fact-intensive inquiry in Ohio

2024Summit No. 29273, 2020-Ohio-473, ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Ray Rogers, 9th Dist.

2024Summit No. 29273, 2020-Ohio-473, ¶ 19 .

2008See id.; State v. Gumm , 73 Ohio St.3d 413 , 429 , 1995-Ohio-24 .

2008See Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420 , 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 ; State v. Gumm , 73 Ohio St.3d 413 , 429 , 1995-Ohio-24 .

2008See id.; State v. Gumm , 73 Ohio St.3d 413 , 429 , 1995-Ohio-24 .

2008See Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420 , 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 ; State v. Gumm , 73 Ohio St.3d 413 , 429 , 1995-Ohio-24 .

2025Id. at ¶ 39, quoting State v. Maxwell, 2014-Ohio-1019, ¶ 148 . {¶31} To aid this inquiry, courts consider three factors: “(1) Did the accused and victim know each other, and if so, was that relationship strained? (2) Did the accused give thought or preparation to choosing the murder weapon or murder site? and (3) Was the act drawn out or ‘an almost instantaneous eruption of events’?” State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15 , 19 (1997), quoting State v. Jenkins, 48 Ohio App.2d 99, 102 (8th Dist. 1976).

2025Id. at ¶ 39, quoting State v. Maxwell, 2014-Ohio-1019, ¶ 148 . {¶31} To aid this inquiry, courts consider three factors: “(1) Did the accused and victim know each other, and if so, was that relationship strained? (2) Did the accused give thought or preparation to choosing the murder weapon or murder site? and (3) Was the act drawn out or ‘an almost instantaneous eruption of events’?” State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15 , 19 (1997), quoting State v. Jenkins, 48 Ohio App.2d 99, 102 (8th Dist. 1976).

2023Building upon that, R.C. 2929.11(B) states that a felony sentence should be “consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” This Court has observed that “ ‘ “[a] consistency-in-sentencing determination * * * is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not lend itself to being initially reviewed at the appellate level.” ’ ” State v. Taylor, 2017-Ohio-4395 , 9 N.E.3d 1 , ¶ 29 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Adams, 2016-Ohio- 7772, 84 N.E.3d 155 , ¶ 46 (4th Dist.), in turn quoting State v. Montanez-Roldon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103509, 2016-Ohio-3062, ¶ 14 .

2022Medina No. 06CA0018-M, 2006-Ohio-6911, ¶ 13 . {¶9} The question of whether an officer had probable cause to arrest a defendant “is a fact-intensive inquiry * * *.” State v. Davis, 9th Dist.

2020State v. Martucci, 9th Dist. No. 28888, 2018-Ohio-3471, ¶ 10 , citing State v. Lerch, 9th Dist. No. 26684, 2013-Ohio-5305, ¶ 8 ; Benson, 11th Dist. No. 2018-A-0054, 2019-Ohio-3234, at ¶ 38 .

2020State v. Martucci, 9th Dist. No. 28888, 2018-Ohio-3471, ¶ 10 , citing State v. Lerch, 9th Dist. No. 26684, 2013-Ohio-5305, ¶ 8 ; Benson, 11th Dist. No. 2018-A-0054, 2019-Ohio-3234, at ¶ 38 .

2020State v. Martucci, 9th Dist. No. 28888, 2018-Ohio-3471, ¶ 10 , citing State v. Lerch, 9th Dist. No. 26684, 2013-Ohio-5305, ¶ 8 ; Benson, 11th Dist. No. 2018-A-0054, 2019-Ohio-3234, at ¶ 38 .

2018Union No. 14-15-27, 2016-Ohio-1293, ¶ 7 . {¶ 25} As a further matter, “ ‘[a] consistency-in-sentencing determination * * * is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not lend itself to being initially reviewed at the appellate level.’ ” State v. Adams, 2016-Ohio-7772 , 84 N.E.3d, 155 , ¶ 46 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Montanez–Roldon, 8th Dist.

2018Lorain No. 16CA011024, 2017-Ohio-4348, ¶ 17-18 . {¶10} Whether a suspect has been subjected to custodial interrogation for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda is a fact-intensive inquiry.

2017As courts have long concluded, a 'defendant must raise [the consistency-in-sentencing] issue before the trial court and present some evidence, however minimal, in order to provide a starting point for analysis and to preserve the issue for appeal.' (Emphasis added.) State v. Spock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99950, 2014-Ohio-606 [ 2014 WL 688793 ], ¶ 37, citing State v. Lang, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92099, 2010-Ohio-433 [ 2010 WL 457140 ] ; State v. Picha, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102506, 2015-Ohio-4380 [ 2015 WL 6392638 ], ¶ 9.

2017No. 5D08-3196, 24 So.3d 671 (“It is clear * * * that the ‘nature of the charge’ is determinative of whether there exists a reasonable basis to search for evidence, not whether there is some independent evidence that gives rise to a belief that the particular vehicle contains evidence.”). {¶76} Notably, the “additional step” or additional evidence that the Taylor and Reagan courts would require before permitting a lawful “search incident to arrest” for OVI could often supply its own, independent basis for a search of a vehicle, which would seem to undermine the necessity for a search incident t

2007Thus, serious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case. . . . {¶ 17} "A non-exhaustive litany of some examples of serious emotional distress should include traumatically induced neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia." Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72 , 78 , 451 N.E.2d 759 , citations omitted. {¶ 18} The determination of the seriousness of an emotional injury often involves a very fact-intensive inquiry.

2007Thus, serious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case. . . . {¶ 17} "A non-exhaustive litany of some examples of serious emotional distress should include traumatically induced neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia." Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72 , 78 , 451 N.E.2d 759 , citations omitted. {¶ 18} The determination of the seriousness of an emotional injury often involves a very fact-intensive inquiry.

2005Olivier, 2005-Ohio-1910 , 2005 WL 937928 , at ¶ 31.

2000In Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75 , 514 N.E.2d 1122 , the court reiterated its earlier pronouncement in Colley v. Bazell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 243 , 416 N.E.2d 605 , that whether neglect-which Dostie's counsel concedes-is excusable involves a fact intensive inquiry which "must of necessity take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances." Griffey , at 79, 514 N.E.2d at 1126 .

2000In Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75 , 514 N.E.2d 1122 , the court reiterated its earlier pronouncement in Colley v. Bazell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 243 , 416 N.E.2d 605 , that whether neglect-which Dostie's counsel concedes-is excusable involves a fact intensive inquiry which "must of necessity take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances." Griffey , at 79, 514 N.E.2d at 1126 .

2000Although stating a preference for decisions on the merits rather than upon procedural grounds, the court stated its "refus[al] to let Civ.R. 60(B) serve as an emasculation of the pleading rules and time limits." Id.