availability immunity in West Virginia

2021We stated that “[a]n interlocutory order would be subject to appeal under [the collateral order] doctrine if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed controversy, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 12 its qualified immunity ruling if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the availability of that defense.” Id.

2021We stated that “[a]n interlocutory order would be subject to appeal under [the collateral order] doctrine if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed controversy, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 12 its qualified immunity ruling if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the availability of that defense.” Id.

2015Although this appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss, we find that our rationale in Robinson is applicable to this case because “[any] ruling denying the availability of immunity fully resolves the issue of a litigant’s obligation to participate in litigation.” Id., 223 W.Va. at 832 , 679 S.E.2d at 664 .

2015Although this appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss, we find that our rationale in Robinson is applicable to this case because “[any] ruling denying the availability of immunity fully resolves the issue of a litigant’s obligation to participate in litigation.” Id., 223 W.Va. at 832 , 679 S.E.2d at 664 .

2013As to the second faetor[,] which focuses on whether the immunity ruling resolves significant issues separate from the merits, there is little question that the “claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiffs claim that his [or her] rights have been violated.” Id. at 527-28 ,105 S.Ct. [at 2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 ].

2013As to the second faetor[,] which focuses on whether the immunity ruling resolves significant issues separate from the merits, there is little question that the “claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiffs claim that his [or her] rights have been violated.” Id. at 527-28 ,105 S.Ct. [at 2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 ].

2006Expressly citing the adoption of West Virginia Code § 23-4-1f, which exempts mental-mental claims from being compensable injuries, this Court emphasized in Messer that the Legislature intended that certain work-related injuries and diseases are outside the meaning of the term "injury." Concluding that the extension of immunity to employers under West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 is controlled by the definition of the term "injury," the Court in Messer found that the "list of work-related injuries exempted from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act" (expressly referencing mental-mental clai

2006Expressly citing the adoption of West Virginia Code § 23-4-1f, which exempts mental-mental claims from being compensable injuries, this Court emphasized in Messer that the Legislature intended that certain work-related injuries and diseases are outside the meaning of the term "injury." Concluding that the extension of immunity to employers under West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 is controlled by the definition of the term "injury," the Court in Messer found that the "list of work-related injuries exempted from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act" (expressly referencing mental-mental clai

1990Co., 279 U.S. 377 , 49 S.Ct. 355 , 73 L.Ed. 747 (1929) ], the [.Missouri ex rel.

1990Co., 279 U.S. 377 , 49 S.Ct. 355 , 73 L.Ed. 747 (1929) ], the [.Missouri ex rel.

1989In the course of discussing the assumption of risk doctrine, we stated in note 11 of Pack, 177 W.Va. at 491 , 354 S.E.2d at 587 : “The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1989In the course of discussing the assumption of risk doctrine, we stated in note 11 of Pack, 177 W.Va. at 491 , 354 S.E.2d at 587 : “The parties do not raise and, therefore, we do not address the question of whether in view of our comparative negligence law established in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332 , 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), there is a need to retain the doctrine of assumption of risk.

1989In Pack v. Van Meter, 177 W.Va. 485 , 354 S.E.2d 581 (1986), we limited the availability of the defense of assumption of risk where the defendant had breached a duty imposed by a statutory safety scheme.

1989In Pack v. Van Meter, 177 W.Va. 485 , 354 S.E.2d 581 (1986), we limited the availability of the defense of assumption of risk where the defendant had breached a duty imposed by a statutory safety scheme.