11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
John Nagle Co. v. Gokeygreen2 sentences2018The Law Court in John Nagle Co. v. Gokey, 2002 ME 101 , 799 A.2d 1225, 1227 , in discussing partnership and joint venture theory noted, in pertinent part, 7 the Maine Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons ... to carry on as co-owners a business for profit ... " 31 M.R.S.A. §286. 4 .•. whether a paitnership has been formed is a fact intensive inquiry in which "no one factor alone is determinative." .... 2018The Law Court in John Nagle Co. v. Gokey, 2002 ME 101 , 799 A.2d 1225, 1227 , in discussing partnership and joint venture theory noted, in pertinent part, 7 the Maine Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons ... to carry on as co-owners a business for profit ... " 31 M.R.S.A. §286. 4 .•. whether a paitnership has been formed is a fact intensive inquiry in which "no one factor alone is determinative." .... | 1 | 2 |
State v. Longgreen1 sentence2023See State v. Hofland, 2012 ME 129, ¶¶ 2-3, 22-24 , 58 A.3d 1023 . 13 crime against the victim.” State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Me. 1980); see also State v. Long, 577 A.2d 765, 766 (Me. 1990) (noting that the definition of “restrain” used in the kidnapping statute “precludes a separate conviction for kidnapping, a felony, based upon conduct that merely facilitates the commission of other crimes”). [¶23] Whether restraint is incidental to the commission of another crime or culpable in and of itself is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
River Dale Ass'n v. Blossgreen2 sentences2023See River Dale Ass’n, 2006 ME 86, ¶¶ 12-13 , 901 A.2d 809 . 2023See River Dale Ass’n, 2006 ME 86, ¶¶ 12-13 , 901 A.2d 809 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hoflandgreen2 sentences2023See State v. Hofland, 2012 ME 129, ¶¶ 2-3, 22-24 , 58 A.3d 1023 . 13 crime against the victim.” State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Me. 1980); see also State v. Long, 577 A.2d 765, 766 (Me. 1990) (noting that the definition of “restrain” used in the kidnapping statute “precludes a separate conviction for kidnapping, a felony, based upon conduct that merely facilitates the commission of other crimes”). [¶23] Whether restraint is incidental to the commission of another crime or culpable in and of itself is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances. 2023See State v. Hofland, 2012 ME 129, ¶¶ 2-3, 22-24 , 58 A.3d 1023 . 13 crime against the victim.” State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Me. 1980); see also State v. Long, 577 A.2d 765, 766 (Me. 1990) (noting that the definition of “restrain” used in the kidnapping statute “precludes a separate conviction for kidnapping, a felony, based upon conduct that merely facilitates the commission of other crimes”). [¶23] Whether restraint is incidental to the commission of another crime or culpable in and of itself is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Estesgreen2 sentences2023See State v. Hofland, 2012 ME 129, ¶¶ 2-3, 22-24 , 58 A.3d 1023 . 13 crime against the victim.” State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Me. 1980); see also State v. Long, 577 A.2d 765, 766 (Me. 1990) (noting that the definition of “restrain” used in the kidnapping statute “precludes a separate conviction for kidnapping, a felony, based upon conduct that merely facilitates the commission of other crimes”). [¶23] Whether restraint is incidental to the commission of another crime or culpable in and of itself is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances. 2023See, e.g., Estes, 418 A.2d at 1110, 1112-13 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Christopher Rarickgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snow, 160 N.E.3d 277 , 288 (Mass. 2021); United States v. Rarick, 636 F. App’x 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2016).9 However, whether a search warrant satisfies the constitutional particularity requirement is ultimately a question of law that we determine de novo. | 1 | 1 |
American Sardine Co. v. Olsengreen2 sentences2018See American Sardine Co. v. Olsen, 117 Me. 26, 30 , 102 A. 797, 799 (1917) ("Reasonableness is a question of fact."). 2018See American Sardine Co. v. Olsen, 117 Me. 26, 30 , 102 A. 797, 799 (1917) ("Reasonableness is a question of fact."). | 1 | 1 |
Levesque v. Changreen2 sentences2017Cf. Levesque v. Chan, 569 A.2d 600, 601 (Me. 1990). 2017Cf. Levesque v. Chan, 569 A.2d 600, 601 (Me. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Lauck v. Campbell Countygreen1 sentence2016See Lauck v. Campbell County, 627 F.3d 805, 812 (10th Cir. 2010) (Am. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dalton v. Austin
green
2 sentences2007"Evidence relevant to the existence of a partnership includes evidence of a voluntary contract between two persons to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or business with the understanding that a community of profits will be shared." Dalton, 432 A.2d at 777 . 2002Nonetheless, whether a partnership has been formed is a fact intensive inquiry in which “[n]o one factor alone is determinative.” Id. | 2 | 2002–2007 |
Gregory Selden v. Airbnb, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Determining the enforceability of a sign-in wrap agreement “requires a fact-intensive inquiry.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also McKee v. Audible, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
John F. Murphy Homes, Inc. v. State of Maine
neutral
2 sentences2018For Spurwink to obtain summary judgment on the issue whether its sleep time policy comports with section 785.23 and hence is enforceable under 26 M.R.S. § 664(3), Spurwink acknowledges that it must establish that its policy was reasonable as a matter oflaw. 12 "Reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry ..." John F. Murphy Homes, Inc. v. State, 2017 ME 67 , ~38, 158 A.3d 921 (Jabar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 2018For Spurwink to obtain summary judgment on the issue whether its sleep time policy comports with section 785.23 and hence is enforceable under 26 M.R.S. § 664(3), Spurwink acknowledges that it must establish that its policy was reasonable as a matter oflaw. 12 "Reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry ..." John F. Murphy Homes, Inc. v. State, 2017 ME 67 , ~38, 158 A.3d 921 (Jabar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Portland Gas Light Co. v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2013Cf. Portland Gas Light Co. v. Johnson, 244 A.2d 817 (Me.1968) (undertaking a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether fuel used in a manufacturing process was subject to use tax). [¶ 16] In this case, the court considered appropriate factors in its analysis, including the nature of Eagle Rental’s dealership activities, the way it managed the Esca-lades in comparison with its other inventory, how the Escalades were advertised, Eagle Rental’s pattern of trading in the Escalades for newer models, the number of miles put on the Escalades, and whether the Escalades were ultimately sold at retail | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.