fact-intensive inquiry in New Mexico

2014See Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014 , ¶¶ 1, 3, 11 (holding that “[f]oreseeability is a fact-intensive inquiry relevant only to breach of duty and legal cause considerations. . . . not [to] whether a duty exists” and overruling prior cases insofar as they conflict with the appropriate duty analysis).

2014See Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014 , ¶¶ 1, 3, 11 (holding that “[fjoreseeability is a fact-in tensive inquiry relevant only to breach of duty and legal cause considerations.... not [to] whether a duty exists” and overruling prior cases insofar as they conflict with the appropriate duty analysis).

2011The Rules of Evidence permit admission 9 of 10 A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the 11 declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject 12 the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by 13 the declarant against another that a reasonable person in the declarant's 14 position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be 15 true. 16 Rule 11-804(B)(3). “[T]he analysis regarding statements against penal interests 17 involves a fact-intensive inquiry that can only be answered in light of all the

1999We concluded in Toms that, “Because the analysis regarding statements against penal interests involves a fact-intensive inquiry that ‘can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances,’ ... we see nothing sufficiently unique about Rule 11-804(B)(3) to convince us to depart from the deferential standard of review applicable to other exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 604 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ); accord State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 5 , 128 N.M. 44 , 989 P.2d 419 (utilizing an abuse of discretion standard when considering the admission of

2023“We have continually used a fact-based, case-by-case approach to determine . . . whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of his or her search or seizure during an investigatory stop.” State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011- NMSC-009, 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 ; see also Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 54 (“[O]ur cases construing Article II, Section 10 have persisted in rejecting bright-line rules.”). {5} The State argues that the smell of marijuana coming from the car and later from Defendant prov

2023“We have continually used a fact-based, case-by-case approach to determine . . . whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of his or her search or seizure during an investigatory stop.” State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011- NMSC-009, 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 ; see also Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 54 (“[O]ur cases construing Article II, Section 10 have persisted in rejecting bright-line rules.”). {5} The State argues that the smell of marijuana coming from the car and later from Defendant prov

2023See Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 35 (explaining that “[t]he particular facts of each stop and the intrusiveness of the questioning will dictate what questions are reasonable or unreasonable”); State v. Guzman, 1994-NMCA-088 , ¶ 7, 118 N.M. 113 , 879 P.2d 114 (“The determination of whether reasonable suspicion justifies a detention depends both on the probativeness of the articulable suspicious circumstances and the extent of the intrusion.”); see, e.g., State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 14-16 , 138 N.M. 408 , 120 P.3d 830 (explaining that, under the circumstances, “the officer had a right to inv

2023See Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 35 (explaining that “[t]he particular facts of each stop and the intrusiveness of the questioning will dictate what questions are reasonable or unreasonable”); State v. Guzman, 1994-NMCA-088 , ¶ 7, 118 N.M. 113 , 879 P.2d 114 (“The determination of whether reasonable suspicion justifies a detention depends both on the probativeness of the articulable suspicious circumstances and the extent of the intrusion.”); see, e.g., State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 14-16 , 138 N.M. 408 , 120 P.3d 830 (explaining that, under the circumstances, “the officer had a right to inv

2023“We have continually used a fact-based, case-by-case approach to determine . . . whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of his or her search or seizure during an investigatory stop.” State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011- NMSC-009, 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 ; see also Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 54 (“[O]ur cases construing Article II, Section 10 have persisted in rejecting bright-line rules.”). {5} The State argues that the smell of marijuana coming from the car and later from Defendant prov

2023“We have continually used a fact-based, case-by-case approach to determine . . . whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of his or her search or seizure during an investigatory stop.” State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011- NMSC-009, 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 ; see also Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 54 (“[O]ur cases construing Article II, Section 10 have persisted in rejecting bright-line rules.”). {5} The State argues that the smell of marijuana coming from the car and later from Defendant prov

2023See Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 35 (explaining that “[t]he particular facts of each stop and the intrusiveness of the questioning will dictate what questions are reasonable or unreasonable”); State v. Guzman, 1994-NMCA-088 , ¶ 7, 118 N.M. 113 , 879 P.2d 114 (“The determination of whether reasonable suspicion justifies a detention depends both on the probativeness of the articulable suspicious circumstances and the extent of the intrusion.”); see, e.g., State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 14-16 , 138 N.M. 408 , 120 P.3d 830 (explaining that, under the circumstances, “the officer had a right to inv

