fact-intensive inquiry in Colorado

2026N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 2000). ¶ 10 After conducting this analysis, the court must name one presumptive parent the child’s legal parent.

2024N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 2000). ¶ 11 After conducting this analysis, the court will render one person the child’s legal parent, while the other person becomes a “nonparent” who has no rights and responsibilities with respect to the child.

2021See, e.g., People v. Requejo, 919 P.2d 874, 879 (Colo. App. 1996) (holding that an officer’s question about the location of a knife fell within the exception because it was justified to “protect the safety of officers engaged in immediate, on-scene investigation of a crime”); Janis, ¶ 56, 441 P.3d at 13 (holding that an officer’s question about the location of a knife fell under the exception because, given the surrounding facts, it was clear that the question was asked for safety purposes); People v. Wakefield, 2018 COA 37, ¶ 57 , 428 P.3d 639, 651 (holding that officers were justified in ask

2021See, e.g., People v. Requejo, 919 P.2d 874, 879 (Colo. App. 1996) (holding that an officer’s question about the location of a knife fell within the exception because it was justified to “protect the safety of officers engaged in immediate, on-scene investigation of a crime”); Janis, ¶ 56, 441 P.3d at 13 (holding that an officer’s question about the location of a knife fell under the exception because, given the surrounding facts, it was clear that the question was asked for safety purposes); People v. Wakefield, 2018 COA 37, ¶ 57 , 428 P.3d 639, 651 (holding that officers were justified in ask

2021See, e.g., People v. Requejo, 919 P.2d 874, 879 (Colo. App. 1996) (holding that an officer’s question about the location of a knife fell within the exception because it was justified to “protect the safety of officers engaged in immediate, on-scene investigation of a crime”); Janis, ¶ 56, 441 P.3d at 13 (holding that an officer’s question about the location of a knife fell under the exception because, given the surrounding facts, it was clear that the question was asked for safety purposes); People v. Wakefield, 2018 COA 37, ¶ 57 , 428 P.3d 639, 651 (holding that officers were justified in ask

2021See, e.g. , People v. Requejo , 919 P.2d 874, 879 ( Colo. App. 1996 ) ( holding that an officer's question about the location of a knife fell within the exception because it was justified to "protect the safety of officers engaged in immediate, on-scene investigation of a crime" ) ; Janis , ¶ 56 , 441 P.3d at 13 ( holding that an officer's question about the location of a knife fell under the exception because, given the surrounding facts, it was clear that the question was asked for safety purposes ) ; People v. Wakefield , 2018 COA 37 , ¶ 57 , 428 P.3d 639, 651 ( holding that officers were j

2021See, e.g., People v. Requejo, 919 P.2d 874, 879 (Colo. App. 1996) (holding that an officer’s question about the location of a knife fell within the exception because it was justified to “protect the safety of officers engaged in immediate, on-scene investigation of a crime”); Janis, ¶ 56, 441 P.3d at 13 (holding that an officer’s question about the location of a knife fell under the exception because, given the surrounding facts, it was clear that the question was asked for safety purposes); People v. Wakefield, 2018 COA 37, ¶ 57 , 428 P.3d 639, 651 (holding that officers were justified in ask

2021See, e.g. , People v. Requejo , 919 P.2d 874, 879 ( Colo. App. 1996 ) ( holding that an officer's question about the location of a knife fell within the exception because it was justified to "protect the safety of officers engaged in immediate, on-scene investigation of a crime" ) ; Janis , ¶ 56 , 441 P.3d at 13 ( holding that an officer's question about the location of a knife fell under the exception because, given the surrounding facts, it was clear that the question was asked for safety purposes ) ; People v. Wakefield , 2018 COA 37 , ¶ 57 , 428 P.3d 639, 651 ( holding that officers were j

2015Haystack Ranch, LLC v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 552 (Colo. 2000).

2015Haystack Ranch, LLC v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 552 (Colo.2000).

2026See id. at 1379-80 . ¶ 25 In sum, the fact that the allegations in the complaint do not necessarily establish that the three debt-and-discovery confrontations all occurred on a single day, when considered together with the nature of the parties’ relationship, casts doubt on the district court’s “reasonable diligence” determination.

2024See C.L.S. , 313 P.3d at 667 .

2021Requiring those who 4 wish to be married in Colorado to obtain a marriage license would remedy these issues and provide a bright-line rule for courts to rely on. ¶77 For these reasons, I urge the legislature to abolish the common law marriage doctrine. 5 CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, concurring in the judgment only. ¶78 “[T]he cardinal principle of judicial restraint [is that] if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” PDK Lab’ys Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.

