21 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sublettgreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006); Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820, 820 (Fla. 1989). ¶46 In Sublett , however, this court held that the availability of the defense of diminished capacity in Washington, but not in the foreign jurisdiction, does not prevent two crimes from being “comparable.” 176 Wn.2d at 88-89 . 2015In Sublett, however, this court held that the availability of the defense of diminished capacity in Washington, but not in the foreign jurisdiction, does not prevent two crimes from being "comparable." 176 Wn.2d at 88-89 (plurality opinion). | 1 | 2 |
Curtis v. Leingreen1 sentence2017See generally Curtis v. Lein, 169 Wn.2d 884, 888-89 , 239 P.3d 1078 (2010) (calling the cause of action for injuries sustained in falling through a dock on another’s property “a negligence suit” and “a premises liability suit”). | 1 | 1 |
Curtis v. Leingreen1 sentence2017See generally Curtis v. Lein, 169 Wn.2d 884, 888-89 , 239 P.3d 1078 (2010) (calling the cause of action for injuries sustained in falling through a dock on another’s property “a negligence suit” and “a premises liability suit”). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006); Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820, 820 (Fla. 1989). ¶46 In Sublett , however, this court held that the availability of the defense of diminished capacity in Washington, but not in the foreign jurisdiction, does not prevent two crimes from being “comparable.” 176 Wn.2d at 88-89 . | 1 | 1 |
Chestnut v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006); Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820, 820 (Fla. 1989). ¶46 In Sublett , however, this court held that the availability of the defense of diminished capacity in Washington, but not in the foreign jurisdiction, does not prevent two crimes from being “comparable.” 176 Wn.2d at 88-89 . | 1 | 1 |
Will v. Hallockgreen2 sentences2011Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)): accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ("The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not `clearly established'; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential." (citations omitted)). ¶ 22 Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil li 2011Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)): accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ("The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not `clearly established'; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential." (citations omitted)). ¶ 22 Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil li | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Rodegreen2 sentences2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. 2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. | 1 | 1 |
Kucera v. Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. | 1 | 1 |
Spry v. Millergreen2 sentences2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. 2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. | 1 | 1 |
Expert Drywall, Inc. v. Braingreen2 sentences2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. 2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. | 1 | 1 |
Springer v. Rosauergreen2 sentences2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. 2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. | 1 | 1 |
Kucera v. State, Dept. of Transp.green1 sentence2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. | 1 | 1 |
Estill v. Sisters of Charitygreen2 sentences1982But in any case, the later decision of the Washington Supreme Court in In re Estate of Reilly, 78 Wash.2d 623, 647, 663-64 , 479 P.2d 1, 8, 15, 24-25 (1970), has severely limited the availability of the presumption of undue influence. 1982But in any case, the later decision of the Washington Supreme Court in In re Estate of Reilly, 78 Wash.2d 623, 647, 663-64 , 479 P.2d 1, 8, 15, 24-25 (1970), has severely limited the availability of the presumption of undue influence. | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Bursongreen2 sentences1972See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 , 29 L. 1972See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 , 29 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the Personal Restraint of Benn
green
2 sentences2026Restraint of Benn, the Washington Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant did not have the right to be present during a continuance hearing because the hearing 15 No. 59926-1-II did not involve the presentation of evidence, decisions about the admissibility of evidence, or the availability of a defense or theory of the case. 134 Wn.2d 868, 920 , 952 P.2d 116 (1998). 2019The court reasoned that the continuance motion “involved no presentation of evidence, nor was the purpose of the hearing on the motion to determine the admissibility of evidence or the availability of a defense or theory of the case.” Benn, 134 Wn.2d at 920 . | 2 | 2019–2026 |
Matter of Personal Restraint of Benn
green
2 sentences2026Restraint of Benn, the Washington Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant did not have the right to be present during a continuance hearing because the hearing 15 No. 59926-1-II did not involve the presentation of evidence, decisions about the admissibility of evidence, or the availability of a defense or theory of the case. 134 Wn.2d 868, 920 , 952 P.2d 116 (1998). 2019It reasoned that his absence did not affect his opportunity to defend the charge - 21 - No. 77515-4-1/22 because the motion "involved no presentation of evidence, nor was the purpose of the hearing . . . to determine the admissibility of evidence or the availability of a defense or theory of the case." Id. | 2 | 2019–2026 |
Bennett v. Hardy
green
2 sentences2014We assume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine of implied cause of action, which is that the legislature "would not enact a statute granting rights to an identifiable class without enabling members of that class to enforce those rights." Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 919-21 . 2014We assume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine of implied cause of action, which is that the legislature “would not enact a statute granting rights to an identifiable class without enabling members of that class to enforce those rights.” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 919-21 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Bauer
