ancient rule in Michigan

1982By so doing, we join a major trend in this country toward the righting of an age-old wrong.” Williams, supra, p 250 .

1976Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 250 ; 111 NW2d 1 (1961).

2022“To permit a defendant with unclean hands to defend on such a ground would contravene the ancient rule that ‘[h]e who hath committed iniquity shall not have equity . . . .’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

2022Notwithstanding the ancient rule that statutes -2- must be strictly construed, “they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.” US v Wiltberger, 18 US 95 Wheat) 76, 95; 5 L Ed 37 (1820) (discussing penal laws).

2022“When a plaintiffs’ action is based, in whole or in part, on its own illegal conduct, a fundamental common-law maxim . . . known as the ‘doctrine of in pari delicto’ generally applies to also bar the plaintiff’s claim.” Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550, 558 ; 537 NW2d 208 (1995).

2022“When a plaintiffs’ action is based, in whole or in part, on its own illegal conduct, a fundamental common-law maxim . . . known as the ‘doctrine of in pari delicto’ generally applies to also bar the plaintiff’s claim.” Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550, 558 ; 537 NW2d 208 (1995).

2010To permit a defendant with unclean hands to defend on such a ground would contravene the ancient rule that “[h]e who hath committed iniquity shall not have equity ....” Society of Good Neighbors, 324 Mich at 28 ; see also McCredie v Buxton, 31 Mich 383, 388 (1875).

2010To permit a defendant with unclean hands to defend on such a ground would contravene the ancient rule that "[h]e who hath committed iniquity shall not have equity...." Society of Good Neighbors, 324 Mich. at 28 , 36 N.W.2d 308 ; see also McCredie v. Buxton, 31 Mich. 383, 388 (1875).

2007We note that following the Lemons decision the CSC II statute was amended to add three other possible intents that would prove a CSC II, namely, an intentional touching "in a sexual manner for revenge, or to inflict humiliation or out of anger." See n. 12 of this opinion. [15] People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152 (1861) (emphasis added). [16] This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-718 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a

2007We note that following the Lemons decision the CSC II statute was amended to add three other possible intents that would prove a CSC II, namely, an intentional touching "in a sexual manner for revenge, or to inflict humiliation or out of anger." See n. 12 of this opinion. [15] People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152 (1861) (emphasis added). [16] This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-718 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a

2007This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s statement in Schmuck v United States, 489 US 705, 717-718 ; 109 S Ct 1443 ; 103 L Ed 2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a charge not contained in the indictment brought against the defendant.

2007This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s statement in Schmuck v United States, 489 US 705, 717-718 ; 109 S Ct 1443 ; 103 L Ed 2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a charge not contained in the indictment brought against the defendant.

2007We note that following the Lemons decision the CSC II statute was amended to add three other possible intents that would prove a CSC II, namely, an intentional touching "in a sexual manner for revenge, or to inflict humiliation or out of anger." See n. 12 of this opinion. [15] People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152 (1861) (emphasis added). [16] This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-718 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a

2007We note that following the Lemons decision the CSC II statute was amended to add three other possible intents that would prove a CSC II, namely, an intentional touching "in a sexual manner for revenge, or to inflict humiliation or out of anger." See n. 12 of this opinion. [15] People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152 (1861) (emphasis added). [16] This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-718 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a

2007We note that following the Lemons decision the CSC II statute was amended to add three other possible intents that would prove a CSC II, namely, an intentional touching "in a sexual manner for revenge, or to inflict humiliation or out of anger." See n. 12 of this opinion. [15] People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152 (1861) (emphasis added). [16] This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-718 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a

2007We note that following the Lemons decision the CSC II statute was amended to add three other possible intents that would prove a CSC II, namely, an intentional touching "in a sexual manner for revenge, or to inflict humiliation or out of anger." See n. 12 of this opinion. [15] People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152 (1861) (emphasis added). [16] This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-718 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a

2007We note that following the Lemons decision the CSC II statute was amended to add three other possible intents that would prove a CSC II, namely, an intentional touching "in a sexual manner for revenge, or to inflict humiliation or out of anger." See n. 12 of this opinion. [15] People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152 (1861) (emphasis added). [16] This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-718 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a

2007We note that following the Lemons decision the CSC II statute was amended to add three other possible intents that would prove a CSC II, namely, an intentional touching "in a sexual manner for revenge, or to inflict humiliation or out of anger." See n. 12 of this opinion. [15] People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152 (1861) (emphasis added). [16] This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-718 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), that it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that a defendant cannot be held to answer a

2004The modern one permits the presumption to be overcome, but only upon proof which is very convincing. [ Id. at 284, 137 N.W. 55 (emphasis added).] By requiring a previous determination that a child is born out of wedlock, the Legislature has essentially limited the scope of parties who can rebut the presumption of legitimacy to those capable of addressing the issue in a prior proceeding-the mother and the legal father. [27] As this *807 Court noted in Girard, paternity claims generally arise during divorce or custody disputes, and the Legislature contemplated "situations where a court in a prio

1976Another exception to the rule excluding the details exists * * * in this State (People v Gage, 62 Mich 271 [ 28 NW 835 ; 4 Am St Rep 854]), where the victim is of tender years.” Defendant’s brief dwells upon the age of the complainant and maintains that "the prosecutrix is not young enough for corroborating details of the alleged statutory rape to be introduced by Mrs. Smith’s hearsay testimony”.

1976Another exception to the rule excluding the details exists * * * in this State (People v Gage, 62 Mich 271 [ 28 NW 835 ; 4 Am St Rep 854]), where the victim is of tender years.” Defendant’s brief dwells upon the age of the complainant and maintains that "the prosecutrix is not young enough for corroborating details of the alleged statutory rape to be introduced by Mrs. Smith’s hearsay testimony”.

1975Both parties agree that the proper outcome depends on the vitality and applicability of an ancient rule of conveyancing law. *442 That rule is succinctly stated in Choals v Plummer, 353 Mich 64, 71 ; 90 NW2d 851 (1958): "An attempted reservation for the benefit of a stranger to the conveyance is ineffective.” Defendants claim that the rule is outmoded, unjust, and has outlived any usefulness.

1975Both parties agree that the proper outcome depends on the vitality and applicability of an ancient rule of conveyancing law. *442 That rule is succinctly stated in Choals v Plummer, 353 Mich 64, 71 ; 90 NW2d 851 (1958): "An attempted reservation for the benefit of a stranger to the conveyance is ineffective.” Defendants claim that the rule is outmoded, unjust, and has outlived any usefulness.

1970Hence, following Davis, supra, is a logical result.

1969In Yanoff v. Yanoff (1927), 237 Mich 383 , the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that Mrs. Yanoff could not testify that she had intercourse with her husband prior to their marriage and that Mr. Yanoff could not testify that there was no premarital connection.

1968The Roth Case changes this to the average person test. 21 Defendants cite to us the case of United States v. West Coast News Co. (WD Mich, 1964), 228 F Supp 171 , affirmed 357 F2d 855, where the court states that generally expert opinion is not admissible on the issue of “prurient appeal”. 22 The prosecution in Klaw was under 18 TJSCA § 1461 for using the government mails in the carriage of obseene materials, and that jury was made up of 12 residents of New York City.