availability privilege in Colorado

13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
Rogers v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1951 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (A witness “cannot invoke the privilege where response to the specific question in issue . . . would not further incriminate her.”); Wilson v. United States, 558 A.2d 1135, 1141 (D.C. 1989) (“[A] witness may invoke the privilege only as to those specific questions to which his answers would incriminate him.”), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331 (D.C. 1996). ¶ 33 Thus, the determination of whether to invoke the privilege must be made on a question-by-question basis.	1	1
Wilson v. United Statesgreen dc · 1989 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (A witness “cannot invoke the privilege where response to the specific question in issue . . . would not further incriminate her.”); Wilson v. United States, 558 A.2d 1135, 1141 (D.C. 1989) (“[A] witness may invoke the privilege only as to those specific questions to which his answers would incriminate him.”), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331 (D.C. 1996). ¶ 33 Thus, the determination of whether to invoke the privilege must be made on a question-by-question basis.	1	1
New York v. Hillgreen scotus · 2000 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 , 120 S.Ct. 659 , 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). 2008See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 , 120 S.Ct. 659 , 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000).	1	1
In re Malonegreen nyappdiv · 1984 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See In Re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455 , 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 607 (1984); In Re Friedman, 76 Ill.2d 392 , 30 Ill.Dec. 288 , 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (1979). 2001See In Re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455 , 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 607 (1984); In Re Friedman, 76 Ill.2d 392 , 30 Ill.Dec. 288 , 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (1979).	1	1
In Re Friedmangreen ill · 1979 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See In Re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455 , 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 607 (1984); In Re Friedman, 76 Ill.2d 392 , 30 Ill.Dec. 288 , 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (1979). 2001See In Re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455 , 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 607 (1984); In Re Friedman, 76 Ill.2d 392 , 30 Ill.Dec. 288 , 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (1979).	1	1
cluster 665864green ca10 · 1994 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 1 sentence 1997See Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 1394 (D.Colo.1991), aff'd, 19 F.3d 533 (10th Cir.1994); Rosales v. AT & T Info.	1	1
Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.green cod · 1991 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 1 sentence 1997See Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 1394 (D.Colo.1991), aff'd, 19 F.3d 533 (10th Cir.1994); Rosales v. AT & T Info.	1	1
Lybarger v. Peoplegreen colo · 1991 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 2 sentences 1995Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 579 (Colo.1991) ("[T]he question of the availability of the defense is for the court and not the jury...." (emphasis supplied)) Second, if the court determines that the defense is legally available for assertion as a defense to the crime charged, it must next be determined whether there has been sufficient evidence presented to raise a factual issue as to the existence of the defense. 1995Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 579 (Colo.1991) (“[T]he question of the availability of the defense is for the court and not the jury_” (emphasis supplied)) Second, if the court determines that the defense is legally available for assertion as a defense to the crime charged, it must next be determined whether there has been sufficient evidence presented to raise a factual issue as to the existence of the defense.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

Case	Negative	Cited
United States v. Eid Hammad, A/K/A Eddie Hammad, and Taiseer Hammadgreen ca2 · 1988 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001But See, United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir.1988). [7] Although the facts in Reichman reveal that the attorney deceived a court, the basis of the Court's conclusion that he engaged in ethical misconduct is premised upon the deceit, not the party deceived. [8] Once a violation is determined, however, the effect of the misconduct may become relevant in determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed. [9] Both Illinois and New York courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the availability of the defense of "justification" to alleged violations of the rules of professio	1	1

Also cited on this issue (17)

