ancient rule in Connecticut

2000This ancient principle allows relief because "[i]n reason, in conscience, in natural equity, there is no ground to say because a man has stipulated for a penalty in case of his omission to do a particular act (the real object of the parties being the performance of the act), that if he omits to do the act he shall suffer an enormous loss wholly disproportionate to the injury to the other party." The "penalty" is the forfeiture of the leasehold, imposed for "omission to do a particular act," that is, to pay rent; if the payment may be secured without a forfeiture, equity will not permit a forfe

2000This ancient principle allows relief because "[i]n reason, in conscience, in natural equity, there is no ground to say because a man has stipulated for a penalty in case of his omission to do a particular act (the real object of the parties being the performance of the act), that if he omits to do the act he shall suffer an enormous loss wholly disproportionate to the injury to the other party." The "penalty" is the forfeiture of the leasehold, imposed for "omission to do a particular act, " that is, to pay rent; if the payment may be secured without a forfeiture, equity will not permit a forf

1996The ancient rule has always been that the debt sought to be set off had to be for a liquidated amount, Palmer v. Green, 6 Conn. 14 , 19 (1825), Lippit v. Thames Loan Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185 , 199 (1914).

1993Palmer v. Green, 6 Conn. 14 , 19 (1825); Lippitt v. Thames Loan Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185 , 199 (1914); General Consolidated Ltd. v. Rudnick Sons, Inc., 41 Conn. Cir. Ct. 581 , 586 (1967).

1996The ancient rule has always been that the debt sought to be set off had to be for a liquidated amount, Palmer v. Green, 6 Conn. 14 , 19 (1825), Lippit v. Thames Loan Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185 , 199 (1914).

1993Palmer v. Green, 6 Conn. 14 , 19 (1825); Lippitt v. Thames Loan Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185 , 199 (1914); General Consolidated Ltd. v. Rudnick Sons, Inc., 41 Conn. Cir. Ct. 581 , 586 (1967).

2009Ed. 2d 438 (1997), quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 , 14 S. Ct. 548 , 38 L.

2009Ed. 2d 438 (1997), quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 , 14 S. Ct. 548 , 38 L.

2009An ancient principle of the common law is that “the title in the soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high water mark ... is held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 , 117 S. Ct. 2028 , 138 L.

2009An ancient principle of the common law is that “the title in the soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high water mark ... is held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 , 117 S. Ct. 2028 , 138 L.

2002Holbrook v. Judd, 1 Root 456 (1792); see New Haven Water Co. v. Russell, 86 Conn. 361 , 366-67 , 85 A. 636 (1912); Hoyt v. Seeley, 18 Conn. 353 , 357-58 (1847); Woodford v. Webster, 3 Day 472, 475 (1809); Olmsted v. Doty, 2 Root 184 , 185 (1795).

2002Holbrook v. Judd, 1 Root 456 (1792); see New Haven Water Co. v. Russell, 86 Conn. 361 , 366-67 , 85 A. 636 (1912); Hoyt v. Seeley, 18 Conn. 353 , 357-58 (1847); Woodford v. Webster, 3 Day 472, 475 (1809); Olmsted v. Doty, 2 Root 184 , 185 (1795).

1998Story, supra, § 1728.

1996There have been limited exceptions carved out from the general rule, Hubley Mfg Supply Co. v. Ives, 81 Conn. 244 , 247 (1908) (suit by foreign corporation on debt in foreign state) Sullivan v. Merchants National Bank, 108 Conn. 497 , 501 (1928) (set off allowed on unliquidated debt where plaintiff insolvent; court suggested exceptions shouldn't be confined to suits by out of state or insolvent plaintiffs but such set offs can be allowed for "an equivalent equity", Id. p. 503.

1996There have been limited exceptions carved out from the general rule, Hubley Mfg Supply Co. v. Ives, 81 Conn. 244 , 247 (1908) (suit by foreign corporation on debt in foreign state) Sullivan v. Merchants National Bank, 108 Conn. 497 , 501 (1928) (set off allowed on unliquidated debt where plaintiff insolvent; court suggested exceptions shouldn't be confined to suits by out of state or insolvent plaintiffs but such set offs can be allowed for "an equivalent equity", Id. p. 503.

