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34 Pennsylvania opinions name it 9 courts 1918–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisvillegreen2 sentences1958While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-sonam no longer applies to tangibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels; *329 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 1940While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam no longer applies to tan *18 gibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located, (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, 5 because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels: Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 24 | 2 | 2 |
Blodgett v. Silbermangreen2 sentences1958While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-sonam no longer applies to tangibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels; *329 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 1940While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam no longer applies to tan *18 gibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located, (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, 5 because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels: Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 24 | 2 | 2 |
Curry v. McCanlessgreen2 sentences1958While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-sonam no longer applies to tangibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels; *329 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 1958While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-sonam no longer applies to tangibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels; *329 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Teagardengreen2 sentences2019Therefore, she has waived any claim that her prosecution is barred under Section 110(2).9 Nevertheless, even if we were to find Porter did not waive this claim, we would conclude no relief is warranted.10 “Section 110(2) codifies the ancient doctrine of collateral estoppel[,]” and precludes the “relitigation between parties of an issue where that issue has been previously decided by a competent legal forum.” Commonwealth v. Teagarden, 696 A.2d 169, 171 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 702 A.2d 1060 (Pa. 1997). 1999Teagarden, 696 A.2d at 171 . | 1 | 2 |
King Estategreen2 sentences1966In King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127 (1956), Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Bell said: “Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt ex pressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436— that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 582 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . 1958In King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127 , 126 A. 2d 463 (1956), the Supreme Court said: "Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 — that he is the owner of such furniture. | 1 | 2 |
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1958While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-sonam no longer applies to tangibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels; *329 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 1958While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-sonam no longer applies to tangibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels; *329 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 | 1 | 2 |
Frick Et Al. v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences1958While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-sonam no longer applies to tangibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels; *329 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 1940While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam no longer applies to tan *18 gibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located, (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, 5 because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels: Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 24 | 1 | 2 |
Robinson Township v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2023Id. (citing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 969 (Pa. 2013) (stating “this Court has an obligation to vindicate the rights of its citizens where the circumstances require it and in accordance with the plain language of the Constitution”).13 Furthermore, Washington contends that the 2019 amendment to Act 84 cannot be read to be a legislative attempt to deprive prisoners of their due process rights, as Bundy was issued before the amendment, and 13 As to the notion that a remedy might not always be available for some due process violations, Washington invokes the ancient principle ubi | 1 | 1 |
Perkins v. Gaygreen1 sentence1995See also Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & Rawle 327 (1817) (confirming the applicability of the ancient doctrine of consentable line to an action in ejectment). | 1 | 1 |
Gardner v. Allegheny Countygreen2 sentences1993Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 159(b) (incorporating United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 , 66 S.Ct. 1062 , 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946)); accord, Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88 , 114 A.2d 491 (1955). 2 . 1993Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 159(b) (incorporating United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 , 66 S.Ct. 1062 , 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946)); accord, Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88 , 114 A.2d 491 (1955). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.green2 sentences1983See also American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corporation, 456 U.S. 556 , 568 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 1935, 1945, n. 6 , 72 L.Ed.2d 330 , 341 n. 6 (1982) (approving the refusal of Perma Life Mufflers, supra, "to apply the ancient defense of in pari delicto in antitrust cases” inasmuch as “Victorian common law does not define the limits of the antitrust private action.”); E.F. 1983See also American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corporation, 456 U.S. 556 , 568 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 1935, 1945, n. 6 , 72 L.Ed.2d 330 , 341 n. 6 (1982) (approving the refusal of Perma Life Mufflers, supra, "to apply the ancient defense of in pari delicto in antitrust cases” inasmuch as “Victorian common law does not define the limits of the antitrust private action.”); E.F. | 1 | 1 |
| Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad v. Iowagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fine v. Fine
green
2 sentences1967Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 — that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 852 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . 1967Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 — that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 852 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . | 4 | 1956–1967 |
Chadwick Estate
neutral
2 sentences1967Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 — that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 852 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . 1966In King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127 (1956), Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Bell said: “Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt ex pressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436— that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 582 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . | 4 | 1956–1967 |
Schwartz Estate
green
2 sentences1967Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 — that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 852 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . 1966In King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127 (1956), Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Bell said: “Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt ex pressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436— that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 582 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . | 4 | 1956–1967 |
Matheny Estate
green
2 sentences1967Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 — that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 852 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . 1967Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 — that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 852 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . | 4 | 1956–1967 |
Schwartz Estate
neutral
2 sentences1967Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 — that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 852 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . 1966In King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127 (1956), Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Bell said: “Where furniture is contained, at the death of a husband, in a house or apartment which was then or formerly owned or rented by him, the ancient presumption still prevails — notwithstanding the doubt ex pressed in Fine v. Fine, 366 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436— that he is the owner of such furniture: Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 71 A. 2d 831 ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 157 , 35 A. 2d 582 ; Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 18 , 63 A. 2d 477 . | 3 | 1958–1967 |
United States v. Causby
green
2 sentences1993Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 159(b) (incorporating United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 , 66 S.Ct. 1062 , 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946)); accord, Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88 , 114 A.2d 491 (1955). 2 . 1993Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 159(b) (incorporating United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 , 66 S.Ct. 1062 , 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946)); accord, Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88 , 114 A.2d 491 (1955). 2 . | 2 | 1955–1993 |
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota
green
2 sentences1958While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur per-sonam no longer applies to tangibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels; *329 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 1940While the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam no longer applies to tan *18 gibles, these, like land, having their tax situs in the jurisdiction in which they are physically located, (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 ; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 363, 364, 365 ), in the case of intangibles the ancient doctrine still remains, 5 because of obvious differences, theoretical and practical, between them and tangible chattels: Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 24 | 2 | 1940–1958 |
Plauchak v. Boling
green
1 sentence2016It is an ancient doctrine 8 that "is a separate and distinct theory from that of traditional adverse possession." Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Husser v. Pittsburgh School District
green
2 sentences1999Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine perhaps best described by the late Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Musmanno in his dissenting opinion in Husser v. Pittsburgh School District, 425 Pa. 249, 254 , 228 A.2d 910 (1967). 1999Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine perhaps best described by the late Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Musmanno in his dissenting opinion in Husser v. Pittsburgh School District, 425 Pa. 249, 254 , 228 A.2d 910 (1967). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Com., Dept. of Public Wel. v. Uec, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Department of Public Welfare v. UEC, Inc., 483 Pa. 503 , 397 A.2d 779 (1979). 1999Department of Public Welfare v. UEC, Inc., 483 Pa. 503 , 397 A.2d 779 (1979). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commonwealth v. Swinehart
green
2 sentences1996Swinehart 541 Pa. at 522 , 664 A.2d at 967 . 1996Swinehart 541 Pa. at 522 , 664 A.2d at 967 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Garrett v. Moore-Mccormack Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1991See: Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 , 240 n. 2, 63 S.Ct. 246 , 248 n. 2, 87 L.Ed. 239 , 241 n. 2 (1942); Rowley v. *496 Sierra S.S. 1991See: Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 , 240 n. 2, 63 S.Ct. 246 , 248 n. 2, 87 L.Ed. 239 , 241 n. 2 (1942); Rowley v. *496 Sierra S.S. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v. Derby
green
2 sentences1991Savruk v. Derby, 235 Pa.Super. 560 , 564 n. 4, 344 A.2d 624 , 626 n. 4 (1975). 1991Savruk v. Derby, 235 Pa.Super. 560 , 564 n. 4, 344 A.2d 624 , 626 n. 4 (1975). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Shambe v. Delaware Hudson R. R. Co.
