We presume a home rule charter provision is valid and will not interfere with matters of municipal government unless the provision is shown to be "unreasonable and arbitrary, amounting to a clear abuse of municipal discretion." Dallas Merchant's & Concessionaire's Ass'n v. City of Dallas , 852 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. 1993); see also City of Brookside Village v. Comeau , 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982) ("A city ordinance is presumed to be valid[.]") (citing Thompson v. City of Palestine , 510 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1974); Hunt v. City of San Antonio , 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex

2002See id. ' 30-102(b)(2). 2 Standard of Review We presume a home rule charter provision is valid and will not interfere with matters of municipal government unless the provision is shown to be Aunreasonable and arbitrary, amounting to a clear abuse of municipal discretion.@ Dallas Merchant=s & Concessionaire=s Ass=n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. 1993); see also City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982) (AA city ordinance is presumed to be valid[.]@) (citing Thompson v. City of Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1974); Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 46

2015XI, § 5, these broad powers may be limited by statute when the Legislature’s intention to do so appears ‘with unmistakable clarity.’ ”); Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 167 , 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (1948) (explaining that a home rule municipality has full authority to do anything the legislature could have authorized it to do).

2015Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 216.902, 372.003, 377.002, 382.109, 395.011. 14 unmistakable clarity.’”); Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 167 , 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (1948) (explaining that a home rule municipality has full authority to do anything the legislature could have authorized it to do).

1981See also Burch v. City of San Antonio, 518 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1975); Berry v. City of Fort Worth, 124 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1939).

1981See also Burch v. City of San Antonio, 518 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1975); Berry v. City of Fort Worth, 124 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1939).

2021See Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tex. 2016) (addressing immunity of city); Gates v. City of Dall., 704 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex. 1986) (addressing immunity of a home- rule municipal corporation); Dilley v. City of Hous., 222 S.W.2d 992, 993 (Tex. 1949) (addressing immunity of city).

2013See Gates v. City of Dallas, 704 S.W.2d 737 , 738–41 (Tex. 1986) (noting that the defendant city “is a home rule municipal corporation” and that, when the city entered into the underlying contract with plaintiff, it “acted in its proprietary role and was clothed with the same authority and subject to the same liabilities as a private citizen”).

2020Garza v. Garcia, 785 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied); cf. Huntress v. McGrath, 946 S.W.2d 480, 486 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no writ) (analyzing Garza and distinguishing it on its facts).

1997Garza v. Garcia, 785 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Tex.App.- Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).

2020We also find it significant that neither Sauls’s girlfriend nor his girlfriend’s aunt testified at the suppression hearing to corroborate Sauls’s claims, and Sauls did not testify to any specific facts that would support his purported status as an “overnight guest.” See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (holding that although “an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment,” “one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not”); cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960) (concluding that defendant had standing to challenge s

2012Stated in a more general way, “an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 , 119 S.Ct. 469 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998).

2005XI, § 5; (2) that within the limits of a home-rule city, the city’s constitutional right of self-government prevails over a county’s general authority, City of San Antonio, 111 S.W.3d at 28 ; and (3) that, to divest a home- rule city of its authority, the legislature must speak with unmistakable clarity, In re Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d at 796 .

2004Thus, while it is true that "[c]ities adopting a home rule charter have the full power of self government and look to the Legislature only for limitations on their power," City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22 , 27 n. 5 (Tex. 2003), the constitution and general laws limit their authority, see Tex. Const. art.

2008Home rule cities have "all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Constitution, the general laws, or the city's charter." City of Galveston, 217 S.W.3d at 469 (quoting Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex.1998)).

2008Home rule cities have “all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Constitution, the general laws, or the city’s charter.” City of Galveston, 217 S.W.3d at 469 (quoting Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex.1998)).

1986City of Austin v. Jamail, 662 S.W.2d 779 , 782 (Tex.App.-Austin 1983, writ dism'd); Attorney General Opinion JM-226 (1984).

1986City of Austin v. Jamail; 662 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. Apn. - Austin 1983, writ dism’d): Attorney General Opinion s-226 (i984).