9 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williamson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024We agree with the Supreme Court’s observation that the trial court’s analysis of each statement “can be a fact-intensive inquiry,” which requires “careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved[.]” Williamson, 512 U.S. at 604 . 2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi | 3 | 4 |
United States v. William T. Canangreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi 2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Cirilo Mendoza, United States of America v. Cirilo Mendoza, Martha Wheelergreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi 2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Juan Castelangreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi 2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Ojudungreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi 2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi | 2 | 2 |
Wolfgang Von Dunser v. Arnold Y. Aronoffgreen2 sentences2014Cf. Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1072-76 (6th Cir. 1990) (where party challenged subject matter jurisdiction for first time on appeal by raising issue of domicile, and thus of diversity of citizenship, court remanded for factual determination regarding domicile). 2014Cf. Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1072-76 (6th Cir.1990) (where party challenged subject matter jurisdiction for first time on appeal by raising issue of domicile, and thus of diversity of citizenship, court remanded for factual determination regarding domicile). | 2 | 2 |
Blount v. Bostongreen2 sentences2014The issue of domicile, however, requires a fact-intensive inquiry into Kenneth’s intentions (see Blount v. Boston, 351 Md. 360, 367-73 , 718 A.2d 1111 (1998)), which the circuit court was not asked to conduct, and which it would be inappropriate for an appellate court to conduct in the first instance. 2014The issue of domicile, however, requires a fact-intensive inquiry into Kenneth’s intentions (see Blount v. Boston, 351 Md. 360, 367-73 , 718 A.2d 1111 (1998)), which the circuit court was not asked to conduct, and which it would be inappropriate for an appellate court to conduct in the first instance. | 1 | 2 |
Eanes v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604, 615 (1990) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). 2016Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604, 615 (1990) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). | 1 | 1 |
Colten v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2016Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604, 615 (1990) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). 2016Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604, 615 (1990) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Standifur
green
2 sentences2024The trial court’s analysis of each statement “can be a fact-intensive inquiry,” which requires careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved. 2 This may be especially true when a proponent seeks the admission of an extensive narrative or interview containing many individual statements. 1 Although Matusky is our most recent case on this topic, as discussed herein, we first addressed the parsing analysis in State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3 (1987). 2024The trial court’s analysis of each statement “can be a fact-intensive inquiry,” which requires careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved.2 This may be especially true when a proponent seeks the admission of an extensive narrative or interview containing many individual statements. 1 Although Matusky is our most recent case on this topic, as discussed herein, we first addressed the parsing analysis in State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3 (1987). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Lee v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2024The Court observed that a court’s analysis of each statement “can be a fact-intensive inquiry, which . . . require[s] careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved[.]” Id. 28 Justice Scalia concurred and wrote to expound his view that the statement against penal interest exception may properly cover statements that inculpate both the declarant and co-conspirator. 2024The Court observed that a court’s analysis of each statement “can be a fact-intensive inquiry, which . . . require[s] careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved[.]” Id. 28 Justice Scalia concurred and wrote to expound his view that the statement against penal interest exception may properly cover statements that inculpate both the declarant and co-conspirator. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Barchowsky v. Silver Farms, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Determination of whether a claimant is in actual possession of the claimed land is a fact-intensive inquiry. *326 Clearly, “something more than ‘mere occasional use of land’ is needed.” Porter, 126 Md.App. at 277 , 728 A.2d 755 (quoting Barchowsky, 105 Md.App. at 241 , 659 A.2d 347 ). 2008Determination of whether a claimant is in actual possession of the claimed land is a fact-intensive inquiry. *326 Clearly, “something more than ‘mere occasional use of land’ is needed.” Porter, 126 Md.App. at 277 , 728 A.2d 755 (quoting Barchowsky, 105 Md.App. at 241 , 659 A.2d 347 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Blickenstaff v. Bromley
green
2 sentences2008But, “the character, location, and use of lands vary, and the type of possessory acts necessary to constitute actual possession in one case may not be essential in another.” Blickenstaff, 243 Md. at 171 , 220 A.2d 558 . 2008But, “the character, location, and use of lands vary, and the type of possessory acts necessary to constitute actual possession in one case may not be essential in another.” Blickenstaff, 243 Md. at 171 , 220 A.2d 558 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Porter v. Schaffer
green
2 sentences2008Determination of whether a claimant is in actual possession of the claimed land is a fact-intensive inquiry. *326 Clearly, “something more than ‘mere occasional use of land’ is needed.” Porter, 126 Md.App. at 277 , 728 A.2d 755 (quoting Barchowsky, 105 Md.App. at 241 , 659 A.2d 347 ). 2008Determination of whether a claimant is in actual possession of the claimed land is a fact-intensive inquiry. *326 Clearly, “something more than ‘mere occasional use of land’ is needed.” Porter, 126 Md.App. at 277 , 728 A.2d 755 (quoting Barchowsky, 105 Md.App. at 241 , 659 A.2d 347 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Smith v. Shiebeck
green
2 sentences2001It must consider “declarations of the landowner, his intentions as manifested by his acts, and all the other circumstances of the case.” Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 420 , 24 A.2d 795 (1942). 2001It must consider “declarations of the landowner, his intentions as manifested by his acts, and all the other circumstances of the case.” Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 420 , 24 A.2d 795 (1942). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.