ancient rule in New York

1969In the celebrated case of Doctor v. Hughes ( 225 N. Y. 305 ) Judge Cabdozo told us that the ancient doctrine of worthier title was still with us, not as a rule of law but as a rule of construction.

1941(Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298 ; Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 267 id. 358 ; Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 id. 43; Hopkins v. Bank of New York, 261 App. Div. 465 .) In Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. (supra) the Court of Appeals said (at p. 47): “ It is true that our opinion in the Whittemore case assumed that transfers of personal property are embraced by the ancient rule ‘ that a reservation to the heirs of the grantor is equivalent to the reservation of a reversion to the grantor himself.’ (Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 310 .) But this rule (as the Doctor and Whittem

1914This statute was construed by the Court of Appeals in Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122 , and it was held that it operated to revive the ancient doctrine of charitable uses and to restore to the court all the power formerly exercised by a Court of Chancery in the enforcement of the same and, as by the ancient law such charitable uses were exempt from the operation of the statute against perpetuities, the same exemption resulted from the statute of 1893.

1912But we are also of the opinion that the bequest did not fall and that it can be supported as a trust for charitable purposes under the provisions of chapter 701 of the Laws of 1893, as amended by chapter 291 of the Laws of 1901. " " * The effect of this statute, as demonstrated in the case of Allen v. Stevens ( 161 N. Y. 122 ), was to restore the ancient doctrine of charitable uses and trusts as a part of the law of this State, and the statute was designed to cover just such a case as the one at bar.

1946It is an ancient rule that general words in a statute neither include nor bind the government by whose authority it was enacted “ ‘ where its sovereignty, rights, prerogatives or interests are involved.’ ” (Denton v. State of New York, 72 App. Div. 248, 251 .) It is also a well-settled doctrine that a statute .prescribing in general terms procedural requirements is not applicable to the State or its political subdivisions unless such entities are specifically included in the statute.

1941Justice Johnston also observed (p. 584): “ It is an ancient rule that general words in a statute neither include nor bind the government by whose authority it was enacted ‘ where its sovereignty, rights, prerogatives or interests are involved.’ (Denton v. State of New York, 72 App. Div. 248, 251 .) ” The objects of section 876-a and the State Labor Relations Law are similar.

1946This is an ancient rule in New York (Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow. 238, 242 ; affd., 2 Wend. 166, 205 ) * * * Carlisle v. Norris ( 215 N. Y. 400, 409 ) is also cited.

1924This is an ancient rule in New York (Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow. 238, 242 ; affd., 2 Wend. 166, 205 ) and has recently been reiterated by this court. “ He (plaintiff) first called Graham as a witness and relied on him to give substantial evidence necessary to establish his cause of action.

1946This is an ancient rule in New York (Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow. 238, 242 ; affd., 2 Wend. 166, 205 ) * * * Carlisle v. Norris ( 215 N. Y. 400, 409 ) is also cited.

1924This is an ancient rule in New York (Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow. 238, 242 ; affd., 2 Wend. 166, 205 ) and has recently been reiterated by this court. “ He (plaintiff) first called Graham as a witness and relied on him to give substantial evidence necessary to establish his cause of action.

1937If that were not the case, we might have a situation where a party would settle with the master, then sue and recover against the servant, who would then be liable in a suit brought against him by the master, thus forcing him to pay twice for the one wrong.” (Gavin v. Malherbe, 146 Misc. 51 .) As stated in Brown v. City of Cambridge ( 85 Mass. 474, 476 ), cited with approval in Casey v. Auburn Telephone Co. [4th Dept.] 155 App. Div. 66, 70 ): “ It is an ancient doctrine that a release to one joint trespasser or a satisfaction from him discharges the whole. * * * The same doctrine applies to al

1932Co. ( 173 Mo. 249 ), to the effect: “ It does not lie in the mouth of such a plaintiff to say he had no cause of action against the one who paid him for his injuries, for the law presumes that the one who paid committed the trespass and occasioned the whole injury.” The court also cited, with approval, the language of Brown v. City of Cambridge ( 85 Mass. 474 ), to the effect: “ It is an ancient doctrine that a release to one joint trespasser or a satisfaction from him discharges the whole. * * * The same doctrine applies to all joint torts and to torts for which the injured party has an elect

1931In Haines v. Bero Engineering Construction Corp. (supra) the court says: “ The legislative purpose in the enactment of section 211-a was to modify the ancient rule of law (See Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns.

1931R. [1894] A. C. 318.) So in the opinion in the Haines Case (supra) the following language was used: “ The legislative purpose in the enactment of section 211-a was to modify the ancient rule of law (See Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns.

2024Mr. Fallon's authority Gugel v. Hiscox , 138 AD 61, 73-74 , 122 NYS 557 (2d Dept 1910) et al, stands for the doctrine that the Mother-daughter relationship between Gilla and Mia prevents the Court from treating the execution of the contract as an arm's length transaction.

