fact-intensive inquiry in Arizona

2023As a result, failure to give a justification instruction was fundamental error, “tak[ing] away a right essential to [Kemp’s] defense.” See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 138, ¶ 1. ¶14 Still, for an error to warrant reversal, Kemp must show prejudice, which “involves a fact-intensive inquiry.” See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 26 .

2021Determining prejudice “involves a fact- intensive inquiry.” Id. at 568, ¶ 26 . ¶8 First, the sentencing judge, not the jury, found the victim’s age—over 65 years old—was an aggravating factor.

2026Id. at 144, ¶ 31; see also State v. Dickinson, 233 Ariz. 527, 531, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“Prejudice is a fact-intensive inquiry, the outcome of which will depend upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” (citation modified)); State v. Peraza, 239 Ariz. 140 , 149–50, ¶ 37 (App. 2016) (noting the defendant “bears the burden to show he was prejudiced” by the error, and that the “fact-intensive inquiry . . . required to establish prejudice” necessarily differs from case to case).

2024“Prejudice is a fact-intensive inquiry, the outcome of which will depend . . . upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” State v. Dickinson, 233 Ariz. 527, 531, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2024See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 141 ¶ 18, 142 ¶ 21. 7 STATE v. RIOS Opinion of the Court ¶24 Resulting prejudice is a fact-intensive inquiry, the outcome of which will “depend[] upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490 , 494 ¶ 15 (App. 2013).

2023See id. ¶9 “Prejudice under fundamental error ‘is a fact-intensive inquiry and varies depending upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.’” State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490 , 494 ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

2024Specialists v. Farber, 194 Ariz. 363, 366-67, ¶ 11 (1999) (when a decision requires “a fact- intensive inquiry,” “we will give substantial deference both to the trial court’s findings of fact and its application of law to fact”). ¶14 By contrast, whether expert testimony is necessary to prove a plaintiff’s claim requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence, without expert support, is sufficient to establish the elements of the claim.

2017See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that “as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal,” but that appellate courts should “review findings of historical fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers”); cf. Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, 194 Ariz. 363 , 366-67 ¶ 11, 982 P.2d 1277 , 1280- 81 (1999) (because “reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on weighing the totality of the ci

2013“Whether a private person acted as a state agent is ‘a fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.’ ” State v. Martinez, 221 Ariz. 383, ¶ 14 , 212 P.3d 75, 79 (App.2009), quoting United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir.2003); see also State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, ¶ 17 , 100 P.3d 452, 456 (App.2004) (“Whether a private citizen acted as a state agent is determined on a ease-by-case basis....”).

2009Whether a private person acted as a state agent is “ ‘a fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.’ ” United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir.2003), quoting United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir.2003); see also Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Centers, L.L.

2013“Whether a private person acted as a state agent is ‘a fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.’ ” State v. Martinez, 221 Ariz. 383, ¶ 14 , 212 P.3d 75, 79 (App.2009), quoting United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir.2003); see also State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, ¶ 17 , 100 P.3d 452, 456 (App.2004) (“Whether a private citizen acted as a state agent is determined on a ease-by-case basis....”).

2013“Whether a private person acted as a state agent is ‘a fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.’ ” State v. Martinez, 221 Ariz. 383, ¶ 14 , 212 P.3d 75, 79 (App.2009), quoting United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir.2003); see also State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, ¶ 17 , 100 P.3d 452, 456 (App.2004) (“Whether a private citizen acted as a state agent is determined on a ease-by-case basis....”).

2014Instead, the superior court must engage in a fact-intensive analysis of all relevant circumstances, including consideration of six factors set forth by our supreme court in Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security: (1) the length and strength of any parent–child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent–child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length o

2014Instead, the superior court must engage in a fact-intensive analysis of all relevant circumstances, including consideration of six factors set forth by our supreme court in Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security: (1) the length and strength of any parent–child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent–child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length o

2017Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 281, ¶ 9 (App. 2002), and the superior court must engage in a fact-intensive analysis of all "relevant factors", including: (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child's age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to provide a normal home lif

2015A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). ¶13 The length of a parent’s sentence, alone, is not dispositive, Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 281, ¶ 9 , and the juvenile court must engage in a fact- intensive analysis of all relevant circumstances, including: (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length

2016See Farber, 194 Ariz. at 365 ¶ 11 (“‘Each case hinges on its own particular facts.’”) (quoting Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 217 (App. 1989)); see also id. at 369 ¶ 20 (“Reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances.”) (citing cases). ¶24 Shufeldt next argues the superior court erred by not explicitly imposing a burden on NextCare to show the Noncompetition Agreement was reasonable.

2016See Farber, 194 Ariz. at 365 ¶ 11 (“‘Each case hinges on its own particular facts.’”) (quoting Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 217 (App. 1989)); see also id. at 369 ¶ 20 (“Reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances.”) (citing cases). ¶24 Shufeldt next argues the superior court erred by not explicitly imposing a burden on NextCare to show the Noncompetition Agreement was reasonable.

2014“To determine if a statement is truly against interest requires a fact-intensive inquiry of the surrounding circumstances[,] and each declaration must be scrutinized to determine if it is self-inculpato-ry in light of the totality of circumstances.” State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 455 , 924 P.2d 453, 459 (App.1996). ¶ 11 M.H. made his statement during an interview with a detective from the Graham County Sheriffs Office concerning the prior burglary.

