ancient rule in Indiana

1990In fact, the ancient rule limiting the use of copies of documents has been relaxed by modern case law, a view aptly summarized by Judge Garrard in Wilson v. State (1976), 169 Ind.App. 297, 304-05 , 348 N.E.2d 90 , 95: "We therefore hold that a duplicate of a document or other writing is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or *517 by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical, electronic or chemical reproduction or other equivalent technique which accurately reproduces the original.

1990In fact, the ancient rule limiting the use of copies of documents has been relaxed by modern case law, a view aptly summarized by Judge Garrard in Wilson v. State (1976), 169 Ind.App. 297, 304-05 , 348 N.E.2d 90 , 95: "We therefore hold that a duplicate of a document or other writing is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or *517 by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical, electronic or chemical reproduction or other equivalent technique which accurately reproduces the original.

1986Muse v. De Vito, 248 Mass. 884 , 137 N.E. 730 ; McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659, 669 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 .

1986Muse v. De Vito, 248 Mass. 884 , 137 N.E. 730 ; McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659, 669 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 .

1986Muse v. De Vito, 248 Mass. 884 , 137 N.E. 730 ; McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659, 669 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 .

1986Muse v. De Vito, 243 Mass. 384 , 137 N.E. 730 ; McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659, 669 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 .

1981Thompson v. Thompson, (1972) 259 Ind. 266 , 286 N.E.2d 657 .

1981Thompson v. Thompson, (1972) 259 Ind. 266 , 286 N.E.2d 657 .

1978Bedwell v. DeBolt (1943), 221 Ind. 600, 609 , 50 N.E.2d 875, 878 .

1978Bedwell v. DeBolt (1943), 221 Ind. 600, 609 , 50 N.E.2d 875, 878 .

1976Langford's reply is that recent Indiana case law flatly rejects the doctrine of caveat emptor and that the ancient doctrine of caveat lessee is no longer tenable because Indiana has inferentially adopted an implied warranty of habitability or fitness ... with particular reference to Theis v. Heuer (1971), 149 Ind. App. 52 , 270 N.E.2d 764 , adopted on transfer in 1972, Ind., 280 N.E.2d 300 .

1976Langford's reply is that recent Indiana case law flatly rejects the doctrine of caveat emptor and that the ancient doctrine of caveat lessee is no longer tenable because Indiana has inferentially adopted an implied warranty of habitability or fitness ... with particular reference to Theis v. Heuer (1971), 149 Ind. App. 52 , 270 N.E.2d 764 , adopted on transfer in 1972, Ind., 280 N.E.2d 300 .

1976Langford's reply is that recent Indiana case law flatly rejects the doctrine of caveat emptor and that the ancient doctrine of caveat lessee is no longer tenable because Indiana has inferentially adopted an implied warranty of habitability or fitness ... with particular reference to Theis v. Heuer (1971), 149 Ind. App. 52 , 270 N.E.2d 764 , adopted on transfer in 1972, Ind., 280 N.E.2d 300 .

1964The result reached in the Meade case, supra, wherein the legality of the “agency shop” clause in a labor contract under the present Indiana Eight-to-Work Law was upheld by this court, was noted, commented upon, and left unaffected by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. General Motors (1963), 373 U. S. 734 , 83 S. Ct. 1453 .

1964The result reached in the Meade case, supra, wherein the legality of the “agency shop” clause in a labor contract under the present Indiana Eight-to-Work Law was upheld by this court, was noted, commented upon, and left unaffected by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. General Motors (1963), 373 U. S. 734 , 83 S. Ct. 1453 .

1938It is the law in this state that where real estate is conveyed and all or part of the purchase price is not paid, the grantor has a vendor’s lien upon the real estate so conveyed in the amount of the unpaid purchase price | In the case of Cassell v. Lowry (1904), 164 Ind. 1, 3 , 72 N. E. 640 , it is said: “A vendor’s lien is an ancient rule, and had its origin in the principle of natural justice and equity, which impresses the conscience that it is not fair for a vendee of lands, who gives no other security, to have, as between the parties, the absolute estate until he has fully paid for it.

1938It is the law in this state that where real estate is conveyed and all or part of the purchase price is not paid, the grantor has a vendor’s lien upon the real estate so conveyed in the amount of the unpaid purchase price | In the case of Cassell v. Lowry (1904), 164 Ind. 1, 3 , 72 N. E. 640 , it is said: “A vendor’s lien is an ancient rule, and had its origin in the principle of natural justice and equity, which impresses the conscience that it is not fair for a vendee of lands, who gives no other security, to have, as between the parties, the absolute estate until he has fully paid for it.

