ancient rule in California

2019(See Moshonov v. Walsh , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 780, fn. 1 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 , 996 P.2d 699 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) "It is, apparently, an ancient rule that 'when arbitrators have published their award by delivering it to the parties as the award, that it is not the subject of revision or correction by them, and that any alteration without the consent of the parties will vitiate it.' " ( Elliott & Ten Eyck Partnership v. City of Long Beach (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 495 , 501, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 140 , quoting Porter v. Scott (1857) 7 Cal. 312 , 316.) "Arbitrators exhaust their power when the

2001As one court recently put it, “It is, apparently, an ancient rule that ‘when arbitrators have published their award by delivering it to the parties as the award, that it is not the subject of revision or correction by them, and that any alteration without the consent of the parties will vitiate it.’ (Porter v. Scott (1857) 7 Cal. 312, 316 .) The briefing in the Porter case cited precedent back to a Yearbook of Henry VI, as well as other venerable authority.

1974(Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, 142 U.S. 547 .) Although Counselman recognizes “an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures” (id. at pp. 563-564 [ 35 L.Ed. at p. 1114 ]), it is nevertheless held in that case that the objective of the constitutional privilege is “to insure that a person would not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself ha

1974(Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, 142 U.S. 547 .) Although Counselman recognizes “an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures” (id. at pp. 563-564 [ 35 L.Ed. at p. 1114 ]), it is nevertheless held in that case that the objective of the constitutional privilege is “to insure that a person would not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself ha

2019They have no power after having made an award to alter it; the authority conferred on them is then at an end." ( *612 Bayne v. Morris (1863) 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 97, 99 , 17 L.Ed. 495 ; see Doke v. James (1851) 4 N.Y. 568 , 575-576.) From this, Heimlich reasons, notice of a settlement offer must necessarily be given before the final award, when the arbitrator still has the power to act.

2019They have no power after having made an award to alter it; the authority conferred on them is then at an end." ( *612 Bayne v. Morris (1863) 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 97, 99 , 17 L.Ed. 495 ; see Doke v. James (1851) 4 N.Y. 568 , 575-576.) From this, Heimlich reasons, notice of a settlement offer must necessarily be given before the final award, when the arbitrator still has the power to act.

2013(See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 509 .) Read together, these statutes codify and provide the basic rules that “public entities are immune from liability except as provided by statute (§815, subd. (a)), that public employees are liable for their torts except as otherwise provided by statute (§820, subd. (a)), that public entities are vicariously liable for the torts of their employees (§815.2, subd. (a)), and that public entities are immune where their employees are immune, except as otherwise provided by statute. (§815.2, subd. (b).)” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4t

2013(See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 509 .) Read together, these statutes codify and provide the basic rules that “public entities are immune from liability except as provided by statute (§815, subd. (a)), that public employees are liable for their torts except as otherwise provided by statute (§820, subd. (a)), that public entities are vicariously liable for the torts of their employees (§815.2, subd. (a)), and that public entities are immune where their employees are immune, except as otherwise provided by statute. (§815.2, subd. (b).)” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4t

2011None are relevant here. 4 The name is traceable to Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (2d Cir. 1966) 370 F.2d 119 , 121 (“Where the effect of a district court’s order, if not reviewed, is the death knell of the action, review should be allowed.”). 5 As it must.

2010In People v. McLean (1902) 135 Cal. 306 [ 67 P. 770 ], the court noted, “It is provided in [section 512] that the fact that the accused intended to restore the property is no defense, unless the property has been restored before an information has been laid charging the commission of the offense.” (People v. McLean , at pp. 307-308 [defendant jeweler refused to sell or return jewelry, as promised].) Similarly, in Talbot, when corporate officers appropriated funds for personal reasons and characterized these transactions as “advances,” the court concluded: “the fact that such officers intended

2010In People v. McLean (1902) 135 Cal. 306 [ 67 P. 770 ], the court noted, “It is provided in [section 512] that the fact that the accused intended to restore the property is no defense, unless the property has been restored before an information has been laid charging the commission of the offense.” (People v. McLean , at pp. 307-308 [defendant jeweler refused to sell or return jewelry, as promised].) Similarly, in Talbot, when corporate officers appropriated funds for personal reasons and characterized these transactions as “advances,” the court concluded: “the fact that such officers intended

2004(Lorenzen, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1686 .) The absence of disputed facts does not detract from the reasoning in Lorenzen . *699 As explained by Professors Prosser and Keeton, “the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor has lingered on to a very large extent” in judicial consideration of the responsibility of a vendor of land.