2014“To determine if a statement is truly against interest requires a fact-intensive inquiry of the surrounding circumstances[,] and each declaration must be scrutinized to determine if it is self-inculpato-ry in light of the totality of circumstances.” State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 455 , 924 P.2d 453, 459 (App.1996). ¶ 11 M.H. made his statement during an interview with a detective from the Graham County Sheriffs Office concerning the prior burglary.

2009Whether a private person acted as a state agent is “‘a fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.’” United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003), quoting United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Centers, L.L.C., 215 Ariz. 589, ¶ 21 , 161 P.3d 1253, 1259 (App. 2007) (question of fact whether agency relationship existed); State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, ¶ 17 , 100 P.3d 452, 456 (App. 2004) (“Whether a private citizen acted as a state agent is determined on a case-by-case basis . . . .”).

2009Whether a private person acted as a state agent is “‘a fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.’” United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003), quoting United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Centers, L.L.C., 215 Ariz. 589, ¶ 21 , 161 P.3d 1253, 1259 (App. 2007) (question of fact whether agency relationship existed); State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, ¶ 17 , 100 P.3d 452, 456 (App. 2004) (“Whether a private citizen acted as a state agent is determined on a case-by-case basis . . . .”).

2009Whether a private person acted as a state agent is “‘a fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.’” United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003), quoting United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Centers, L.L.C., 215 Ariz. 589, ¶ 21 , 161 P.3d 1253, 1259 (App. 2007) (question of fact whether agency relationship existed); State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, ¶ 17 , 100 P.3d 452, 456 (App. 2004) (“Whether a private citizen acted as a state agent is determined on a case-by-case basis . . . .”).

2009Whether a private person acted as a state agent is “ ‘a fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.’ ” United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir.2003), quoting United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir.2003); see also Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Centers, L.L.

2017Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific, Planning Grp., 262 Ariz. at 265, ¶ 13, but always requires a fact- intensive inquiry to determine whether its exercise comports with traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice,” Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 3-4, ¶ 8 (2000) (citations omitted).

2015Rather, it requires a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether exercising jurisdiction would satisfy Due Process by comporting with traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 , 485–86 (1985)). ¶11 Specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is appropriate when that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state.

2016Prejudice results only when, “but for the error, a reasonable fact-finder ‘could have reached a different result.’ ” Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, ¶ 31 , 158 P.3d at 273 , quoting Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 27 , 115 P.3d at 609 . ¶ 38 Even had the jury instruction not been given, a reasonable jury would still have found Peraza guilty on both counts.

2016Prejudice results only when, “but for the error, a reasonable fact-finder ‘could have reached a different result.’ ” Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, ¶ 31 , 158 P.3d at 273 , quoting Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 27 , 115 P.3d at 609 . ¶ 38 Even had the jury instruction not been given, a reasonable jury would still have found Peraza guilty on both counts.

2014“Fundamental error review involves a fact-intensive inquiry, and the showing required to establish prejudice therefore differs from case to case.“ Id. (citing State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 572 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1175 (1993)). ¶47 The State argues that because the victim’s character for truthfulness was attacked during her cross-examination, Hodgekiss’s 17 STATE v. CENTENO-SARABIA Brown, J., Specially Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part statements were not prejudicial because he would have been permitted to make the statements if the State had recalled him after she testified.

2014“Fundamental error review involves a fact-intensive inquiry, and the showing required to establish prejudice therefore differs from case to case.“ Id. (citing State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 572 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1175 (1993)). ¶47 The State argues that because the victim’s character for truthfulness was attacked during her cross-examination, Hodgekiss’s 17 STATE v. CENTENO-SARABIA Brown, J., Specially Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part statements were not prejudicial because he would have been permitted to make the statements if the State had recalled him after she testified.

2024A defendant “must affirmatively prove prejudice and may not rely upon speculation to carry his burden.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶21 The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause prohibits “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).

2021The attribution of income is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires a court to consider “all the circumstances” to determine the outcome that would be in “the best interests of the child[ren].” See Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518 , 523 ¶ 14 (1999) (quotations omitted); see also Sherman, 241 Ariz. at 113 ¶ 12 (upholding an attribution of income to an involuntarily unemployed parent); see generally Guidelines § 5(E).

2020The Clearwater factors provide that a jury should “measure” — among other things — “the extent of the insurer’s consideration of . . . the strength of the third party’s claim” and “the amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle.” Id. at 259, 260 .2 If this fact- intensive inquiry leads the jury to conclude that the defendant knew it should have settled the case, then a verdict for the plaintiff is proper.

2019Because mistrials raise issues of double jeopardy, a party 5 STATE v. CASTILLO Decision of the Court must ordinarily ask for a mistrial, State v. Laird, 186 Ariz. 203, 207 (1996), and the superior court must find a “manifest necessity” to declare one, State v. Dickinson, 242 Ariz. 120, 124 , ¶¶ 16–17 (App. 2017). ¶13 Castillo argues that the now-complained-of testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Arizona Rule of Evidence 403, which required the superior court to declare a mistrial sua sponte.

2019Instead, we address only the narrow legal issue presented by this special action—whether an order for an interim manager falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission. ¶8 “The Arizona Corporation Commission, unlike such bodies in most states, is not a creature of the legislature, but is a constitutional body which owes its existence to provisions in the organic law of this state.” Miller v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 227 Ariz. 21, 24, ¶ 12 (App. 2011) (citation 1 Both parties present novel arguments regarding jurisdiction.