ancient rule in Virginia

2025“The ancient rule in this Commonwealth is that the prosecution has no right to introduce selected portions of a defendant’s confession and exclude those which tend to mitigate, justify, or excuse the offense charged.” See Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 517 (1985). “[I]f the prosecution fails to prove the whole statement, the accused is entitled to put in evidence all that was said to and by him at the time which bears upon the subject of controversy, including any exculpatory or self-serving declarations . . . .” Pierce, 2 Va. App. at 389 (quoting Am.

2022“The ancient rule in this Commonwealth is that the prosecution has no right to introduce selected portions of a defendant’s confession and exclude those which tend to mitigate, justify, or excuse the offense charged.” Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 517 (1985) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 633, 634 (1838)); see also Va. R.

2022“The ancient rule in this Commonwealth is that the prosecution has no right to introduce selected portions of a defendant’s confession and exclude those which tend to mitigate, justify, or excuse the offense charged.” Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 517 (1985) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 633, 634 (1838)); see also Va. R.

1985Brown v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 633, 634 (1838); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. (6 Hans.) 1, 14-15 (1884); Bowman v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 461, 463-64 , 5 S.E.2d 497, 498-99 (1939).

2025So, when an amended complaint “is filed and a comparison of the original and amended pleading shows that the amended [complaint], was intended as a substitute for the original, the case stands as though the original had never been filed, so far as it relates to the statement of facts.” Breeding by Breeding v. Hensley, 258 Va. 207, 212 (1999) (emphasis added) (citing Trotter v. E.

2024The “historical and common-sense reason” for that duty “is that the witness could otherwise transfer responsibility for a crime from his own shoulders to another’s.” Id. at 466 (quoting People v. Swift, 293 N.Y.S. 378, 381 (1936)); Jones v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 862, 868 (1911) (“[T]he danger of collusion between accomplices and the temptation to exculpate themselves by fixing responsibility upon others is so strong[] that it is the duty of the court to warn the jury against the danger of convicting upon their uncorroborated testimony.”).

2024The “historical and common-sense reason” for that duty “is that the witness could otherwise transfer responsibility for a crime from his own shoulders to another’s.” Id. at 466 (quoting People v. Swift, 293 N.Y.S. 378, 381 (1936)); Jones v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 862, 868 (1911) (“[T]he danger of collusion between accomplices and the temptation to exculpate themselves by fixing responsibility upon others is so strong[] that it is the duty of the court to warn the jury against the danger of convicting upon their uncorroborated testimony.”).

2024See Guthrie v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 461, 464-66 (1938) (tracing the rule to its origins “in the ancient doctrine of ‘approvement’”).

2024The “historical and common-sense reason” for that duty “is that the witness could otherwise transfer responsibility for a crime from his own shoulders to another’s.” Id. at 466 (quoting People v. Swift, 293 N.Y.S. 378, 381 (1936)); Jones v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 862, 868 (1911) (“[T]he danger of collusion between accomplices and the temptation to exculpate themselves by fixing responsibility upon others is so strong[] that it is the duty of the court to warn the jury against the danger of convicting upon their uncorroborated testimony.”).

2018See e.g., Ferguson v. Ferguson, 187 Va. 581, 592 , 47 S.E.2d 346, 352 (1948). -4- supported that determination with the following facts: appellant did not call Mitchem before taking the truck, and appellant “simply had a case of buyer’s remorse and decided that he had gotten the raw end of the deal.” Appellant took the truck “knowing full well that the deal had been consummated . . . and that the truck . . . belonged to [] Mitchem.” The trial court found appellant guilty and convicted him of grand larceny of a motor vehicle.

2018See e.g., Ferguson v. Ferguson, 187 Va. 581, 592 , 47 S.E.2d 346, 352 (1948). -4- supported that determination with the following facts: appellant did not call Mitchem before taking the truck, and appellant “simply had a case of buyer’s remorse and decided that he had gotten the raw end of the deal.” Appellant took the truck “knowing full well that the deal had been consummated . . . and that the truck . . . belonged to [] Mitchem.” The trial court found appellant guilty and convicted him of grand larceny of a motor vehicle.

2014This rule not only ensures that justice is “impartially administered,” but also ensures that it flows “through channels as free from suspicion as possible.” Wright, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) at 943 ; see also Breeden, 217 Va. at 298 , 227 S.E.2d at 735 (application of this ancient rule ensures an accused’s constitu *67 tional right “to trial by ‘an impartial jury,’ ” which demands that “veniremen must stand indifferent in the cause” (quoting U.S. Const, amend.

2014This rule not only ensures that justice is “impartially administered,” but also ensures that it flows “through channels as free from suspicion as possible.” Wright, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) at 943 ; see also Breeden, 217 Va. at 298 , 227 S.E.2d at 735 (application of this ancient rule ensures an accused’s constitu *67 tional right “to trial by ‘an impartial jury,’ ” which demands that “veniremen must stand indifferent in the cause” (quoting U.S. Const, amend.

2012This, indeed is a natural right. . . incident to the land itself, and is therefore property.” Sterns v. City of Richmond, 88 Va. 992, 995 (1892).

2012Co., 259 Va. 493, 499 , 527 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2000)). 10 Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine.

2012Co., 259 Va. 493, 499 , 527 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2000)). 10 Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine.

2008Marymount Coll. of Va. v. Harris, 205 Va. 712, 717 , 139 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1964) (“In the construction of its provisions, it is to be remembered that the Code itself is a single act of the legislature.”) (quoting Shepherd, 154 Va. at 425 , 153 S.E. at 650 ); see also Va. Code Ann. § 1-1 (1950) (“The laws embraced in this and the following titles, chapters, articles, and sections ofthis act shall constitute ... the ‘Code of Virginia’ “).

2008Marymount Coll. of Va. v. Harris, 205 Va. 712, 717 , 139 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1964) (“In the construction of its provisions, it is to be remembered that the Code itself is a single act of the legislature.”) (quoting Shepherd, 154 Va. at 425 , 153 S.E. at 650 ); see also Va. Code Ann. § 1-1 (1950) (“The laws embraced in this and the following titles, chapters, articles, and sections ofthis act shall constitute ... the ‘Code of Virginia’ “).

2006Shultz v. Hughson, 134 Va. 497, 500-02 (1922).

2004See Johnston v. Hargrove, 81 Va. 118, 121 (1885) (“It is an ancient rule of the common law that, before the lessor can exercise a stipulated right of re-entry for breach of covenant to pay rent, he must make an actual demand upon the tenant for payment thereof, unless, by special agreement between the parties, the requirement of demand has been dispensed with.”).

1985Brown v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 633, 634 (1838); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. (6 Hans.) 1, 14-15 (1884); Bowman v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 461, 463-64 , 5 S.E.2d 497, 498-99 (1939).

1985Brown v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 633, 634 (1838); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. (6 Hans.) 1, 14-15 (1884); Bowman v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 461, 463-64 , 5 S.E.2d 497, 498-99 (1939).

1926In Parrish v. Parrish, 116 Va. 481 , 82 S. E. 119, 121 (L.