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9 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 1952–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Kellygreen2 sentences2014I write separately because I do not want the Court’s opinion, reinvigorating the ancient doctrine 7 of constructive adverse possession or constructive possession, to be read to invite mischievous claims asserting ambiguity in deed descriptions to try to gain title by adverse possession to large amounts of land, based on proof of adverse use of a small portion of that land. [¶ 28] The Court’s opinion notes correctly that “[t]ypically, an acquisition of title to property through adverse possession is limited to the area of property that has been actually occupied.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 7 (citing Ir 2014The Court also cites a 1939 treatise that apparently has not been updated. 20 [¶28] The Court’s opinion notes correctly that “[t]ypically, an acquisition of title to property through adverse possession is limited to the area of property that has been actually occupied.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 7 (citing Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416, 419 (Me. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
NELSON BY AND THROUGH STUCKMAN v. Salt Lake Citygreen1 sentence1996Nevertheless, “discretionary immunity ... was not designed to cloak the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity in modern garb.” Nelson by and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Littlefield v. Hiltongreen2 sentences1984Littlefield v. Hilton, 110 Me. 495, 498 , 87 A. 216, 217 (1913). 1984Littlefield v. Hilton, 110 Me. 495, 498 , 87 A. 216, 217 (1913). | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Curtisgreen2 sentences1979Likewise, in Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 90 , 83 A.2d 556 (1951), where the Attorney General had refused to permit the use of his name on the petition for mandamus, and instead appeared as counsel for the respondent, our Court had no difficulty with lack of standing but decided the case on the merits of the controversy. 3 ¡ Again in Kelly v. Curtis, Me., 287 A.2d 426, 430 (1972) our Court paid lip service to the ancient rule by recording “serious doubt” as to the plaintiff’s standing. 1979Likewise, in Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 90 , 83 A.2d 556 (1951), where the Attorney General had refused to permit the use of his name on the petition for mandamus, and instead appeared as counsel for the respondent, our Court had no difficulty with lack of standing but decided the case on the merits of the controversy. [3] Again in Kelly v. Curtis, Me., 287 A.2d 426, 430 (1972) our Court paid lip service to the ancient rule by recording "serious doubt" as to the plaintiff's standing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Knight
green
2 sentences1962Malice aforethought does not necessarily mean that there must be specific intent to kill but our court has laid down the rule in the case of State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11, 137 , as follows: ‘But in all cases where the unlawful killing is proved, and there is nothing in the circumstances of the case as *75 proved, to explain, qualify or palliate the act, the law presumes it to have been done maliciously; and if the accused would reduce the crime below the degree of murder, the burden is upon him to rebut the inference of malice, which the law raises from the act of killing, by evidence in defence. 1952Malice aforethought does not necessarily mean that there must be specific intent to kill but our court has laid down the rule in the case of State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11, 137 , as follows: “But in all cases where the unlawful killing is proved, and there is nothing in the circumstances of the case as proved, to explain, qualify or palliate the act, the law presumes it to have been done maliciously; and if the accused would reduce the crime below the degree of murder, the burden is upon him to rebut the inference of malice, which the law raises from the act of *7 killing, by evidence in defence.” | 2 | 1952–1962 |
Morris v. Goss
green
2 sentences1979Likewise, in Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 90 , 83 A.2d 556 (1951), where the Attorney General had refused to permit the use of his name on the petition for mandamus, and instead appeared as counsel for the respondent, our Court had no difficulty with lack of standing but decided the case on the merits of the controversy. 3 ¡ Again in Kelly v. Curtis, Me., 287 A.2d 426, 430 (1972) our Court paid lip service to the ancient rule by recording “serious doubt” as to the plaintiff’s standing. 1979Likewise, in Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 90 , 83 A.2d 556 (1951), where the Attorney General had refused to permit the use of his name on the petition for mandamus, and instead appeared as counsel for the respondent, our Court had no difficulty with lack of standing but decided the case on the merits of the controversy. 3 ¡ Again in Kelly v. Curtis, Me., 287 A.2d 426, 430 (1972) our Court paid lip service to the ancient rule by recording “serious doubt” as to the plaintiff’s standing. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counselman v. Hitchcock
green
2 sentences1970In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 1892, 142 U.S. 547 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 , the Supreme Court of the United States, in reviewing the applicability of the constitutional privilege, stated it was an ancient principle of the law of evidence that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures. 1970In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 1892, 142 U.S. 547 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 , the Supreme Court of the United States, in reviewing the applicability of the constitutional privilege, stated it was an ancient principle of the law of evidence that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
State v. Cox
green
1 sentence1956But even the slightest doubt, if reasonable, is enough to justify his standing his ground, and in determining whether his doubt is reasonable every allowance must be made for the predicament in which his assailant has placed him.” See also State v. Cox, 138 Me. 151 . *136 The ancient doctrine that one must “retreat to the wall” has been discarded by our courts and it is now the almost universal rule that in case of assault and battery the assaulted person may stand his ground and defend himself just as long as he uses no more force than necessary to repel the attack. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Hall v. Otis
neutral
1 sentence1953I Greenleaf (6th Ed.), 329; Hall v. Otis, 77 Me. 122 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.