ancient rule in South Carolina

1984Expressing the opinion that "[r]eliance on the indiscriminate application of the ancient doctrine [of sovereign immunity] to thwart compensation for an injured party is not in keeping with public policy," Justice Ness articulated that policy in his dissent to Boyce v. Lancaster County Natural Gas Authority , 266 S.C. 398, 407 , 223 S.E. (2d) 769 (1976): Public convenience can no longer outweigh individual compensation for injuries sustained through the negligence of ... government.

1984Expressing the opinion that "[r]eliance on the indiscriminate application of the ancient doctrine [of sovereign immunity] to thwart compensation for an injured party is not in keeping with public policy," Justice Ness articulated that policy in his dissent to Boyce v. Lancaster County Natural Gas Authority , 266 S.C. 398, 407 , 223 S.E. (2d) 769 (1976): Public convenience can no longer outweigh individual compensation for injuries sustained through the negligence of ... government.

2008Id. at 492 , 179 S.E.2d at 914 .

2008Id. at 492 , 179 S.E.2d at 914 .

1924But taken in connection with the ancient principle of evidence, that one shall not be compelled, in any proceeding to make disclosures or to give testimony which may tend to incriminate him, or subject him to fines, penalties, or forfeitures, to be used against him in a criminal proceeding subsequently instituted, it has come to be construed, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., 547 , 12 Sup. Ct., 195; 35 L.

1924But taken in connection with the ancient principle of evidence, that one shall not be compelled, in any proceeding to make disclosures or to give testimony which may tend to incriminate him, or subject him to fines, penalties, or forfeitures, to be used against him in a criminal proceeding subsequently instituted, it has come to be construed, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., 547 , 12 Sup. Ct., 195; 35 L.

1923In Thackston v. Railroad Co., 40 S. C., 80, 18 S. E., 177 , in an exhaustive and able charge by Circuit Judge Izlar, approved by the Court, it is said: “For the rule, as I understand it, in a case like the present, is, that if the negligence of the plaintiff’s intestate contril> uted in any degree there can be no recovery.” In Shealey v. Railroad Co., 67 S. C., 61, 45 S. E., 119 , the Court says: “In order to constitute contributory negligence, the injured person’s negligence must directly and proximately cause the injury, combining and concurring with the negligence of the injured (injuring?)

1923In Thackston v. Railroad Co., 40 S. C., 80, 18 S. E., 177 , in an exhaustive and able charge by Circuit Judge Izlar, approved by the Court, it is said: “For the rule, as I understand it, in a case like the present, is, that if the negligence of the plaintiff’s intestate contril> uted in any degree there can be no recovery.” In Shealey v. Railroad Co., 67 S. C., 61, 45 S. E., 119 , the Court says: “In order to constitute contributory negligence, the injured person’s negligence must directly and proximately cause the injury, combining and concurring with the negligence of the injured (injuring?)