Case	Cited	Years
Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. green colo · 1991 2 sentences 1995Smith Harvestore Products, 819 P.2d 69 (Colo.1991). 1995Smith Harvestore Products, 819 P.2d 69 (Colo.1991).	2	1995–1995
In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation green ilnd · 1978 2 sentences 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa.1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.Ill.1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D.Ill.1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir.1976); cf. Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D.Del.1975) (minority shareholder sought disclosure of communications between controlling shareholder, which was a corporation, and its counsel). 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa. 1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.	2	1984–1984
Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc. green paed · 1978 2 sentences 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa.1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.Ill.1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D.Ill.1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir.1976); cf. Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D.Del.1975) (minority shareholder sought disclosure of communications between controlling shareholder, which was a corporation, and its counsel). 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa. 1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.	2	1984–1984
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. green ilnd · 1978 2 sentences 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa.1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.Ill.1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D.Ill.1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir.1976); cf. Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D.Del.1975) (minority shareholder sought disclosure of communications between controlling shareholder, which was a corporation, and its counsel). 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa. 1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.	2	1984–1984
In re LTV Securities Litigation green txnd · 1981 2 sentences 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa.1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.Ill.1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D.Ill.1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir.1976); cf. Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D.Del.1975) (minority shareholder sought disclosure of communications between controlling shareholder, which was a corporation, and its counsel). 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa. 1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.	2	1984–1984
cluster 291747 green ca1 · 1970 2 sentences 1984But where the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stock holders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance.! 5 ! 430 F.2d at 1103-04 . 6 Other courts have adopted the holding in Garner. 1984But where the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders *6 to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance. [5] 430 F.2d at 1103-04 . [6] Other courts have adopted the holding in Garner .	2	1984–1984
Carter v. United States green dc · 1996 1 sentence 2021See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (A witness “cannot invoke the privilege where response to the specific question in issue . . . would not further incriminate her.”); Wilson v. United States, 558 A.2d 1135, 1141 (D.C. 1989) (“[A] witness may invoke the privilege only as to those specific questions to which his answers would incriminate him.”), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331 (D.C. 1996). ¶ 33 Thus, the determination of whether to invoke the privilege must be made on a question-by-question basis.	1	2021–2021
Peretz v. United States green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 2008In reliance on the general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, see United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-201 , 115 S.Ct. 797 , 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995), of even the most basic rights of criminal defendants, see Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 , 111 S.Ct. 2661 , 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991); and the court's determination that the IAD contemplates a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability; the Supreme Court had earlier found a valid waiver of the time limits of Article III from nothing more than defense counsel's agreement t 2008In reliance on the general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, see United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-201 , 115 S.Ct. 797 , 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995), of even the most basic rights of criminal defendants, see Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 , 111 S.Ct. 2661 , 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991); and the court's determination that the IAD contemplates a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability; the Supreme Court had earlier found a valid waiver of the time limits of Article III from nothing more than defense counsel's agreement t	1	2008–2008
United States v. Mezzanatto green scotus · 1995 2 sentences 2008In reliance on the general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, see United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-201 , 115 S.Ct. 797 , 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995), of even the most basic rights of criminal defendants, see Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 , 111 S.Ct. 2661 , 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991); and the court's determination that the IAD contemplates a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability; the Supreme Court had earlier found a valid waiver of the time limits of Article III from nothing more than defense counsel's agreement t 2008In reliance on the general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, see United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-201 , 115 S.Ct. 797 , 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995), of even the most basic rights of criminal defendants, see Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 , 111 S.Ct. 2661 , 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991); and the court's determination that the IAD contemplates a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability; the Supreme Court had earlier found a valid waiver of the time limits of Article III from nothing more than defense counsel's agreement t	1	2008–2008
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 1995I also agree that, on this record, the presumption of reliance in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 , 92 S.Ct. 1456 , 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972), is inapplicable, and that this court need not address the availability of the doctrine of fraud-created-the-market. 1995I also agree that, on this record, the presumption of reliance in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 , 92 S.Ct. 1456 , 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972), is inapplicable, and that this court need not address the availability of the doctrine of fraud-created-the-market.	1	1995–1995
Miranda v. Arizona green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1990The trial court, however, adequately considered the defendant's status as an on-duty police officer and determined that a reasonable person in the defendant's position "would consider himself deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way." Contrary to the majority, I do not view the trial court's ultimate conclusion as inconsistent with or unsupported by its evidentiary findings of fact. 1338 The Supreme Court made it abundantly clear in Miranda that the privilege against self incrimination is so fundamental to our constitutional scheme and the expedient of giving a warning as to the 1990The trial court, however, adequately considered the defendant's status as an on-duty police officer and determined that a reasonable person in the defendant's position "would consider himself deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way." Contrary to the majority, I do not view the trial court's ultimate conclusion as inconsistent with or unsupported by its evidentiary findings of fact. 1338 The Supreme Court made it abundantly clear in Miranda that the privilege against self incrimination is so fundamental to our constitutional scheme and the expedient of giving a warning as to the	1	1990–1990
Converse v. Zinke green colo · 1981 2 sentences 1986Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.1981). 1986Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.1981).	1	1986–1986
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc. green ilnd · 1972 1 sentence 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa.1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.Ill.1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D.Ill.1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir.1976); cf. Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D.Del.1975) (minority shareholder sought disclosure of communications between controlling shareholder, which was a corporation, and its counsel).	1	1984–1984
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc. green ded · 1975 1 sentence 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa.1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.Ill.1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D.Ill.1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir.1976); cf. Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D.Del.1975) (minority shareholder sought disclosure of communications between controlling shareholder, which was a corporation, and its counsel).	1	1984–1984
Bailey v. Meister Brau green ca7 · 1976 1 sentence 1984In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.Tex.1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D.Ill.1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa.1978); In Re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D.Ill.1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D.Ill.1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir.1976); cf. Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D.Del.1975) (minority shareholder sought disclosure of communications between controlling shareholder, which was a corporation, and its counsel).	1	1984–1984
Wright v. Creative Corporation green coloctapp · 1972 2 sentences 1973While we have acknowledged the availability of this doctrine under the law of this state and have given it tacit approval, see Ford Motor v. Conrardy, 29 Colo.App. 577 , 488 P.2d 219 , and Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo.App. 575 , 498 P.2d 1179 , we have not heretofore delineated its principles and applied them to a specific fact situation. 1973While we have acknowledged the availability of this doctrine under the law of this state and have given it tacit approval, see Ford Motor v. Conrardy, 29 Colo.App. 577 , 488 P.2d 219 , and Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo.App. 575 , 498 P.2d 1179 , we have not heretofore delineated its principles and applied them to a specific fact situation.	1	1973–1973
Ford Motor Company v. Conrardy green coloctapp · 1971 2 sentences 1973While we have acknowledged the availability of this doctrine under the law of this state and have given it tacit approval, see Ford Motor v. Conrardy, 29 Colo.App. 577 , 488 P.2d 219 , and Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo.App. 575 , 498 P.2d 1179 , we have not heretofore delineated its principles and applied them to a specific fact situation. 1973While we have acknowledged the availability of this doctrine under the law of this state and have given it tacit approval, see Ford Motor v. Conrardy, 29 Colo.App. 577 , 488 P.2d 219 , and Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo.App. 575 , 498 P.2d 1179 , we have not heretofore delineated its principles and applied them to a specific fact situation.	1	1973–1973

