ancient doctrine in Florida

2016Part of the rationale for this approach is historical, deriving from common law crimes, where there was “the ancient requirement of a culpable state of mind.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).

2016Part of the rationale for this approach is historical, deriving from common law crimes, where there was “the ancient requirement of a culpable state of mind.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).

2008Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142 , 150 (2d Cir.1993) ("A duty to *521 speak cannot arise simply because two parties may have been on opposite sides of a bargaining table when a deal was struck between them, for under New York law the ancient rule of caveat emptor is still alive and well.").

2007Bermudez, 433 So.2d at 566 (quoting Griffin, 73 So.2d at 846 ).

1989See generally Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 446 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.1971); First Nat'l Bank v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App. 1984).

1980Cf. Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491 , 1 So.2d 480 (1941).

1980Cf. Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491 , 1 So.2d 480 (1941).

1971Heisler v. Marceau, 116 So. 447 .

1971Heisler v. Marceau, 116 So. 441 .

1962In the case of Sullivan et al. v. McMillan et al., 37 Fla. 134 , 19 So. 340 , the Supreme Court held that the ancient rule which was adverse to the assessment of interest on unliquidated demands was susceptible to the more liberal ideas as to the allowance of interest in the modern, especially American, authorities and in the allowance of interest the distinction is practically obliterated between liquidated and unliquidated demands.

1959A study of these cases, however, will show that the decision of the court was based on a statutory provision such as the case of Re Miller's Estate, 158 Cal. 420 , 111 P. 255 , where it was held that evidence was admissible to show the abandonment, since, to be entitled to the benefits of the statute, West's Ann.Prob.Code, § 645, the widow must be a member of the family at the time of the death of her husband.

1959A study of these cases, however, will show that the decision of the court was based on a statutory provision such as the case of Re Miller's Estate, 158 Cal. 420 , 111 P. 255 , where it was held that evidence was admissible to show the abandonment, since, to be entitled to the benefits of the statute, West's Ann.Prob.Code, § 645, the widow must be a member of the family at the time of the death of her husband.

1954This ancient doctrine is fully discussed in Society of Shakers v. Watson, 6 Cir., 1885, 68 F. 730, 738 , a case involving an analogous situation.

1939A. (N. S.) 664, 124 N. W. 492 : “ ‘The ancient doctrine that the accused could waive nothing was unquestionably founded upon the anxiety of the courts to see that no innocent man should be convicted.

1938At least the dotcrine should not be extended, in the face of Section 4 of our constitutional Declaration of Rights referred to by Mr. Justice Ellis in the Kaufman case, supra.” As late as the case of Lewis v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 426 , 173 So. 150 , this Court recognized the distinction between a municipality’s liability in the performance of its governmental functions and its liability in the exercise of private or corporate powers and duties.

1938At least the dotcrine should not be extended, in the face of Section 4 of our constitutional Declaration of Rights referred to by Mr. Justice Ellis in the Kaufman case, supra.” As late as the case of Lewis v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 426 , 173 So. 150 , this Court recognized the distinction between a municipality’s liability in the performance of its governmental functions and its liability in the exercise of private or corporate powers and duties.

1934That this Court, and the other Federal Courts, in this situation and by right of their own powers, may decline to enforce the ancient rule of the common law under conditions as they now exist we think is not fairly open to doubt. * * *" And so it was that, with the foregoing declaration of a fundamentally sound judicial principle, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of FUNK v. UNITED STATES, 290 U.S. 371 , 54 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212 , 78 L.Ed. 231 (opinion filed December 11, 1933, No. 394, October term), without in anywise destroying its earlier decisions as precedents controlling sit

1933Thus where the defense to an action on a promissory note was that the defendants executed the notes as sureties, that no consideration moved to them and that the principal maker was a married woman, and so not liable, of all which plaintiff had notice, it was held, that the sureties were liable, there being no fraud, duress, or deceit on the part of the payee in procuring the note.” This principle was also enunciated by this Court in Wilson v. Friedenburg, 22 Fla. 144 ; Coznie v. Randolph, 71 Fla. 503 , 72 Sou. 177 . *6 Thus it is, that the writ of certiorari heretofore issued should be quashe