fact-intensive inquiry in Tennessee

2022“The best interest analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry, and each case is unique.” In re Kenneth D., No. M2021-00214-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 556739 , at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2022) (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).

2018When all the factors are evaluated in conjunction with the testimony, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the minor children. - 19 - “[A]scertaining a child’s best interests in a termination proceeding is a fact- intensive inquiry requiring the courts to weigh the evidence regarding the statutory factors, as well as any other relevant factors.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (footnote omitted); see also White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

2014The best interest analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry requiring the court to consider the unique facts of the case “from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 523 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

2013The best interest analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry requiring the court to consider the unique facts of the case “from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 523 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

2024Therefore, she has waived the argument that her failure to visit and failure to pay support was not willful[.] (Paragraph numbering omitted.) Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(C) defines “token visitation” as visitation, under the circumstances of the individual case, [that] constitutes nothing more than perfunctory visitation or visitation of such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the child. 9 As this Court has explained, “[w]hether a parent’s visitation is ‘token’ requires a fact- intensive inquiry to be determine

2024And, importantly, whether visitation is “token” under section 36-1-102(1)(C) “is a fact-intensive inquiry to be decided on a case-by-case basis.” In re Keri C., 384 S.W.3d 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).

2018The best interest analysis is “a fact-intensive inquiry” requiring the court to consider the unique facts of the case “from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” Id. (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194 ).

2018When all the factors are evaluated in conjunction with the testimony, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the minor children. - 19 - “[A]scertaining a child’s best interests in a termination proceeding is a fact- intensive inquiry requiring the courts to weigh the evidence regarding the statutory factors, as well as any other relevant factors.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (footnote omitted); see also White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

2016The Pollard court concluded that “because the considerations required under Wilkerson involve a fact-intensive inquiry . . . the better course is to remand to the trial court for consideration of the Wilkerson requirements in determining the propriety of consecutive sentencing.” Id. at 864 .

2014The Pollard court concluded that “because the considerations required under Wilkerson involve a fact-intensive inquiry . . . the better course is to remand to the trial court for consideration of the Wilkerson requirements in determining the propriety of consecutive sentencing.” Id. at 864 .

2026See Fannon v. City of LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418, 432 (Tenn. 2010) (recognizing that the “prevailing party” determination is a fact-intensive inquiry).

2026Fannon v. City of LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418, 432 (Tenn. 2010).

2021See Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692 (“A trial court’s determinations of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and whether modification of a parenting plan serves a child’s best interests are factual questions.”).

2014Other Modifications to Parenting Plan Decisions concerning the details of parenting plans require a fact-intensive inquiry and “consideration of numerous factors.” See, e.g., Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 .

2026Id. at 454-55 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2025Notably, “marital debts are subject to equitable division in the same manner as marital property.” Alford v. Alford, 120 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tenn. 2003).

2020It found that she had “come nowhere near close to doing [her] part to maintain contact or a relationship with the children.” On appeal, Mother argues that two visits during the relevant four-month period should not be deemed token visitation. - 11 - “‘Whether visitation is ‘token’ . . . is a fact-intensive inquiry to be decided on a case-by- case basis.’” In re Ellie K., No. M2019-01269-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 1943522 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2020) (quoting In re Keri C., 384 S.W.3d 731, 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010)). “[T]his Court has never imposed a bright-line rule as to what percentage of

2018See, e.g., Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that this Court must determine whether the overall property distribution is equitable rather than focusing on one asset).

2016Here, the trial court‟s order demonstrates the delicate balance of the facts surrounding the children‟s best interest in maintaining a relationship with Appellants through “occasional, temporary visitation” and the avoidance of a substantial “infringe[ment] on [Mother and Father‟s12] fundamental right to „control the upbringing . . . of their children.‟” See Hoeing v. Williams, 880 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App.2008) (quoting Swartz v. Swartz, 720 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).

2016See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (omitting any provision discussing factors, other than reasonableness, to guide the trial court in determining the amount of visitation to order); see also In re Visitation of L-A.D.W., 38 N.E.3d 993, 999 (opining that the nature of grandparent visitation cases coupled with the abuse of discretion standard of review necessitates a fact-intensive analysis); Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 2012) (noting that grandparent visitation cases are “fact-intensive inquiries”).

2016See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (omitting any provision discussing factors, other than reasonableness, to guide the trial court in determining the amount of visitation to order); see also In re Visitation of L-A.D.W., 38 N.E.3d 993, 999 (opining that the nature of grandparent visitation cases coupled with the abuse of discretion standard of review necessitates a fact-intensive analysis); Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 2012) (noting that grandparent visitation cases are “fact-intensive inquiries”).

2016Here, the trial court‟s order demonstrates the delicate balance of the facts surrounding the children‟s best interest in maintaining a relationship with Appellants through “occasional, temporary visitation” and the avoidance of a substantial “infringe[ment] on [Mother and Father‟s12] fundamental right to „control the upbringing . . . of their children.‟” See Hoeing v. Williams, 880 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App.2008) (quoting Swartz v. Swartz, 720 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).

2016Telfer v. Telfer, No. M2012-00691-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 3379370 , at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013) (citing Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tenn. 2009)).

2016See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (omitting any provision discussing factors, other than reasonableness, to guide the trial court in determining the amount of visitation to order); see also In re Visitation of L-A.D.W., 38 N.E.3d 993, 999 (opining that the nature of grandparent visitation cases coupled with the abuse of discretion standard of review necessitates a fact-intensive analysis); Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 2012) (noting that grandparent visitation cases are “fact-intensive inquiries”).

2016See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (omitting any provision discussing factors, other than reasonableness, to guide the trial court in determining the amount of visitation to order); see also In re Visitation of L-A.D.W., 38 N.E.3d 993, 999 (opining that the nature of grandparent visitation cases coupled with the abuse of discretion standard of review necessitates a fact-intensive analysis); Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 2012) (noting that grandparent visitation cases are “fact-intensive inquiries”).

2015Here, the eleven factors in Allen require a fact-intensive inquiry for each individual case; the necessity for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law cannot be overstated in cases where a party seeks to pierce the corporate veil, as it ―depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.‖ Dog House Investments, LLC v. Teal Props, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 905, 918 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).

2015See Hughes, 340 S.W.3d at 366 (describing the inquiry as not being based upon a ―bright-line rule,‖ but instead as being determined by consideration of several ―fact-intensive‖ factors).

2012State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Tenn. 2003); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

2012State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Tenn. 2003); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

2012State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 757 (Tenn. 2011).

2012SNPCO, Inc., 363 S.W.3d at 475 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012SNPCO, Inc., 363 S.W.3d at 475 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011See id. at 299.