Where else courts name it

NY 129 (1892–2026) PA 101 (1947–2026) CA 74 (1938–2026) CT 49 (1947–2024) FL 38 (1916–2023) NJ 35 (1930–2024) TX 32 (1920–2023) MI 30 (1951–2023) OH 28 (1985–2025) IL 27 (1912–2026) IN 27 (1978–2026) AL 26 (1913–2025) OR 22 (1951–2023) WA 21 (1966–2026) MA 19 (1975–2020) DE 19 (1957–2025) MD 19 (1962–2026) MN 19 (1953–2026) VT 16 (1963–2024) IA 15 (1975–2023) NC 14 (1941–2020) KS 13 (1961–2024) CO 13 (1973–2021) DC 13 (1973–2026) WI 11 (1957–2025) VA 11 (1956–2024) TN 11 (1987–2024) LA 11 (1971–2017) MT 11 (1976–2018) WY 10 (1972–2010) WV 10 (1989–2021) MO 10 (1970–2023) ME 9 (1977–2022) UT 9 (1982–2022) NM 9 (1978–2020) GA 8 (1994–2020) RI 8 (1937–2007) NH 7 (1979–2007) AR 6 (1972–2021) AZ 6 (1962–2016) HI 5 (1962–2023) ID 4 (1961–2025) SC 4 (1951–2007) NE 3 (1947–2014) KY 3 (2017–2024) SD 3 (1981–2020) NV 3 (1994–2011) OK 2 (2014–2014) AK 2 (1980–1992)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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