ancient principle (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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ancient principle in Arizona

11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1899–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Sharpgreen
ariz · 1920 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2000–2001
2 sentences

2001It loosely reflects the ancient principle that "the King can do no wrong," and bars holding the state or its political subdivisions liable for the torts of its officers or agents unless the government expressly waives its immunity. [5] As all parties agree, at the time Arizona adopted its constitution, "the state, in consequence of its sovereignty, [was] immune from prosecution in the courts and from liability to respond in damages for negligence, except in those cases where it [had] expressly waived immunity or assumed liability by constitutional or legislative enactment." State v. Sharp, 21

2001It loosely reflects the ancient principle that "the King can do no wrong," and bars holding the state or its political subdivisions liable for the torts of its officers or agents unless the government expressly waives its immunity. [5] As all parties agree, at the time Arizona adopted its constitution, "the state, in consequence of its sovereignty, [was] immune from prosecution in the courts and from liability to respond in damages for negligence, except in those cases where it [had] expressly waived immunity or assumed liability by constitutional or legislative enactment." State v. Sharp, 21

22
Amerco v. Shoengreen
arizctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015A printout of a profile by Forbes magazine listed Husband’s salary for 4 The applicable legal precept here may be summarized by the ancient rule of “sauce for goose.” See AMERCO v. Shoen, 184 Ariz. 150 , 164 n.16, 907 P.2d 536 , 550 n.16 (App. 1995) (“The Oxford English Dictionary 128 (1933) cites Collier 2d Def.

2015A printout of a profile by Forbes magazine listed Husband’s salary for 4 The applicable legal precept here may be summarized by the ancient rule of “sauce for goose.” See AMERCO v. Shoen, 184 Ariz. 150 , 164 n.16, 907 P.2d 536 , 550 n.16 (App. 1995) (“The Oxford English Dictionary 128 (1933) cites Collier 2d Def.

11
cluster 328767green
ca3 · 1975 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
1 sentence

1984This exception to the ancient principle that a party may not immunize himself from the consequences of his own negligence is predicated upon the consideration that businessmen can bargain over which party is to bear the risk of damage and set the price accordingly, thus achieving a more rational distribution of the risk than the law would otherwise allow. [Citations omitted.] The rationale presupposes that the contracting parties have in fact considered the negative costs of insuring against negligent design and manufacture and have incorporated their conclusions into the contract____ Jig the

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission green
ariz · 1963
2 sentences

2001In Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384 , 381 P.2d 107 (1963), convinced that the doctrine had become unjust and outmoded and that its application created many inequities, this court abolished the substantive defense of governmental immunity.

2001In Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384 , 381 P.2d 107 (1963), convinced that the doctrine had become unjust and outmoded and that its application created many inequities, this court abolished the substantive defense of governmental immunity.

22000–2001
Dean v. Dickey neutral
texapp · 1949
2 sentences

1972There can be no doubt that it owes its origin to the fact that a successful counterfeit of another's handwriting is exceedingly difficult, and that therefore the requirement that it should be in the testator's handwriting would afford protection against *181 a forgery of this character.'" 225 S.W.2d at 1000 .

1972There can be no doubt that it owes its origin to the fact that a successful counterfeit of another’s handwriting is exceedingly difficult, and that therefore the requirement that it should be in the testator’s handwriting would afford protection against a forgery of this character.’ ” 225 S.W. 2d at 1000 .

21972–1972
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. green
ariz · 1984
1 sentence

1997Id. (quoting Jig the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins..

11997–1997
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois green
· 1892
2 sentences

1992R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 , 13 S.Ct. 110 , 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892).

1992R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 , 13 S.Ct. 110 , 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892).

