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17 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. Stategreen2 sentences2022“Understandably, such a fact intensive inquiry results in a very deferential standard of review, at least with respect to the question of whether each discrete part of Odom is satisfied, thus giving rise to presumptive prejudice.” Id. (citing Lewis v. State, 580 So. 2d 1279, 1283 (Miss. 1991)). ¶23. 1998See Lewis v. State, 580 So.2d 1279, 1283 (Miss.1991). | 3 | 3 |
Meridian Professional Baseball Club v. Jensengreen2 sentences2023Further, in Meridian Professional Baseball Club v. Jensen, 828 So. 2d 740, 747 (¶21) (Miss. 2002), the supreme court held that “where a permanent partial disability renders a worker unable to continue in the position held at the time of injury, we hold that such inability creates a rebuttable presumption of total occupational loss of the member, subject to other proof of the claimant’s ability to earn the same wages which the claimant was receiving at the time of injury.” “Under Jensen, determining industrial loss is a fact-intensive inquiry, which must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Howard 2022We noted that “[d]etermining industrial loss is a fact-intensive inquiry, which must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at (¶23). | 2 | 3 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2015A claim that the State has violated the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial requires a fact-intensive analysis of the four-factor balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), adopted by this Court in Wells v. State, 288 So.2d 860 (Miss.1974): (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 2015A claim that the State has violated the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial requires a fact-intensive analysis of the four-factor balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), adopted by this Court in Wells v. State, 288 So.2d 860 (Miss.1974): (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. | 2 | 2 |
PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowerygreen2 sentences2017“Because there is no bright line rule, the specific facts of the case will determine whether the plaintiff knew or reasonabl[y] should have known that an injury existed.” Lowery, 909 So. 2d at 51 . 2006PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, 909 So.2d 47, 50 (Miss.2005). | 1 | 2 |
Collins v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 , Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918, 926 (Miss.), reh'g denied 693 So.2d 384 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 198 , 139 L.Ed.2d 135 ,(1997); Davis, 660 So.2d at 1242 . ¶ 14. 1996Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, Collins v. State, 691 So. 2d 918, 926 (Miss.), reh'g denied 693 So. 2d 384 , cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 198 ,(1997); Davis, 660 So. 2d at 1242 . ¶14. | 1 | 2 |
Howard Industries, Inc. v. Robbinsgreen1 sentence2023Further, in Meridian Professional Baseball Club v. Jensen, 828 So. 2d 740, 747 (¶21) (Miss. 2002), the supreme court held that “where a permanent partial disability renders a worker unable to continue in the position held at the time of injury, we hold that such inability creates a rebuttable presumption of total occupational loss of the member, subject to other proof of the claimant’s ability to earn the same wages which the claimant was receiving at the time of injury.” “Under Jensen, determining industrial loss is a fact-intensive inquiry, which must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Howard | 1 | 1 |
Nash v. Damson Oil Corp.green1 sentence2022(Citing Nash v. Damson Oil Corp., 480 So. 2d 1095, 1100 (Miss. 1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Bright v. Michelgreen2 sentences2015We’ll figure it out.” Although the chancellor noted that the Haases believed the house was sitting on the Elchoses’ property, and he found that the Haases, did not discover the problem until 2007, whether estoppel applies, should not hinge on whether the Haases knew, 10 but on a fact-intensive analysis that determines whether the Haases had “sufficient notice or .means of knowledge.” Bright, 137 So.2d at 159 (emphasis added). ¶ 85. ’Since the application of equitable estoppel is a fact-intensive analysis, Í would further hold that the trial court is better équipped to make the' determination. 2015We’ll figure it out.” Although the chancellor noted that the Haases believed the house was sitting on the Elchoses’ property, and he found that the Haases did not discover the problem until 2007, whether estoppel applies should not hinge on whether the Haases 42 knew,10 but on a fact-intensive analysis that determines whether the Haases had “sufficient notice or means of knowledge.” Bright, 137 So. 2d at 159 (emphasis added). ¶85. | 1 | 1 |
Summerlin v. Bowdengreen1 sentence2001Id. at 844, quoting Summerlin v. Bowden, 353 So.2d 1175, 1179 (Ala.Civ.App.1978). ¶ 28. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vrettos v. Rezza
green
2 sentences1998Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 , Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918, 926 (Miss.), reh'g denied 693 So.2d 384 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 198 , 139 L.Ed.2d 135 ,(1997); Davis, 660 So.2d at 1242 . ¶ 14. 1996Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, Collins v. State, 691 So. 2d 918, 926 (Miss.), reh'g denied 693 So. 2d 384 , cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 198 ,(1997); Davis, 660 So. 2d at 1242 . ¶14. | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences1998Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 , Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918, 926 (Miss.), reh'g denied 693 So.2d 384 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 198 , 139 L.Ed.2d 135 ,(1997); Davis, 660 So.2d at 1242 . ¶ 14. 1998Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 , Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918, 926 (Miss.), reh'g denied 693 So.2d 384 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 198 , 139 L.Ed.2d 135 ,(1997); Davis, 660 So.2d at 1242 . ¶ 14. | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences1998Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 , Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918, 926 (Miss.), reh'g denied 693 So.2d 384 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 198 , 139 L.Ed.2d 135 ,(1997); Davis, 660 So.2d at 1242 . ¶ 14. 1996Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, Collins v. State, 691 So. 2d 918, 926 (Miss.), reh'g denied 693 So. 2d 384 , cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 198 ,(1997); Davis, 660 So. 2d at 1242 . ¶14. | 2 | 1996–1998 |
City of Laurel v. Guy
green
1 sentence2023Ct. App. 2015) (citing Jensen, 828 So. 2d at 747 (¶20)). “[W]hen the industrial loss is greater than the medical loss, the claimant’s industrial or occupational disability or loss of wage-earning capacity controls his degree of disability.” [City of Laurel v. Guy, 58 So. 3d 1223, 1226 ] (¶14) [(Miss. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Odom v. State
green
1 sentence2022“Understandably, such a fact intensive inquiry results in a very deferential standard of review, at least with respect to the question of whether each discrete part of Odom is satisfied, thus giving rise to presumptive prejudice.” Id. (citing Lewis v. State, 580 So. 2d 1279, 1283 (Miss. 1991)). ¶23. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corporation
green
2 sentences2019Wicker defined specific situations requiring a fact-intensive inquiry: “[w]here a specific known risk or malady is not mentioned in the release, it would seem difficult for the employer to show it was known to the employee and that he or she intended to release liability for it[,]” and “where a release merely details a laundry list of diseases or hazards, the employee may attack that release as boiler plate [sic], not reflecting his or her intent.” Id. 2019Wicker defined specific situations requiring a fact-intensive inquiry: "[w]here a specific known risk or malady is not mentioned in the release, it would seem difficult for the employer to show it was known to the employee and that he or she intended to release liability for it[,]" and "where a release merely details a laundry list of diseases or hazards, the employee may attack that release as boiler plate [sic], not reflecting his or her intent." Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Miller-El v. Dretke
green
1 sentence2017The United States Supreme Court has found that in reviewing the use of peremptory strikes, the strikes must be considered as a whole, reiterating in Snyder that: In Miller–El v. Dretke, the Court made it clear that in considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted. 545 U.S. at 239, 125 S. Ct. 2317 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wells v. State
green
2 sentences2015Ed. 2d 101 (1972), adopted by this Court in Wells v. State, 288 So. 2d 860 (Miss. 1974): (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 2015A claim that the State has violated the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial requires a fact-intensive analysis of the four-factor balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), adopted by this Court in Wells v. State, 288 So.2d 860 (Miss.1974): (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.