neutral
2 sentences2014Bauer, 174 Wn. 2014Bauer, 174 Wn. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Mitchell v. Forsyth
green
2 sentences2011Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)): accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ("The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not `clearly established'; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential." (citations omitted)). ¶ 22 Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil li 2011Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)): accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ("The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not `clearly established'; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential." (citations omitted)). ¶ 22 Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil li | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Pearson v. Callahan
green
2 sentences2011Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)): accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ("The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not `clearly established'; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential." (citations omitted)). ¶ 22 Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil li 2011Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)): accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ("The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not `clearly established'; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential." (citations omitted)). ¶ 22 Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil li | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Hunter v. Bryant
green
2 sentences2011Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)): accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ("The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not `clearly established'; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential." (citations omitted)). ¶ 22 Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil li 2011Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)): accord Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ("The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not `clearly established'; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential." (citations omitted)). ¶ 22 Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil li | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Murphy v. Campbell Investment Co.
green
2 sentences2001This amendment did not affect the availability of the doctrine in court actions under RCW 18.27.080. 79 Wn.2d 417 , 486 P.2d 1080 (1971). 2001This amendment did not affect the availability of the doctrine in court actions under RCW 18.27.080. 79 Wn.2d 417 , 486 P.2d 1080 (1971). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
In Re GAULT
green
2 sentences1987Our consideration of the unique character and purpose of juvenile proceedings is not precluded by the statement in Gault that "the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked ..." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 , 18 L. 1987Our consideration of the unique character and purpose of juvenile proceedings is not precluded by the statement in Gault that "the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked ..." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 , 18 L. | 2 | 1976–1987 |
State v. Smith
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 590-91, 31 P.3d 1222 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Nuttall v. Dowell
green
2 sentences2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. 2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
B.A. Van De Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County
neutral
2 sentences2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. 2001Van de Grift, Inc. v. Skagit County, 59 Wash. App. 545, 550 , 800 P.2d 375 (1990) (substantial compliance argument fails in the absence of public liability insurance). [22] Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 . [23] Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash.App. 98, 108 , 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 1941, ch. 252. [24] Springer v. Rosauer, 31 Wash.App. 418, 421 , 641 P.2d 1216 (1982). [25] We reject the argument that Calibre, a "sophisticated builder," is not a member of the public protected by the statute. [26] 25 Wash.App. 741 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980). [27] Spry, 25 Wash.App. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1981Ed. 2d 694 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1977), the Supreme Court, when requiring law enforcement officers to advise suspects of their pretrial rights, stated: The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. 1981Ed. 2d 694 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1977), the Supreme Court, when requiring law enforcement officers to advise suspects of their pretrial rights, stated: The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Carraway v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1966The availability of the doctrine of unavoidable accident on retrial becomes dubious, for, as we said in Carraway v. Johnson, 63 Wn.2d 212 , 386 P.2d 420 (1963), it is *610 only when the accident appears to have been caused by a child too young to be charged with contributory negligence that the accident may be considered unavoidable within the contemplation of that doctrine. 1966The availability of the doctrine of unavoidable accident on retrial becomes dubious, for, as we said in Carraway v. Johnson, 63 Wn.2d 212 , 386 P.2d 420 (1963), it is *610 only when the accident appears to have been caused by a child too young to be charged with contributory negligence that the accident may be considered unavoidable within the contemplation of that doctrine. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.