1927Hampton v. State (1856), 8 Ind. 366 ; Hizer v. State (1859), 12 Ind. 330 .

1906Albans Trust Co., supra; Sheehan, etc., Transportation Co. v. Sims (1889), 36 Mo. App. 224 .

1906Adams School Tp. v. Irwin (1898), 150 Ind. 12 ; State v. Hindman (1903), 159 Ind. 586 . 4.

1906Adams School Tp. v. Irwin (1898), 150 Ind. 12 ; State v. Hindman (1903), 159 Ind. 586 . 4.

1903Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 ; Jones v. Carnahan, 63 Ind. 229 ; Sackett v. State, ex rel., 74 Ind. 486 ; Wampler v. State, ex rel., 148 Ind. 557 , 38 L.

1903Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 ; Jones v. Carnahan, 63 Ind. 229 ; Sackett v. State, ex rel., 74 Ind. 486 ; Wampler v. State, ex rel., 148 Ind. 557 , 38 L.

1903Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 ; Jones v. Carnahan, 63 Ind. 229 ; Sackett v. State, ex rel., 74 Ind. 486 ; Wampler v. State, ex rel., 148 Ind. 557 , 38 L.

1903Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 ; Jones v. Carnahan, 63 Ind. 229 ; Sackett v. State, ex rel., 74 Ind. 486 ; Wampler v. State, ex rel., 148 Ind. 557 , 38 L.

1900Pratt, etc., Co. v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371 , 3 South. 555 ; Little Rock, etc., R.

1894Not so where the grantor remains in possession after the execution of a deed absolute on its face, but claims that it was but a mortgage, as was the case in Creighton v. Hoppis, supra. That case not only does not support appellee’s contention, but it even supports the contention of the appellant.

1891The Supreme Court having jurisdiction in so far as the proceedings involved the right to take the real estate, it likewise takes jurisdiction of the whole case, for, as stated in the case of Ex parte Sweeney, 126 Ind. 583 ,“ It is an ancient rule, illustrated by many cases, that if a court obtains jurisdiction for one purpose it will retain it for all purposes.” In the case of Parker v. Indianapolis Nat’l Bank, 126 Ind. 595 , it was held that the Appellate Court had jurisdiction of án application to set aside a judgment, rendered upon default, for less than $1,000.

1891The Supreme Court having jurisdiction in so far as the proceedings involved the right to take the real estate, it likewise takes jurisdiction of the whole case, for, as stated in the case of Ex parte Sweeney, 126 Ind. 583 ,“ It is an ancient rule, illustrated by many cases, that if a court obtains jurisdiction for one purpose it will retain it for all purposes.” In the case of Parker v. Indianapolis Nat’l Bank, 126 Ind. 595 , it was held that the Appellate Court had jurisdiction of án application to set aside a judgment, rendered upon default, for less than $1,000.

1890Dumpor’s Case, 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, 47; 2 Washburn Real Prop. (4th ed.) 12; Nordyke & Marmon Co. v. Gery, 112 Ind. 535 .

1886Morgan v. Muldoon, 83 Ind. 347 , and authorities cited.

1885Town of Elkhart v. Ritter, 66 Ind. 136 ; Weisenberg v. City of Appleton, 26 Wis. 56 ; S. C., 7 Am.

1885Town of Elkhart v. Ritter, 66 Ind. 136 ; Weisenberg v. City of Appleton, 26 Wis. 56 ; S. C., 7 Am.

1884Of a like import was the language of the court in Thomas v. Wheeler, 47 Mo. 363 , where it was said: “ The declarations or admissions of one in possession of property, explanatory of his possession — as that he holds it in his own right, or as a tenant or trustee of another — are admissible evidence because they explain the character of his possession.

1884In a note to the text it is said: “ Such declarations are now generally admitted.” In Sheaffer v. Eakman, 56 Pa. St. 144, it was said: “The character of a possession may always be shown by contemporaneous declarations of the tenant.” A like ruling was made in Jackson v. Bredenhergh, 1 Johns. 159 , where it was said : “ But for another purpose, the declarations of Mrs. Punderson were clearly evidence, namely, to show in what character, or with what intent, she entered, and held possession of the premises in dispute.” After quoting from 1 Coke’s Institutes, 374, a, the Supreme Court of Connectic

1883But in Patterson v. Nixon, 79 Ind. 251 , this court decided that this ancient rule of the ■common law did not apply to a conveyance of a tenant in •common; that the possession of one tenant in common was, •constructively, the possession of all; and that there could, therefore, be no such adverse possession by any such tenant •as would render void the deed of his cotenant.