fact-intensive inquiry in Michigan

2019Id., quoting Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 506 ; 103 S Ct 1319 ; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983).

2016“Reasonableness is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances” and “is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not lend itself to resolution through the application of bright-line rules.” Id.

2019Id., quoting Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 506 ; 103 S Ct 1319 ; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983).

2019Id., quoting Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 506 ; 103 S Ct 1319 ; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983).

2026Kitchen, 465 Mich at 662 .

2025Under the test set forth in Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679 , 682-684 & n 2; 677 NW2d 843 (2004), collateral estoppel is a fact-intensive inquiry involving several essentially equitable considerations.

2025Under the test set forth in Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679 , 682-684 & n 2; 677 NW2d 843 (2004), collateral estoppel is a fact-intensive inquiry involving several essentially equitable considerations.

2024Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 605 ; 766 NW2d 903 (2009).

2024Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 605 ; 766 NW2d 903 (2009).

2022“A warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States.” People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 362 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975).

2022“A warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States.” People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 362 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975).

2020As illustrated in this Court’s caselaw, determining the applicability of an amended ordinance is a fact-intensive inquiry that involves weighing numerous factors and considerations: In Klyman, [ 40 Mich App at 279 ], this Court identified several factors to be considered when exercising discretion to admit or deny evidence of an amended ordinance: (a) whether the plaintiff had an unquestionable right to issuance of a permit before the amendment, (b) whether the municipality had not forbidden the type of construction the plaintiff proposed before the amendment, (c) whether the ordinance was ame

2020Similarly, in [Rodney Lockwood & Co v Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211 ; 286 NW2d 87 (1979)], this Court reiterated the general rule that the law to be applied is that in effect at the time of the zoning decision, subject to the exception that a court will not apply an amendment of a zoning ordinance if the amendment was “enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs’ suit.” The Court noted that, in the case before it, there was evidence indicating that the amendment was intended to clarify an ambiguous ordinance and that the amendment did not apply only to the plaintiffs’ p

2020Similarly, in [Rodney Lockwood & Co v Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211 ; 286 NW2d 87 (1979)], this Court reiterated the general rule that the law to be applied is that in effect at the time of the zoning decision, subject to the exception that a court will not apply an amendment of a zoning ordinance if the amendment was “enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs’ suit.” The Court noted that, in the case before it, there was evidence indicating that the amendment was intended to clarify an ambiguous ordinance and that the amendment did not apply only to the plaintiffs’ p

2020Similarly, in [Rodney Lockwood & Co v Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211 ; 286 NW2d 87 (1979)], this Court reiterated the general rule that the law to be applied is that in effect at the time of the zoning decision, subject to the exception that a court will not apply an amendment of a zoning ordinance if the amendment was “enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs’ suit.” The Court noted that, in the case before it, there was evidence indicating that the amendment was intended to clarify an ambiguous ordinance and that the amendment did not apply only to the plaintiffs’ p

2020Similarly, in [Rodney Lockwood & Co v Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211 ; 286 NW2d 87 (1979)], this Court reiterated the general rule that the law to be applied is that in effect at the time of the zoning decision, subject to the exception that a court will not apply an amendment of a zoning ordinance if the amendment was “enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs’ suit.” The Court noted that, in the case before it, there was evidence indicating that the amendment was intended to clarify an ambiguous ordinance and that the amendment did not apply only to the plaintiffs’ p

2016“Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is brief.” People v Williams, 236 Mich App 610 , 612 n 1; 601 NW2d 138 (1999).

2016“Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is brief.” People v Williams, 236 Mich App 610 , 612 n 1; 601 NW2d 138 (1999).

2015“Generally, searches or seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional.” People v Barbarich, 291 Mich App 468, 472 ; 807 NW2d 56 (2011).

2015“Generally, searches or seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional.” People v Barbarich, 291 Mich App 468, 472 ; 807 NW2d 56 (2011).

2011Although it may be difficult to determine what amount of noneconomic damages would justly compensate plaintiff, and an award of $100,000 may seem high in comparison to some other awards in cases involving property damage, “[t]he law does not provide any exact standard or yardstick for measuring damages of this type.” Howard v Burton, 338 Mich 178, 186 ; 61 NW2d 77 (1953).

2011Although it may be difficult to determine what amount of noneconomic damages would justly compensate plaintiff, and an award of $100,000 may seem high in comparison to some other awards in cases involving property damage, “[t]he law does not provide any exact standard or yardstick for measuring damages of this type.” Howard v Burton, 338 Mich 178, 186 ; 61 NW2d 77 (1953).

2008For instance, in Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 133-134 ; 683 NW2d 611 (2004), the majority accepted a similarly subjective list of court-made, nonexclusive factors as giving acceptable guidance to a similar fact-intensive analysis.

2008For instance, in Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 133-134 ; 683 NW2d 611 (2004), the majority accepted a similarly subjective list of court-made, nonexclusive factors as giving acceptable guidance to a similar fact-intensive analysis.