2024Mr. Fallon's authority Gugel v. Hiscox , 138 AD 61, 73-74 , 122 NYS 557 (2d Dept 1910) et al, stands for the doctrine that the Mother-daughter relationship between Gilla and Mia prevents the Court from treating the execution of the contract as an arm's length transaction.

1973In the case of contraband its possession is a crime per se, and hence the inference of guilt, that is, knowledgeable possession, is as strong as is the case for instance, with stolen goods (e.g., People v. Roman, 12 N Y 2d 220, 222; People v. Berger, 260 App. Div. 687, 689-690 , affd. 285 N. Y. 811 ; Wigmore, op. cit., supra, § 152; Richardson, loc. cit., supra).” (29 N Y 2d, at pp. 285-286.) Needless to say, the inference of knowledge rests on the probabilities of human transactions.

1971In the case of contraband its possession is a crime per se, and hence the inference of guilt, that is, knowledgeable possession, is as strong as is the case, for instance, with stolen goods (e.g., People v. Roman, 12 N Y 2d 220, 222; People v. Berger, 260 App. Div. 687, 689-690 , affd. 285 N. Y. 811 ; Wigmore, op. cit., supra, § 152; Richardson, loc. cit., supra).

1973In the case of contraband its possession is a crime per se, and hence the inference of guilt, that is, knowledgeable possession, is as strong as is the case for instance, with stolen goods (e.g., People v. Roman, 12 N Y 2d 220, 222; People v. Berger, 260 App. Div. 687, 689-690 , affd. 285 N. Y. 811 ; Wigmore, op. cit., supra, § 152; Richardson, loc. cit., supra).” (29 N Y 2d, at pp. 285-286.) Needless to say, the inference of knowledge rests on the probabilities of human transactions.

1971In the case of contraband its possession is a crime per se, and hence the inference of guilt, that is, knowledgeable possession, is as strong as is the case, for instance, with stolen goods (e.g., People v. Roman, 12 N Y 2d 220, 222; People v. Berger, 260 App. Div. 687, 689-690 , affd. 285 N. Y. 811 ; Wigmore, op. cit., supra, § 152; Richardson, loc. cit., supra).

1967It is an ancient rule that general words in the statute neither include nor bind the government by whose authority it was enacted where its sovereign rights or interests are involved (Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn v. “ John Doe ”, 252 App. Div. 581, 584 ; see, also, Matter of Long Is.

1946(Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. “ John Doe ”, 252 App. Div. 581 .) As was said in Beale v. State (46 N. Y.

1948In the Koehler case ( 284 N. Y. 260, 263 , supra) the Court of Appeals said: ' The presumption of legitimacy, we have often said, is ‘ one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law.’ (Matter of Findlay, 253 N. Y. 1, 7 .) At one time, as the court pointed out in that case, the presumption was conclusive ' if a husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas of England during the period of gestation.’ In such case the court would not listen to evidence casting doubt on his paternity/ Even now, though the ancient rule no longer is applied with the same rigor, if husband an

1940The presumption of legitimacy, we have often said, is Tone of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law.” (Matter of Findlay, 253 N. Y. 1, 7 .) At one time, as the court pointed out in that case, the presumption was conclusive “if a husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas of England during the period of gestation.” In such case the court would not “ listen to evidence casting doubt on bis paternity.” Even now, though the ancient rule no longer is applied with the same rigor, “ if husband and wife are living together in the conjugal relation, legitimacy will be pres

1946This is an ancient rule in New York (Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow. 238, 242 ; affd., 2 Wend. 166, 205 ) * * * Carlisle v. Norris ( 215 N. Y. 400, 409 ) is also cited.

1924By doing this he in effect vouched for his reliability and credibility, and thereafter, even though he was called by the other side, he could not give evidence to impeach him.” (Hiscock, J., in Carlisle v. Norris, 215 N. Y. 400, 409 .) While it may be urged with some degree of force that a party does not by calling a witness upon one point vouch for him on every point without knowing what he may say when the adverse party calls him, it logically follows that one should not be permitted to say in one breath, “ the witness speaks truthfully for me and, by reason of his bad character, is not to b

1937Corp., 230 App. Div. 332 ) and permitted contributions between joint tort feasors.

1931In Haines v. Bero Engineering Construction Corp. (supra) the court says: “ The legislative purpose in the enactment of section 211-a was to modify the ancient rule of law (See Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns.