2019See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 1987-NMCA-133 , ¶ 20, 106 N.M. 492 , 745 P.2d 717 (“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the [district] court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.”); see also Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA- 095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853 , 215 P.3d 791 (stating the primary purposes for the preservation rule as “(1) to specifically matter of settled law that the settlement agreements are public records subject to IPRA and instead poses a fact intensive inquiry ill-suited for resolu

2019See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 1987-NMCA-133 , ¶ 20, 106 N.M. 492 , 745 P.2d 717 (“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the [district] court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.”); see also Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA- 095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853 , 215 P.3d 791 (stating the primary purposes for the preservation rule as “(1) to specifically matter of settled law that the settlement agreements are public records subject to IPRA and instead poses a fact intensive inquiry ill-suited for resolu

2019See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 1987-NMCA-133 , ¶ 20, 106 N.M. 492 , 745 P.2d 717 (“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the [district] court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.”); see also Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA- 095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853 , 215 P.3d 791 (stating the primary purposes for the preservation rule as “(1) to specifically matter of settled law that the settlement agreements are public records subject to IPRA and instead poses a fact intensive inquiry ill-suited for resolu

2019See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 1987-NMCA-133 , ¶ 20, 106 N.M. 492 , 745 P.2d 717 (“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the [district] court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.”); see also Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA- 095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853 , 215 P.3d 791 (stating the primary purposes for the preservation rule as “(1) to specifically matter of settled law that the settlement agreements are public records subject to IPRA and instead poses a fact intensive inquiry ill-suited for resolu

2019See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984- NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764 , 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that when a party fails to cite authority for an argument, we may assume none exists).

2019See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984- NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764 , 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that when a party fails to cite authority for an argument, we may assume none exists).

2017See State v. Porras-Fuerte, 1994-NMCA-141 , 17 ¶ 10, 119 N.M. 180 , 889 P.2d 215 .

2017See State v. Porras-Fuerte, 1994-NMCA-141 , 17 ¶ 10, 119 N.M. 180 , 889 P.2d 215 .

1999We concluded in Toms that, “Because the analysis regarding statements against penal interests involves a fact-intensive inquiry that ‘can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances,’ ... we see nothing sufficiently unique about Rule 11-804(B)(3) to convince us to depart from the deferential standard of review applicable to other exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 604 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ); accord State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 5 , 128 N.M. 44 , 989 P.2d 419 (utilizing an abuse of discretion standard when considering the admission of

1999We concluded in Toms that, “Because the analysis regarding statements against penal interests involves a fact-intensive inquiry that ‘can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances,’ ... we see nothing sufficiently unique about Rule 11-804(B)(3) to convince us to depart from the deferential standard of review applicable to other exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 604 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ); accord State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 5 , 128 N.M. 44 , 989 P.2d 419 (utilizing an abuse of discretion standard when considering the admission of

1998See State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144 , 870 P.2d 103, 106 (1994) ("`If the concerns of judicial administration—efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight— make it more appropriate for a district judge to determine whether the established facts fall within the relevant legal definition, we should subject his [or her] determination to deferential, clearly erroneous review.'" (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.1984))).

1998See State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144 , 870 P.2d 103, 106 (1994) ("`If the concerns of judicial administration—efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight— make it more appropriate for a district judge to determine whether the established facts fall within the relevant legal definition, we should subject his [or her] determination to deferential, clearly erroneous review.'" (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.1984))).

1998See State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144 , 870 P.2d 103, 106 (1994) ("`If the concerns of judicial administration—efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight— make it more appropriate for a district judge to determine whether the established facts fall within the relevant legal definition, we should subject his [or her] determination to deferential, clearly erroneous review.'" (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.1984))).

1998See State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144 , 870 P.2d 103, 106 (1994) (“ ‘If the concerns of judicial administration — efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight— make it more appropriate for a district judge to determine whether the established facts fall within the relevant legal definition, we should subject his [or her] determination to deferential, clearly erroneous review.’ ” (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.1984))).