2020See Estates in Eagle Ridge, LLLP v. Valley Bank & Tr., 141 P.3d 838, 843 (Colo. App. 2005) (the substance of a pleading controls over its form or caption); see also Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners Ass’n, 202 P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009) (court may take into account the fact that a party is appearing pro se, notwithstanding that pro se parties are bound by rules of civil procedure). • Father asserted that the parties had agreed that he would not pay child support after physical care of the child was transferred to him. ¶ 44 Contrary to the district court’s implicit determination, we con

2020See Estates in Eagle Ridge, LLLP v. Valley Bank & Tr., 141 P.3d 838, 843 (Colo. App. 2005) (the substance of a pleading controls over its form or caption); see also Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners Ass’n, 202 P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009) (court may take into account the fact that a party is appearing pro se, notwithstanding that pro se parties are bound by rules of civil procedure). • Father asserted that the parties had agreed that he would not pay child support after physical care of the child was transferred to him. ¶ 44 Contrary to the district court’s implicit determination, we con

2017See People v. Torres , 224 P.3d 268 , 273 (Colo. App. 2009) ("We decline to address this contention because we cannot determine the constitutionality of an as applied challenge without a complete record of relevant facts."). ¶ 70 We conclude that the statute is constitutionally valid on its face.

2016See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35 (trial court has great latitude to effect an equitable distribution of marital property based on facts and circumstances of each case, and an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion); Szafranski II, 34 N.E.3d at 1161-62 (balancing of interests approach involves “a fact-intensive inquiry into each party’s interest in using or preventing the use of the []embryos”); cf. In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142, 147-48 (Colo. 2005) (in 16 parental relocation case, conducting abuse of discretion review of trial cou

2016See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).

2016See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).

2016See Reiner, 532 U.S. at 20; Razatos, 699 P.2d at 976. ¶28 On the record before us, however, we are unable to determine whether Roberson’s answer to the polygraph examiner’s question regarding any sexual fantasies involving minors that Roberson might have had within the preceding six months would also have been incriminating within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. ¶29 Whether a question poses a reasonable danger of incrimination involves a fact-intensive inquiry.

2016See Reiner, 532 U.S. at 20 ; Razatos, 699 P.2d at 976 . ¶28 On the record before us, however, we are unable to determine whether Roberson’s answer to the polygraph examiner’s question regarding any sexual fantasies involving minors that Roberson might have had within the preceding six months would also have been incriminating within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. ¶29 Whether a question poses a reasonable danger of incrimination involves a fact-intensive inquiry.

2016See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35 (trial court has great latitude to effect an equitable distribution of marital property based on facts and circumstances of each case, and an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion); Szafranski II, 34 N.E.3d at 1161-62 (balancing of interests approach involves “a fact-intensive inquiry into each party’s interest in using or preventing the use of the []embryos”); cf. In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142, 147-48 (Colo. 2005) (in 16 parental relocation case, conducting abuse of discretion review of trial cou

2016See Reiner, 532 U.S. at 20; Razatos, 699 P.2d at 976. ¶28 On the record before us, however, we are unable to determine whether Roberson’s answer to the polygraph examiner’s question regarding any sexual fantasies involving minors that Roberson might have had within the preceding six months would also have been incriminating within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. ¶29 Whether a question poses a reasonable danger of incrimination involves a fact-intensive inquiry.

2016See Reiner, 532 U.S. at 20 ; Razatos, 699 P.2d at 976 . ¶28 On the record before us, however, we are unable to determine whether Roberson’s answer to the polygraph examiner’s question regarding any sexual fantasies involving minors that Roberson might have had within the preceding six months would also have been incriminating within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. ¶29 Whether a question poses a reasonable danger of incrimination involves a fact-intensive inquiry.

2015See Campbell, 106 F.3d at 68 (“When an appellate court subsequently reverses a conviction (or convictions) that was part of the original sentence, the district court’s job on remand is to reconsider the entirety of the (now-changed) circumstances and fashion a sentence that fits the crime and the criminal. . . .

2015The aggregate approach's inherent flexibility best comports with this important goal." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). 127 The logic of the aggregate approach is apparent, as demonstrated in a recent court of appeals opinion, People v. Woellhaf, 199 P.3d 27, 31 (Colo.App.2007).

2014Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2007).

2013And in any event, doing so would be inappropriate because in reviewing summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must receive the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts." Mancuso v. United Bank of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732, 736 (Colo.1991) (quotations and citations omitted).

2011See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 186 F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir.1999).

2011Seq, eg., United States v. Martines-Cruz, 186 F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir.1999).