1932Co. ( 173 Mo. 249 ), to the effect: “ It does not lie in the mouth of such a plaintiff to say he had no cause of action against the one who paid him for his injuries, for the law presumes that the one who paid committed the trespass and occasioned the whole injury.” The court also cited, with approval, the language of Brown v. City of Cambridge ( 85 Mass. 474 ), to the effect: “ It is an ancient doctrine that a release to one joint trespasser or a satisfaction from him discharges the whole. * * * The same doctrine applies to all joint torts and to torts for which the injured party has an elect

1913Co. ( 173 Mo. 249, 256 ): “ It does not lie in the mouth of such a plaintiff to say he had no cause of action against the one who paid him for his injuries for the law presumes that the one who paid committed the trespass and occasioned the whole injury. ” The same principle is thus expressed in Brown v. City of Cambridge ( 85 Mass. 474, 476 ): “It is an ancient doctrine that a release to one joint trespasser or a satisfaction from him discharges the whole. * * * The same doctrine applies to all joint torts and to torts for which the injured party has an election to sue one or more parties sev

1927As is said in People v. Cignarale ( 110 N. Y. 23, 30 ): “ The doctrine that a man once tried and convicted, or acquitted of a crime on a valid indictment by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be tried again for the same offense has its foundation in the principles of justice and is a very ancient doctrine of the common law.

1911It is embodied in that provision of the Constitution of our State (article 1, section 6) which declares that 1 no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.’ In the application of this constitutional principle, it is well settled that an acquittal or conviction by verdict of a jury, although not followed by judgment or sentence, is an acquittal or conviction which protects an accused person against another trial, provided there was a competent court and a lawful indictment, or, in case of conviction, so long as the judgment remains unreversed.” (People v. Cignara

1917(Rowell v. Janvrin, 151 N. Y. 60, 66 .) Here the statute clearly limits the requirement for a license to persons who are not the owners or lessees of farm land and in possession of the same, and if the defendant was in fact the owner or lessee of farm land on which he was hunting, and in possession of the same, he was not bound to have a license at all, and he could not be subject to the penalty prescribed.

1905The rule of pleading applicable to an action of this character is clearly stated in Rowell v. Janvrin, 151 N. Y. 60, 66 , as follows: “In stating a cause of action arising upon a statute, it is an ancient rule that where an exception is incorporated in the body of the clause of a statute, he who pleads the cause ought to plead the exception * * *.

1912The authorities bearing upon this modern relaxation of the ancient rule were very succinctly, yet comprehensively, reviewed by Judge HAIGHT in the case of Gilbert v. Finch ( 173 N.Y. 455 , 466 ), and the conclusion of this court was thus stated in the closing paragraph of the opinion in that case: "It thus appears that the decisions of this court are in accord with the English rule and in harmony with our statute in reference to joint debtors.

1912The authorities bearing upon this modem relaxation of the ancient rule were very succinctly, yet comprehensively, reviewed by Judge Haight in the case of Gilbert v. Finch ( 173 N. Y. 455, 466 ), and the conclusion of this court was thus stated in the closing paragraph of the opinion in that case: “It thus appears that the decisions of this court are in accord with the English rule and in harmony with our statute in reference to joint debtors.

1903McLaughlin v. Police Commissioners ( 174 N. Y. 450 ), where the previous decisions in this state are quite exhaustively reviewed and discussed, and the following statement of the general rule is quoted with approval: “ The proceeding by quo warranto is the proper and appropriate remedy for trying and determining the title *438 to a public office, and of ascertaining who is entitled to hold it; of obtaining possession of an office to which one has been legally elected and has become duly qualified to hold, and also of removing an incumbent who has. usurped it, or who claims it by an invalid ele

1903McLaughlin v. Police Commissioners, 174 N. Y. 450 , and Greene v. Knox and others, decided in the Court of Appeals on June 25, 1903, 175 N. Y. 432 ; have reaffirmed the ancient rule that title to an office must be determined by a proceeding instituted upon information in the nature of a quo warranto or, under present practice, by the Code equivalent of a direct action instituted by the Attorney-General.

1889In Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473 ,13 N. E.

1889In the Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber ( 106 N. Y. 473 * ), it was held that “ a party may legally purchase the trade and business of another for the very purpose of preventing competition, and the validity of the contract, if supported by a consideration, will depend upon its reasonableness as between the parties.” It was also held that a restraint of trade was not general, but partial, though covering the whole country with the exception of Nevada and Montana.

2020Nugent v Board of Police Commissioners, 114 NY 245 , 250–251 [1889]; Stewart v Stone, 127 NY 500, 507 [1891]; Hirshfeld v Fitzgerald, 157 NY 166, 185 [1898]; In re Scott’s Will, 8 NY2d 419 , 426–427 [1960]; McKinney’s Cons Laws of New York Statutes § 141 [“The court will not interpret a statute to require an impossibility”]).

2020Nugent v Board of Police Commissioners, 114 NY 245 , 250–251 [1889]; Stewart v Stone, 127 NY 500, 507 [1891]; Hirshfeld v Fitzgerald, 157 NY 166, 185 [1898]; In re Scott’s Will, 8 NY2d 419 , 426–427 [1960]; McKinney’s Cons Laws of New York Statutes § 141 [“The court will not interpret a statute to require an impossibility”]).