11992–1992
Galas v. United States green
scotus · 1976
1 sentence

1984This exception to the ancient principle that a party may not immunize himself from the consequences of his own negligence is predicated upon the consideration that businessmen can bargain over which party is to bear the risk of damage and set the price accordingly, thus achieving a more rational distribution of the risk than the law would otherwise allow. [Citations omitted.] The rationale presupposes that the contracting parties have in fact considered the negative costs of insuring against negligent design and manufacture and have incorporated their conclusions into the contract____ Jig the

11984–1984
Whitt v. Vauthier green
scotus · 1976
1 sentence

1984This exception to the ancient principle that a party may not immunize himself from the consequences of his own negligence is predicated upon the consideration that businessmen can bargain over which party is to bear the risk of damage and set the price accordingly, thus achieving a more rational distribution of the risk than the law would otherwise allow. [Citations omitted.] The rationale presupposes that the contracting parties have in fact considered the negative costs of insuring against negligent design and manufacture and have incorporated their conclusions into the contract____ Jig the

11984–1984
Perkins v. Manning neutral
ariz · 1942
2 sentences

1964The proper proceeding is, by mandamus, to compel the common council to order a special election to fill such vacancy, and not by quo warranto to try the title to such office, such representative being neither a de facto nor de jure officer.” (Emphasis in original.) The objections of plaintiffs to the City Manager — City Engineer combination are based on this ancient doctrine of incompatible offices, which was recognized in Arizona in Perkins v. Manning, 59 Ariz. 60 , 122 P. 2d 857 (1942).

1964The proper proceeding is, by mandamus, to compel the common council to order a special election to fill such vacancy, and not by quo warranto to try the title to such office, such representative being neither a de facto nor de jure officer.” (Emphasis in original.) The objections of plaintiffs to the City Manager — City Engineer combination are based on this ancient doctrine of incompatible offices, which was recognized in Arizona in Perkins v. Manning, 59 Ariz. 60 , 122 P. 2d 857 (1942).

11964–1964
Rowell v. . Janvrin green
ny · 1896
1 sentence

1919In Rowell v. Janvrin, 151 N. Y. 60 , on page 66, 45 N. E. 398 , 400, the court said: “In stating a cause of action arising upon a statute, it is an ancient rule that, where an exception is incorporated in the body of the clause of a statute, he who pleads the clause ought to plead the exception.

11919–1919
Beard v. United States green
scotus · 1895
1 sentence

1899In the case of Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 550 , 15 Sup. Ct. 962, the supreme court reviewed at length the cases bearing upon this point, and quoted with approval the summing up of the principle of the right of one to stand his own ground and defend himself when attacked, as made by Rice on Evidence (sec. 360), which is as follows: “A very brief examination of the American authorities makes it evident that the ancient doctrine as to the duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can, before lie is justified in repelling force by force, has been greatly modified in this country, an

11899–1899

Where else courts name it

NY 121 (1841–2024) CA 42 (1895–2024) KY 41 (1909–2022) MD 35 (1850–2021) PA 34 (1918–2023) IL 31 (1882–2019) TX 30 (1877–2023) NJ 29 (1939–2025) NC 27 (1879–2017) MO 27 (1877–2016) MA 26 (1848–2018) AL 24 (1875–2016) GA 23 (1900–2012) VA 22 (1888–2025) IN 22 (1857–1990) MI 21 (1919–2022) CT 20 (1830–2009) OK 18 (1897–2024) WV 17 (1898–2022) NE 17 (1899–2021) FL 16 (1933–2016) WI 16 (1893–2008) WA 16 (1906–2021) MT 14 (1922–2018) OR 14 (1872–2017) KS 12 (1906–2022) WY 11 (1931–2004) AZ 11 (1899–2015) SD 11 (1944–2021) IA 11 (1906–2018) SC 10 (1923–2024) MS 10 (1934–2010) CO 9 (1913–1980) ME 9 (1952–2014) NV 9 (1922–2018) OH 8 (1841–2013) DE 8 (1916–2021) MN 6 (1890–2001) VT 6 (1856–1994) TN 6 (1928–2019) NH 5 (1849–2016) LA 5 (1916–1998) AR 5 (1919–1996) NM 4 (1926–2004) ID 4 (1966–2026) HI 4 (1913–2015) UT 4 (1999–2015) DC 4 (1989–2015) RI 4 (1997–2012) ND 2 (1968–1985)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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