2001In Green, supra, 10 Cal.3d 616 , the Supreme Court traced—beginning in the Middle Ages—the property law principle that a landlord had no duty to place leased premises in a habitable condition and no duty to repair based on the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, or “let the buyer beware.” The court discussed modem urbanization, the change in the contemporary housing market, modem legal decisions discarding the caveat emptor approach in order to protect consumers, and the widespread enactment of comprehensive housing codes throughout the nation. ( Green, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 622-627.) The cou

2001In Green, supra, 10 Cal.3d 616 , the Supreme Court traced—beginning in the Middle Ages—the property law principle that a landlord had no duty to place leased premises in a habitable condition and no duty to repair based on the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, or “let the buyer beware.” The court discussed modem urbanization, the change in the contemporary housing market, modem legal decisions discarding the caveat emptor approach in order to protect consumers, and the widespread enactment of comprehensive housing codes throughout the nation. ( Green, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 622-627.) The cou

1997So it seems clear that the meaning of the statute is that a creditor without a judgment can sue to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.” (Lind, supra, 282 N.W. at p. 667 .) Part of Lind’s holding and rationale is: “. . .

1997In many cases the third party grantee will be saved the burden of defending a suit by one whose cause of action failed against his grantor. “[T]his statute simply abrogates ‘the ancient rule whereby a judgment and a lien were essential preliminaries to equitable relief against a fraudulent conveyance’, and that what it ‘seeks’ is to level ‘distinctions that at times had been the refuge of the dilatory debtor.’ American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 7 , 166 N.E. 783, 785 , 65 A.L.R. 244 .

1997In many cases the third party grantee will be saved the burden of defending a suit by one whose cause of action failed against his grantor. “[T]his statute simply abrogates ‘the ancient rule whereby a judgment and a lien were essential preliminaries to equitable relief against a fraudulent conveyance’, and that what it ‘seeks’ is to level ‘distinctions that at times had been the refuge of the dilatory debtor.’ American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 7 , 166 N.E. 783, 785 , 65 A.L.R. 244 .

1981In City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 ], we reaffirmed the ancient doctrine that tidelands—lands between the lines of mean high tide and mean low tide—are owned by the public, that the state holds these lands in trust for the people for their use for commerce, navigation, fishing and other purposes, and that this trust interest is retained even if the title to tidelands has been conveyed to private persons, unless the conveyance has been made to promote the purposes of the trust.

1981In City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 327 , 606 P.2d 362 ], we reaffirmed the ancient doctrine that tidelands—lands between the lines of mean high tide and mean low tide—are owned by the public, that the state holds these lands in trust for the people for their use for commerce, navigation, fishing and other purposes, and that this trust interest is retained even if the title to tidelands has been conveyed to private persons, unless the conveyance has been made to promote the purposes of the trust.

1980Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois (1892) 146 U.S. 387 [ 36 L.Ed. 1018 , 13 S.Ct. 110 ], was the seminal case on the scope of the public trust doctrine and remains the primary authority even today, almost nine decades after it was decided.

1980Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois (1892) 146 U.S. 387 [ 36 L.Ed. 1018 , 13 S.Ct. 110 ], was the seminal case on the scope of the public trust doctrine and remains the primary authority even today, almost nine decades after it was decided.

1980Neither did the Espinosa court provide any justification for its rejection of the plaintiff's attempt to "subvert the ancient rule that mental suffering alone will not support an action for damages based upon negligence." ( 114 Cal. App.2d at p. 234 .) Therefore, we must look elsewhere.

1980Neither did the Espinosa court provide any justification for its rejection of the plaintiff’s attempt to “subvert the ancient rule that mental suffering alone will not support an action for damages based upon negligence.” ( 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 234 .) Therefore, we must look elsewhere.

1978The section is but an application of the ancient principle that “[cjourts will not permit a party to give an apparent acquiescence which will operate to mislead and entrap his adversary.” (Goodale v. West (1855) 5 Cal. 339, 341 .)

1974The privilege is limited* to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.” (Id. at p. 562 [ 35 L.Ed. at p. 1114 ], italics added.) In the seminal case of Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616 [ 29 L.Ed. 746 , 6 S.Ct. 524 ], relied upon by amici, the United States sought only the forfeiture of personal property under a federal statute which provided that an importer who attempted to defraud the government of import duties could be “fined ... , or imprisoned . . , or both; and, in addition to such fine, such merchandise shall be forfeited.” (Id. at p.

1974The privilege is limited* to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.” (Id. at p. 562 [ 35 L.Ed. at p. 1114 ], italics added.) In the seminal case of Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616 [ 29 L.Ed. 746 , 6 S.Ct. 524 ], relied upon by amici, the United States sought only the forfeiture of personal property under a federal statute which provided that an importer who attempted to defraud the government of import duties could be “fined ... , or imprisoned . . , or both; and, in addition to such fine, such merchandise shall be forfeited.” (Id. at p.