green
2 sentences1990In those latter circumstances, causes of action would lie where the corporation was “doing *244 business.” Seeking to define that term, Shambe developed rules that these business contacts must be judged on the basis of their “quality” and “quantity.” “A single act is not enough,” while “each case must depend on its own facts.” Id., 288 Pa. at 246 , 135 A. 755 . 1990In those latter circumstances, causes of action would lie where the corporation was “doing *244 business.” Seeking to define that term, Shambe developed rules that these business contacts must be judged on the basis of their “quality” and “quantity.” “A single act is not enough,” while “each case must depend on its own facts.” Id., 288 Pa. at 246 , 135 A. 755 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc., Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Melford Berns, and Lenny Garcia, Appellants/cross-Appellees
green
1 sentence1983Hutton v. Berns, 682 F.2d 173 , 176 n. 6 (8th Cir.1982) (Collecting securities law violation cases which either allow or deny the in pari delicto defense). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Commonwealth v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1983In Banks , the court, quoting Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 181 Pa.Super. 225 , 124 A.2d 407 (1956) said: “ ‘The doctrine of retreat as developed in homicide cases is not by the weight of authority regarded as applicable to cases involving a mere battery, especially where immediate action appears to be necessary for self protection.’ (citations omitted) ‘The ancient doctrine which makes it the duty of a person assaulted to “retreat to the wall” before he is justified in repelling force by force has been generally modified in the United States. 1983In Banks , the court, quoting Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 181 Pa.Super. 225 , 124 A.2d 407 (1956) said: “ ‘The doctrine of retreat as developed in homicide cases is not by the weight of authority regarded as applicable to cases involving a mere battery, especially where immediate action appears to be necessary for self protection.’ (citations omitted) ‘The ancient doctrine which makes it the duty of a person assaulted to “retreat to the wall” before he is justified in repelling force by force has been generally modified in the United States. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Goodman
green
1 sentence1973In Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408 (1946), the doctrine is somewhat expanded wherein it was held that a husband may recover for the loss of his wife’s services and society in a death action, again citing Gaydos v. Domabyl, supra. This ancient doctrine was further and most recently expanded in Spangler v. Helm’s New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482 (1959), wherein it was held that in a death action brought by a husband for the death of his wife, among other elements of damages, plaintiff may recover for her loss considering in the amount to be awarded all t | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express
green
2 sentences1973In Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408 (1946), the doctrine is somewhat expanded wherein it was held that a husband may recover for the loss of his wife’s services and society in a death action, again citing Gaydos v. Domabyl, supra. This ancient doctrine was further and most recently expanded in Spangler v. Helm’s New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482 (1959), wherein it was held that in a death action brought by a husband for the death of his wife, among other elements of damages, plaintiff may recover for her loss considering in the amount to be awarded all t 1973In Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408 (1946), the doctrine is somewhat expanded wherein it was held that a husband may recover for the loss of his wife’s services and society in a death action, again citing Gaydos v. Domabyl, supra. This ancient doctrine was further and most recently expanded in Spangler v. Helm’s New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482 (1959), wherein it was held that in a death action brought by a husband for the death of his wife, among other elements of damages, plaintiff may recover for her loss considering in the amount to be awarded all t | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Gaydos v. Domabyl green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh
green
1 sentence1973In Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408 (1946), the doctrine is somewhat expanded wherein it was held that a husband may recover for the loss of his wife’s services and society in a death action, again citing Gaydos v. Domabyl, supra. This ancient doctrine was further and most recently expanded in Spangler v. Helm’s New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482 (1959), wherein it was held that in a death action brought by a husband for the death of his wife, among other elements of damages, plaintiff may recover for her loss considering in the amount to be awarded all t | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Prescott v. Otterstatter green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Commonwealth v. Universal Trades green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Commonwealth v. Chester County Light & Power Co. green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Norris v. Crowe neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Commonwealth v. Senauskas green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Commonwealth v. Gibson green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization & Assessment green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Alcorn v. Alcorn green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Beck v. Germantown Cricket Club neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Casaccio v. Marrone green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co. green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Wilkinson v. McCullough green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Best v. Hammond green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Hancock's Appeal green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Chandler v. Woelpper green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Estate of Root green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Bruckman's Estate green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Hunter v. Hunter neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Metzger's Estate green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.