1994Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623 , 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

1994Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623 , 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

1990A written agreement or memorandum thereof is an ancient requirement; Tainter v. Brockway, 1 Root 59 (1773); and whether the writing is sufficient to satisfy the statute has been the subject of infinite litigation.

1988The plaintiffs have appealed, presenting as the principal issue whether this court should abandon or modify the ancient doctrine that “[n]o right of way appurtenant can be created without a dominant as well as a servient estate” and that “[t]he way can become legally attached to the dominant estate only if the same person has unity of title to both the way and the dominant estate.” Curtin v. Franchetti, 156 Conn. 387, 389 , 242 A.2d 725 (1968).

1988The plaintiffs have appealed, presenting as the principal issue whether this court should abandon or modify the ancient doctrine that “[n]o right of way appurtenant can be created without a dominant as well as a servient estate” and that “[t]he way can become legally attached to the dominant estate only if the same person has unity of title to both the way and the dominant estate.” Curtin v. Franchetti, 156 Conn. 387, 389 , 242 A.2d 725 (1968).

1981Id.

1973There is authority that implied regulatory powers "do not extend to the adoption of a rule abrogating the ancient rule ... [of nonassignability]." City of Richmond v. Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 108 , 122 S.E.2d 895 . [5] The rights of workmen's compensation insurers are set out in detail in General Statutes § 31-293, which commences with the provision: "When any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer a legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee may

1973There is authority that implied regulatory powers "do not extend to the adoption of a rule abrogating the ancient rule ... [of nonassignability]." City of Richmond v. Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 108 , 122 S.E.2d 895 . [5] The rights of workmen's compensation insurers are set out in detail in General Statutes § 31-293, which commences with the provision: "When any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer a legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee may

1947By way of illustration, it has been said that *509 “It is a very ancient rule of the common law, that an entry upon land to save goods which are in jeopardy of being lost or destroyed by water, fire, or any like danger, is not a trespass.” Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376, 377 ; see 52 Am.

1929He was liable to prosecution as if he were the principal offender, under § 6716 of the General Statutes, which reads as follows: “Every person who shall assist, abet, counsel, cause, hire or command another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.” In State v. Levy, 103 Conn. 138 , 130 Atl. 96 , we point out that this statute merely perpetuates the ancient principle that one who participates in any offense is hable to the same punishment as the principal offender.

1929He was liable to prosecution as if he were the principal offender, under § 6716 of the General Statutes, which reads as follows: “Every person who shall assist, abet, counsel, cause, hire or command another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.” In State v. Levy, 103 Conn. 138 , 130 Atl. 96 , we point out that this statute merely perpetuates the ancient principle that one who participates in any offense is hable to the same punishment as the principal offender.

1926Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 10 Mass. 225 .

1877Starkie, in a note to his work on Evidence, Vol. 1, p. 169, says, “A juror can not be examined and sifted as to the grounds of his verdict; the ancient rule of law was otherwise.” In Manny v. Harris, however, ( 2 Johns., 24 ,) Kent, C.

1854R., 51; Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East, 92; Wise v. Wilcox, 1 Day, 22 ; Vernon v. Keyes, 12 East, 632; Upton v. Vail, 6 Johns., 182 ; Galagher v. Brunel, 6 Cowen, 346; 1 Sw.

1830The same court, in Fleckner v. The Bank of the United States, determined, that the endorsement of a promissory note, by the cashier of a Bank, authorized by vote, was obligatory on the corporation. 8 Wheat.

1830Rep. 326; and in The Bank of Columbia v. Patterson’s administrator, 7 Cranch, 299 ., it was held, in opposition to the ancient rule, and in view of its manifest inconvenience, that all parol contracts made by the agents of the corporation, are express promises of the corporation; and that all duties imposed upon it by law. and all benefits conferred at its request, raise implied promises, on which it is liable.